

JAVA COLLAPSE FROM FORCED LABOR TO LAPINDO MUDFLOW

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Foreword

The earth needs balance to be able to support the harmonious and sustainable chain of life. Furthermore basically the natural system prevails in this universe is able to meet human needs in a balanced manner. Problem occurs when the human desire to exploit the earth is beyond its carrying capacity to keep itself balanced. Then what happen next is damage and destruction.

The declining quality of human life and earth capacity negatively impact the interaction of both. This triggers the threat and vulnerability on the community and will eventually leads to multidimensional disaster and crisis.

The continuous and interconnected crises on ecology, social, economic and politics are results of the operation of a system of a political economy order which puts the earth and everything in it as commodities. Such political economy system is oriented towards market interest and capital accumulation. Therefore it negates the balance of ecological and socio-cultural aspects. It has destroyed the earlier local systems, norms, and values, which were indeed more capable of ensuring the safety, well-being, and sustainability of a balanced living order.

Regional infrastructure projects at various scales have been always aiming to gain profit for all actors involved in the whole chains. Yet it gives little to none benefits to the local residents and communities. The case studies in this Java Collapse book are plainly portraying the development and expansion of regional infrastructure projects under the banner of community prosperity and welfare. However only a handful of elite circle who enjoys the benefits. The prosperity of the elite is built on misery of the community with their blood and lives.

To achieve the prosperity, creative destructive actions became part of Java development process. The change on living system is performed on a large scale by dredging the Java's wealth with high costs. Therefore, the actors' responses to the declining of profit

limit is (always) directly affecting the reform of power, production, consumption and local natural landscape governance with the community as its permanent victims.

The entire processes make the community continue to subsidize the elite group until today. People actually realize that the state has never given the benefit of their subsidy (taxes) that they have paid. The people have lost their social memory after experiencing an extreme environmental change due to development interventions. This condition is never taken into account in the development itself. Risk and cost of industrialization process (business external factors) are never accounting the burdens or costs bear by the local community and environment.

Domestic industry paradigm remains in rent-seekers character. Although it is a strategic sector with high risk, high capital and high technology, just like the non-strategic industrial sector. Oil and gas industry, which is classified as a strategic sector, is never involving the regional officials in its business planning.

Industrialization (apparently) does not develop in a well planned manner and always collide with spatial planning in every region. The impact of disasters caused by industries has always sacrificing the community. The regional officials recognized the fact that the state is powerless to respond the disaster.

This book interprets several points about safety and welfare of the community, community resilience to survive and to improve their quality of life, and sustainability of the environmental nature. The process of writing has been delayed for two years due to various reasons, yet with the support of various parties, this book is eventually published.

The Java Collapse book is expected to be a reference for a variety of advocacy actions, both case by case and systemic ones; to sue public policy and unequal administration structure. In other words, environmental issue is no longer being an exclusive issue. But it becomes mainstream topics in in debates on the role of state in ensuring the fulfillment of

citizens' needs' and protection of public interest. Equally important, it becomes an effective reference to formulate alternative concepts on state policy in managing the region, in Java or in other islands.

In turn, the appropriate policy intervention could potentially triggered public awareness to start demanding state responsibility in ensuring the fulfillment of people safety, prosperity and productivity. At the same time it is also ensuring sustainability of environmental services.

For the publishing of this book we would like to thank the victimized communities who shares extraordinary knowledge, which have strengtehn our position and alignment. We thank also our Java Collapse Team that has worked hard and spent numerous time, energy and thoughts to prepare this book. We also thank our colleagues and comrades who contributed ideas in the writing of this book and offered hands so this book could be published. Finally to the readers, we expect critics and suggestions for future improvement. We hope this book can benefits us all. Amin.

Jakarta, April 2010

Berry Nahdian Forqan

National Executive Director of WALHI

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Chapter 1

ON JAVA Collapse

The learning team of Java Collapse was born from long reflections of WALHI's field works, the biggest environmental Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) in Indonesia. This team was a manifestation of public interest advocacy experiences performed by various NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The reflections gave birth to a thesis about the lack of knowledge basis on systemic works of various events that caused public misery.

The learning team of Java Collapse – hereinafter called Java Collapse Team – was building a knowledge management system. This system is expected to become the main reference on advocacy actions with pre-emptive or preventive nature. It is no longer in form of reactive or instant actions, with narrow context and tends to be normative, as done by some NGOs. Therefore public interest advocacy is effective and progressive. It is also able to provide accurate assessment of inevitable impacts of many state policies and implementations on the lives of citizens.

As a pre-emptive space, the Java Collapse Team shall be the provider of basic materials and contexts for public interest advocacy works, as well as long-term work on education and learning development to future WALHI generations. The big dream is to remodel regional development paradigm in this archipelagic country.

That was why the Java Collapse Team designed with knowledge management strategy, not directing it directs it as an information center.

This book is the first product of the Thematic Research of Java Collapse Team. In addition, there will be Collapse Events Database and Thematic Annual Record. All are expected to be reference for variety of advocacy actions, both case by case and systemic one, in litigating the public policy.

In other words, environmental issues should no longer being an exclusive discussion. It should become mainstream in debates on state roles to ensure the fulfillment of citizen needs and the protection of public interest.

Furthermore, the results of Java Collapse Team researches will be promoted to the public domain in line with mainstream public policy. It is expected that it will be a strong foundation and effective reference for formulation of alternative concepts on state policy in regional management in Java and other islands.

In turn, the right policy interventions have the potential to trigger public awareness to start demanding state responsibility in ensuring fulfillment of community safety, prosperity and productivity. At the same it will ensure the sustainability of environmental services.

Managing Knowledge

Why Java? Java is the most densely populated island in Indonesia. Java can be an example to unpack regional development paradigm in Indonesia. In addition, Java usually becomes a measure and reference of Indonesian prosperity, production center and consumption. At the same time, for more than ten decades Java has been continuously experiencing the decrease of carrying capacity quality and productivity due to natural or man-made disasters.

Man-made disaster occurs because of human activity accumulation. Its destruction capacity amplified by accumulation of damage on regional carrying capacity and productivity. These disasters express the torn apart and collapse of Java Island. Therefore, Java is worthy to become an initial learning site.

The Java Collapse Team was driven by a focused working group. They are representatives of WALHI Regional Executive in Java Island, which were then called the Java Collapse Team. This team consisted of representatives of study groups in West Java, Jakarta, Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java.

The knowledge management conducted by the Java Collapse Team produced a complete map of the collapse of Java as a thinking platform. The structure consisted of Collapse Events Database and Java Collapse White Book. The media that drives this knowledge management system was the Thematic Research, Collapse Events Database and Thematic Annual Record.

First, Thematic Research on Java collapse. It was conducted every four months, covering the main themes of collapse and its case studies. The central theme was the main

ideas of Java Collapse Annual Record which portrayed dominant characters of disaster events in Java.

The selection of main theme was considering the contrast with mainstream policy thinking, collective public memory, and ability to convince public about the importance of this theme on their living sustainability.

The next activity was conducting collapse case studies. The case studies were selected according to the main theme. The scope of the case study was the causative factors (direct, indirect, and driving ones), dimension of destruction capacity, action or public response of the victims, action or policy responses of the state (regional) apparatus, wisdom or lessons learned (or not), and relevance to contemporary portrait of Java Island. The research findings will be the data provider for collapse database system as well as the main materials for the preparation of annual record.

The selection and agreement of research theme and agenda conducted through a series of focused discussions. For the first time, the Java team set the complete map of Java collapse as a thinking platform, structure of collapse Events Database, and main frame of Java Collapse White Paper, which will be the reference for the publication of Annual Record of subsequent years. Furthermore, Java Collapse Team will conduct a series of focus group discussions to agree on the selected themes, also the research agenda will refer to the results of team reflection and evaluation.

Data collection and findings analysis which in line with the research agenda involved a variety of technically and contextually appropriate methods. The general measures of data collection were conducted, from the identification of data sources (status of data update and accessibility), identification of data and information gaps available to the needs of the research agenda, selection of data collection methods, deposit and storage of data on Collapse Events Database, up to discussion and assessment of findings to the preparation of research reports.

Second, Java Collapse Events Database was essentially spaces to capture data excavated and extracted from various events that cause public suffering and distress. In general, it was divided into two main groups: (a) basic database of geography, demography, and regional governance, and (b) collapse events database.

The geographic, demographic, and regional governance of Java Island database is the structure of basic data capturing storage collected from official sources: state offices, offices of international organizations, as well as published research. The database was reviewed once a year to update and maintain the structure.

Furthermore the Collapse Events Database is a structure to capture and store data gathered from various sources of public news, either those circulated in a particular region, or national, regional and global scale. The database was reviewed once a year for the purpose of updating and improving the structure.

Third, Java Collapse Annual Record. The team will compile and prepare an annual record based on the Thematic Research findings and data collected through the Collapse Events Database. The theme of Annual Records was agreed during the discussion of research agenda. The preparation started immediately after the completion of thematic research.

Annual Record of Java Collapse contains studies, fact sheets, case studies and highlighted issues, which are important for the public to know and understand. More specifically, the main framework of the Java Collapse Annual Record was organized following the themes, critical notes, collapse events fact sheets, relevant case studies, victims' testimony and recommended emergency and survival actions.

The publication of thematic Annual Record is designed to grab the public attention. Also it can move and drive series of discussions and further debates. This effort involved the authorities and potential victims.

Even more ambitious, the thematic Annual Record should be able to be included in the context of debates in other areas, outside of the Java Island, in order to avoid or at least, reduce the potential risks of a disaster to the public interest.

The writing processes of Annual Record collection were essentially the "peak" of a series of Thematic Researches. The research reports produced will be the main reference in preparing the Annual Record. These notes will be distributed free of charge to various strategic parties, among others: the House of Representatives (DPR), state offices in Jakarta which are relevant to the theme, the governor's offices in Java as well as relevant agencies, head of district/mayor offices and relevant department and non-departmental offices, editors of printed and electronic local, national, regional and international mass media, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, campus organizations in various regions in Java.

The cornerstone of Java Collapse Team work was meeting and talking with the public at large about the generated findings and studies through mobile workshops. This was a series of thematic workshops related to the Annual Record. This action was one of the options for Java Collapse Team to keep interacting and dialoguing with the wider public.

The mobile workshops provided the inputs and feedbacks to review the team findings. It was also aimed as a means of testing the collapse modeling developed and formulated by the team. The workshop served as an extreme method to examine the collapse modeling.

The Annual Record, research reports, and Collapse Events Database will be a source of endless inspirations and ideas for the preparation of the book series or any other publication on Java collapse.

Collapse Java series will be an example and encouragement for similar work in other islands in Indonesia. To that end, the team was expected to consistently produce alternative

ideas about the regional governance on the island of Java and other regions. The counter ideas that makes Java as the barometer, role model of policies, and strategies for regional development in other islands.

Java Collapse Team hopes, by improving the way of reading and learning, NGOs and CSOs can improve the way the public advocacy.

Chapter 2

LEARNING FROM JAVA

The wealth Java has been discussed since long time ago, even before Jesus was born. Once upon a time, the kings of the Han in China ordered their aides to chew Java cloves before speaking in front of the king.¹ Winchester (2003) described how the herb of eastern kingdoms, including Java, is part of the high-priced luxurious world culinary. The history recorded that the spice trade, as part of Java's wealth, was an entrance of the change of political power that led to restructure of land use, mode of production, and the development of infrastructure that made up Java to what it is today.

Java has the highest population density in Southeast Asia, with the most modern infrastructure throughout the Indonesian archipelago, and firmly remains as the center of trade and manufacturing industry in Indonesia.

Why Java attracted various nations? Why did the power centralization in Java generate tremendous industrialization, leaving behind other islands in this country? Was it the geography, geology, and ecology that influenced the attractiveness of the island from time to time?

Excellence of Java

Java is located in the southeast of the Malaka Strait, heavily congested by trade and warfare centuries ago. The strategic position of the Malaka Strait as the gateway to East Asia

¹ Winchester, in his book "Krakatoa", page 26.

became the source of fights by many nations over time. In the early days of European exploration, the economic and political power of the Malaka Strait moved from Spanish, Portuguese, and the last British, who then controlled the whole Malay Peninsula, up to a small part of Sumatra.

Although Java was the largest producer of spices at that time, but it was not the frontline of fights between nations. It could be because of the power of the Sultanate of Banten which was too strong that European nations would prefer to trade with Banten, rather than conquering them. But when the Dutch sailors gained valuable spices such as pepper, nutmeg and cloves, the lust to monopolize the trade of various sources of production rose. Therefore the conquest of the Sultanate of Banten became an absolute necessity.

Having a trading post in Java was very important, since the source of the spice was not only here. Maluku Islands were the important source of production, famous with their spices, especially nutmeg and cloves. In addition, at the same time the Portuguese has penetrated into the east, preceded the Netherlands.

Java could serve as the intermediary post to rest and recharge supplies as well as other spices before being shipped to Europe.² For this reason, VOC (*Verenidging Oost Indie Compagnie*) established trading posts near the Sunda Kelapa in 1619.³ Getting pepper from the East Indies for the Dutch sailors was like having priceless treasure. When they returned to their country, their profits could be multiplied by 400 percents!

Such high profits were certainly very interesting, especially if the whole circulation of spices could be monopolized. Of course, Java was indeed interesting place and excel in terms of production and geographical location. Raffles recorded that the spice production of Java islands far beyond the other, even higher than Maluku Islands.

² Day, Clive, "The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java", pp. 41

³ *ibid*

One of the keys to the high productivity of the spices in Java Islands was the fertility of the soil. Geologically, almost the entire Indonesian islands have volcanic soil types, formed from the mineralization of volcanic eruption.

Java has an active volcano from the west to the east end. It is recorded Java has 79 active volcanoes that have erupted since the 1600s. There are 29 volcanoes that have erupted before the 1600s. There are 21 *fumarola* and *solfatara* types of volcanoes that have been inactive since very long time ago.⁴

Many volcanoes and younger rocks as well as morphology, shape the nature of the fertile soil of Java compared to other islands. Java was reported six times more fertile than other islands. It has a broad alluvial plains in the north shore area that fits into the agri-food area. Even a long time ago, the name *Jawa* was associated with *jewawut* (barley (rice)).

The morphology of Java from west to east is divided into three types, i.e. morphological units of coastal plain, central mountains, and southern mountains. The coastal plain morphological unit stretches across the northern part of the island of Java, from Serang to Surabaya plains and narrows towards Panarukan.⁵

Central mountains and the coastal plains are fertile regions and suitable for a variety of agricultural crops. The soil of central mountains is generally suitable for perennial plants. While the coastal plains formed by alluvial sediments and water recharge area are fertile lands for grains, sugarcane, nila (*Indigofera*) and many other short lifespan plants.

Due to the condition of the soil morphology and formation of Java Islands, throughout the human civilization, the food-producing and Java development centers constantly located

⁴ “*Profil Lingkungan Geologi Pulau Jawa*”, Direktorat Tata Lingkungan Geologi dan Pertambangan, Ditjen Geologi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, Departemen Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral 2004.

⁵ *ibid* II-1

in the same area. Although the coastal plain areas are fertile both on land and quite broad wetland areas, these areas do not have good drainage. Water tends to stagnate during floods, forming marshes naturally with high sedimentation.

Coastal plains and mountainous units are experiencing the strongest pressure for their enticing bio-physical characters. The observations up to the 1990s, the central mountainous region continued to experience erosion. The BAPPENAS study in 2004 described the north coast of Java as the most critical, viewed from the shrinking of the functions of nature and biodiversity.

The entire infrastructure development since the days of the Dutch East Indies aimed to make the coastal plains and central highlands regions as the center of agriculture and forestry industries. As the evidence, the coastal plain region, the valley of Bengawan Solo River, Brantas, Madiun plains, to mountain belt reaches an altitude of 1200 meters, turned into the rice production areas and the highly demanded commodities at that time.

Southern mountainous regions have different characters compared to the central mountains and the coastal plains in the north. Southern mountainous region is generally limestone mountains, with much less availability of water than the central highlands and the northern coast. Therefore, may be the pressure on the southern mountains, not as much as that experienced by the central mountains and the coastal plains.

However, it doesn't mean the experiments of changing the south mountain never been done. The story of the fatal failure to open Sewu mountain into coffee plantation was one example. The failure that affecting the drought continues until over a century, because of unsuitability of the land for coffee plants, as well as the vulnerability of the region characterized by limestone and karts.

The increase of Java industrial capacity caused supporting elements such as production of skilled labor also increased. A number of schools were established, from

paramedic schools, *carik* (clerk) school, to engineering schools. The development attracted the coming of the populations outside Java to study in Java.

Boomgard (1996) recorded the increase of the population of Java throughout the development of the industry, especially during the liberalization and *Ethische Politiek* (ethical policy) era. Unfortunately, it was not exactly clear why the population increased in numbers in the period of industrialization of agriculture and manufacture time. One thing noted was the increase of food agricultural production and health care service. This contributed to longer life expectancy of the population. However, whether population boom really occurred in the days of forced cultivation until the late 19th century remained unanswered.

Donner (1987) explained the absence of adequate census in 17th to 19th century. All population records were only based on estimation. However it is noteworthy that one of the reasons industrialization was done in Java, not just because its fertile land and morphological condition, but also the availability of labor. It means since the old days Java's population has been already high enough to meet the manpower needs, from the construction of the highway, forced cultivation, liberalization era, until the manufacture industry in the late 19th century.

In short, Java has a number of advantages in terms of geography, geology, ecology, and population. Geographically, the advantageous position was because of being in the middle of the spice trade route, between the east and west regions. Geologically, it has a highly fertile soils that allows agricultural and plantation industries to grow rapidly. In addition, adequate amount of population served labor by any kinds of models, either feudalistic or capitalistic one.

Java then grew naturally, which possibly without a plan. The poor planning of Java kept being repeated until the independence era. During the development period led by Soeharto, Java became the center of growth of manufacturing and processing industries. The

reason for choosing Java as the center of development was regard to the availability of infrastructure already built 150 years ago.

A number of large infrastructures such as roads, giant dams, trading center, industrial center, and settlement even aggravated the condition of fertile but vulnerable Java Islands. Department of Public Works recorded, within less than a century, 85 percents river areas were badly damaged on Java Islands. Soil water availability decreased in rural and urban areas. The areas formerly serving as water catchment and retaining areas converted into industrial, settlements and infrastructure zones. The widespread and worsening of Jakarta floods are real examples of human destruction to natural conditions.

Even up to the 21st century, Java remains the center of growth and trade services. For instance, the 10 GW electricity project announced by Government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, mostly allocated for Java, Madura, and Bali. Similarly, the transportation infrastructure such as the 1000 kms toll roads along the northern coast of Java.

The consequences of unequal growth of Java compared to other islands in Indonesia have an impact on the high rate of migration to urban centers in all cities in Java.

Indonesia's urban population grew rapidly following the migration from the countryside. Many studies mentioned, the rural development has failed. Just like the same policies imposed by the Dutch Government. Rural Java was totally oppressed to provide cheap food. The deterioration of rural areas caused by the decline of agriculture, trade, urban expansion, and natural led migration in large numbers.

Even without balanced with supporting infrastructure the migration rate increased. The indication of the increasing number of migration can be seen every end of Ramadhan month. Jakarta is the first choice for the villagers to try their luck in the city, without any sufficient skills.

Migration to Jakarta is an indicator of the worsening situation of rural areas. With limited areas, Java still remains attractive to rural migrants to try their luck, rather than living in the village. The signs of the rural collapse have even occurred during the last century (see The Great Post Road case study). Yet no adequate measures are able to withstand the collapse of socio-ecological rural life. The rural collapse became great questions of the development dreams.

In urban areas, the conditions do not improve either. The increasing gap and widespread of slums in every vacant corner of the city answered with repeated measures since the New Order: eviction. The increasingly deteriorating environment is more obvious in this 21st century. Floods, disease, and the failure of waste management occur everywhere, in the midst of elite housing widespread in metropolitan cities.

In the end we can conclude, people in Java has never had a change in way of life. The leaders still dream of wealth, power and capital accumulation at the expense of other citizens, while the urban and rural poor people's lives do not change. They struggle to survive throughout the deteriorating environmental conditions or to flee to urban areas. Only one that distinguished between the 19th and mid-20th to 21st century, the choice of migration beyond state borders as low rank workers. Java has not completely collapsed, but some areas have collapsed for being abandoned by its people.

Whose prosperity?

Java, from the history of its existence until today, has always been an interesting portrait to be seen as a storyline of crisis. A story of ordinary people controlled by the elite since the kingdoms era, colonization, up to the present. In the name of development, every ruling class in particular period of time, seize their power, perpetuate their existence as the power elite.

The power system of the leaders on Java Island has placed itself as an elite group over the ruled class. In this case, the ordinary people are always being the objects in the entire development story to create the dream of prosperity and welfare of the elite.

Daendels was the first figure in the Dutch colonization era that laid the foundations of industrialization in Java. In the history, he dreamed to control the governance of trading and economic routes in Java, even in Eastern Indonesia, that he conducted through the development of infrastructure to support economic activity. One of them was the most famous mega infrastructure project: The Great Post Road, the highway that served as the trading route from western to the east of Java Islands.

The development considered Java as being very strategic in political and economical terms. In addition, it was also rich with natural and human resources that can be employed by force. The Javanese political situation was also very supportive. The political leaders in Java could be used as liaisons or Dutch partners to monopolize the trading route. This was the foundation of economic colonization that went on hand in hand with political colonization.

Although only three years in power, the elit power principles of Daendels well echoed by the next predecessors, since the colonial days and until today, namely, the industrialization practice underpinned by giant scale infrastructures. This became the foundation or model of development that led to the power system, land use planning, production and consumption management system that benefits only a handful of political and capital powers.

Forced cultivation was continued policy launched by the colonial Dutch after the Post Road. The goal was securing the supply of Java commodity production to be sold on the world market. The forced cultivation served as an effective tool for mobilizing economic production. But it created misery and poverty for millions of people in Java. True indeed, forced cultivation drove agricultural export growth and involvement in international trade.

But from the entire story, those who reaped the benefits and interests from the trade were the Dutch trading companies. Not the farmers who performed the forced cultivation.

After the construction Anyer Panarukan road, during the New Order era, the political entities in Java followed and strengthened the practice of infrastructure development for the benefit of the industry. Economic development was a myth that continuously voiced out by state officials and capital owners to control the land use, production system and human consumption in Java. The development policy promoted, like Daendels, never calculated the sustainability values of Java people's lives. They were merely counting the economic sustainability without considering the safety, well-being, productivity and sustainability of natural service.

During the New Order, the development of modern infrastructure and manufacturing industries became the main engine of economic growth tale. Sukarno had tried to carry on the rural economic order after being ravaged by the Dutch colonialists. But it was altered again by Soeharto into industrial society; despite all the prerequisites towards industrial society were not yet fulfilled.

In the present context, the construction of roads is a top priority of the Jakarta governors, from Ali Sadikin to Fauzi Bowo. Development is only intended to provide supporting facilities for the investment in Jakarta.

The infrastructure development of Jakarta is very rapid in order to meet the investment needs and increase the rate of national economic growth. This is done by building roads, flyovers, highways, and various other infrastructure developments with low priced land acquisition for the residents. All in the name of development and people's welfare jargon. Later on, it often raises issues that continue long afterward, including evictions and expropriation of people's lands for the sake of development.

We can witness in Jakarta what kind of sacrifices demanded by power elite to the people to facilitate economic development and investment rates.

The construction of a number of roads in Jakarta is prepared to provide lands for business purposes. That means that the power elite is pushing industry and playing such a big role in urban development. The government policy through Presidential Decree No. 36/2005, then revised into Decree No. 522006, legitimized the taking of people's lands to build infrastructures on behalf of public interest. Development and expansion of infrastructure will likely displace thousands of people, who are forced to make sacrifices in the name of common interests, the interests of the nation, and even more disgusting, in the name of economic and political stability.

For the state officials, such sacrifice is typical in the development tale. Just like the story of the dead during the era of forced labor during Daendels era to build Anyer-Panarukan roads. Or the story of the lost of living space of 23,380 people who lived in the 37 villages in three districts and seven sub-districts down during the construction of Kedung Ombo in New Order days. This was considered as a kind of people's sacrifice to the power elite or the state, in the name of development.

The Lapindo Mudflow story is the most contextual story today. The story of an industry that has become a new angel, ready to kill people, whenever and wherever they want. In the story of Lapindo, the oil and gas industry turned into an industry equipped with the political economic power.

To this day, the industry in mining and oil and gas sector is being the most restricted industry in providing information to the public. Yet people around them live without any assurance of safety, productivity, well-being and sustainability of nature service. Lapindo case is a complete portrait of how and industry is able to instantly destroy buildings owned by the Sidoarjo people.

In the history of oil mining in Indonesia in late 19th century, the oil industry was a key in the dynamics of diplomatic process in the early years of independence. With the commitment to the allocate multiple blocks that can be controlled by foreigners meant there was no social political benefit gained by the people, after going through the bloody struggle for 350 years. The strategic position of the industry made the power elite as the toold capital owners involved the military power to secure various mining installations in Indonesia until today.

In urban areas, the industrial hegemony has even penetrated the enssence of the urban community life. The industry is capable of changing consumption patterns, generating a trash lifestyle packed in such a neat and attractive manner through life style advertising. The consumption patterns developed by the industry, continue to turn people into victims as consumers with the level of consumption driven by the industry. And victims, as the collateral damage, must feel the impact of continously growing consumption patterns. It happened in Bandung, where no less than 125 people dead for being buried by waste, due to a pattern of consumption developed by the elite of power and capital.

Another story urban community in Java is the loss of people's living space, eliminated by the rapid pace of development and industrialization. This experienced by the early communities of Betawi Jakarta. Today only 30 percent of the community remain, waiting to be eliminated.

The development industry infrastructure ignored Java vulnerability to disasters. This was compounded by the absence of disaster in the calculation of government spending and the poor handling of disaster. The citizens become victims over and over due to weak state responses to disasters.

In fact, disaster then became a new commodity. Imagine, a variety of assistance coming taken over by the power and capital elites. When the victims survived on their own

ways, the power elite were busy campaigning through the message of patience, and unabashedly, included the name of God in the story of a new commodity called disaster. Approximately 6,400 people died in the earthquake in Yogyakarta. Not to mention the thousands of people who lost their homes.

And what about the dreams of prosperity always voiced aloud by the ruling class in Java. Is prosperity for all people? In a straight line, the ruling class of certain period, from the colonial era to the current regime, laying a foundation of development with the same dream. Namely, affluence and prosperity for perpetuating their power and sacrifice the people. Even using the same reading. The whole story of the industrial infrastructure development is used as a platform for consolidation of capital, politic (power) and military.

Prosperity, in the whole story of development, is the dream of the elites in power systems, placing the people as objects in the entire flow of the embodiment of dream of this prosperity tale. Prosperity is the numbers of suffering people that can be manipulated through unreasonable assumptions and insults the common sense, among others, the poverty rate.

For the people who have always been the object, prosperity is just an illusion or a dream that can never come true. Instead people are always demanded to sacrifice. From time to time, since the colonization days, Old Order, New Order, until the reform era, the people are always placed as a mere object. If you look at the crisis experienced by the people from year to year, we are actually looking at the same cycle. The level of victims from time to time are experiencing the same thing. Nameless, faceless.

Poverty is a real fact from time to time, experienced by the people who do not have the "ability" to respond to the crisis created by the accumulation of capital and power. In fact, the crisis continually grows with longer duration and wider spread. Central Bureau of Statistics submitted that the poverty in 2006 increased, reaching 3.90 percent from the previous year, to 35.10 million people.

That figure was mostly in the countryside. The cause was the loss of production resources as being controlled by the capital power elite. Never mind the welfare or prosperity, safety of the people was never counted as a cost, which should be the basis of policy development.

Poverty alleviation story is also not new. Government always has a poverty alleviation program, even through foreign debts. The program, however, never answered the prevailing crisis. The World Bank even recommended one of the poverty alleviation programs through economic growth program. Although economic formula never gives a fair distribution to the people.

Indeed the economic growth is no more than just a form of capitalist accumulation and the state apparatus that controls the power, production system, consumption, and land use. Malnutrition and maternal mortality rates are still high, a daily menu on the mass media that accompanied our breakfast every morning. Then where is the dream of prosperity?

CHAPTER 3

RECORDING HISTORY, UNDERSTANDING CRISIS

Jared Diamond is the author of the book that introduces the collapse discourse in "*Collapse, How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*". He used a "framework" when analyzing the situation of the collapse of a society. It consisted of five "factor devices" that affect people's lives, namely: environmental damage, climate change, hostility with neighbors, the disappearance of trading partners, as well as how people respond to changes and damage to the environment.

This book inspired Java Collapse Team to conduct a study on the collapse of Java. This study intended to outline the pattern of relationship between human lives in Java with their nature. Interaction of human lives and the effect on the condition and sustainability of natural functions is the major topic; the road to the collapse of Java.

In this study, Java collapse is defined as the process of human life and natural capacity degradation, due to the mutually predating interaction between humans and nature in the history of power systems in Java. The interaction of both generates negative impacts that lead to a crisis. This argument can be obviously seen in the case studies of this book – ranging from Daendels, Betawi and Lapindo. In all the three cases, the crisis occurred repeatedly, both in quality and quantity. At a later stage, the crisis has implications for the decrease of people's capacity to survive, which led to the exclusion of their living space, and even death.

The three main points of the road to Java collapse, as seen in this research as the team interpretation, were based on: (1) the safety and welfare of the people (2) power to resist, to meet and restore quality of life (3) sustainability of nature and environmental services.

a. Safety and Welfare

The interpretation of the safety and well-being is defined as a condition of the people and nature around them through a number of prerequisites, such as: no threat to their life and living space, secure identity and existence, able to determine their present and future life, able to meet the basic rights and needs, and able to meet the civic and political rights.

Less safe and prosperous interpreted as a citizen and a natural condition around them who are in a state of: vulnerable to life-threatening and life space, no safety assurance, narrowing of living and livelihood spaces, depending on the initiative of others to determine their future life, and under the hegemony of other parties to determine their future.

Not safe can be interpreted as a condition of the people who experience exclusion out of their living space, like living with the drip hose of the others or even mass death.

b. Power to resist and to surrender

Power to resist – able to meet and restore the quality of life, interpreted as a condition of the people and the nature around them, with some prerequisites: able and active in

expression by relying on social capital, able to meet the needs on an ongoing basis in accordance with ability, and able to secure production sources.

Lack of power to resist construed as a condition of the people and the nature around them who are in state of: reduced social capital for creativity and expression, and limited space for creativity and expression.

No power to resist – to meet and recover quality of life, interpreted as the condition of people whose social capital vanished, do not have access to the source of production, and cannot afford to be creative and express themselves.

c. Sustainability of nature and environmental services

It is interpreted as a capacity of nature to provide sustainable energy cycles as well as water and carbon cycles (according to the theory of photosynthesis, photosynthetic input and the third law of thermodynamics). The shrinking number of natural services and availability interpreted as the lost capabilities of natural condition vital to the cycle of energy of life. The disappearance of natural services is interpreted as a condition of natural ability without the cycle of energy, water and carbon.

Java in Brink of Collapse

The crisis is a causal series from various natural events and human activities time to time. The events and activities that have a negative impact on people and their assets are the processes of the emergence of crisis. The case studies in this research explain the crisis and response of people and nature on the negative impact(s) of crisis, based on the level of their capacities. The high capacity of the people in dealing with the crisis is a prerequisite to maintain their existence and assets.

The causes of crisis can be divided into three categories: direct cause, indirect cause and driving force. All three are derived from natural events and human activities. The impact of the crisis, caused by the nature, influenced by the responses of the people, state or other

parties. The influence will show whether it exacerbate the impact or otherwise, while the impact of crisis triggered by human activities also need to be further examined, whether compounded by natural conditions or otherwise. This is to examine the patterns of human relationships and nature in times of crisis. The selected case studies will also explain the pattern and nature of human relationships in a crisis, as well as the ecological footprint.

The process of crisis can be divided into two categories, sporadic processes (irregular and abrupt) and recurrent crises (regularly occurring). Both categories of crisis will be viewed with the same measurement tool based on the distinctive characters of the crisis, namely fast, brief, short - with the enlarged chain of crisis. The Yogyakarta earthquake and Lapindo case studies will outline how the crisis happened, either sporadic or repetitive, as well as how the enlarged chain of crisis occurred.

The impact or the final state of the crisis on human and nature is important point to be described in this study. The final state of crisis on humans and nature will be viewed with a measurement tool, which indicates the capacity to sustain life. The tool will show some possible ends of the crisis on human and nature condition. On humans, the condition can lead to poverty, exclusion and death, while on nature, it will be whether being irreversible or unrecoverable. The availability or access to water, food and energy are reading device of the final state of crisis in both humans and nature.

Understanding the Crisis

The way to read the crisis in Java focused on crisis aggregate developed by Java Collapse Team, among others: (1) high risk policy development on human and nature, (2) policy (human culture) in Java shifting the cycles of interdependence between humans and nature, (3) development policies that ignore the cycles of nature, (4) the absence of information on the cycles of nature and characters of the region, (5) economic tensions and power elite politics sacrificing the ordinary people.

a. High Risk Development Policy on Humans and Nature

Aggregates were selected based on the team findings by looking at crises occurred in Java. The analysis on the objective situation showed that the power system contributed the most to the crisis. The high risk policy development on humans and nature is one of the manifestations. The big impact on the series of crises occurred was an accumulation of policy implementation, which never calculate the risk posed, neither to the safety of people, as well as their assets.

All the case studies selected obviously describing how the above condition occurred. A policy was regarded as a high-risk one based on its conformity with the existing laws of nature. Power policies that are contrary to the laws of nature will be high risk to human safety and their environment. The magnitude of the impact caused by the occurrence of floods, landslides, earthquakes, industrial accidents and drought, is a real picture of high-risk policies.

b. Policies (human cultural) the human shift the dependency cycle between humans and nature

The impact of the policy shifting the dependency cycle between man and nature is a long process of people's life. This leads to the change of the power system and elite configuration related to control of land, production resources and power. The developments carried out directly resulting in the disappearance of citizens living space. This pattern then cut off the relations between people and their surrounding nature, which has been running for very long time. Then the natural functions will be manipulated according to the interests and welfare of the ruling class.

The longers implications resulted in collapse and even disappearance of social capital in the community (social relations, institutions, power structures and physical infrastructure). This process is the beginning of the creation of people's dependence on external institutions.

The cultures and traditions of living in harmony with nature changed and degraded into the culture and attitudes of fulfilling needs in instant manners.

The increase of population in Java, due to the development and migration from the outer islands, triggered a change in culture. The phenomenon caused the acceleration of change in consumption orientation greater than production. This process occurred due to increased competition to gain access to basic needs, while the people's production resources have been reduced, even exhausted, due to expropriation carried out by the authorities in cooperation with capital owners. One form of transaction of both parties is policy, which means the contrary as it leads to the suffering of the people. People's safety and productivity and the sustainability of natural services are not a priority in determining the stipulation of policies.

c. Development policies ignoring the cycle of nature

Floods in Jember, Bengawan Solo, Jakarta, Yogyakarta earthquake, Pangandaran tsunami and Galunggung volcanic eruption recorded as some of the large impact disasters in Java. These are the effects of neglecting the local cycle of nature in the development process.

For instance Yogyakarta earthquake in May 27, 2006. Piyungan was one of the sub-districts in Bantul District passed by opak active faults. The development process in the Bantul District, however, turned it into industrial and residential areas. The potential threat of active earthquake faults was never being decisive consideration. It means the authorities deliberately put a high risk in the region, which is a folly as the threat of earthquakes have been known before.

Jakarta floods are another example. The economic centers and supporting infrastructure have been built in the middle of the flood threats. As a result, the impact becomes greater when flooding occurs. The impact is compounded when the state apparatus did not set up the protection system against the threat of flooding.

Information related to hazards is a fundamental precondition of protection system from disaster. However, the information was very minimal, and not even distributed to the people living in the impact areas. This was due to the regional information characters oriented and prioritized to serve the interests of the corporations.

Meteorological information has been used only for the purposes of security and ensures the safety of the transportation sectors in strategic areas. Geophysical information was only used for the purposes of mineral, oil and gas extraction investment. It was exacerbated by development policies which were oriented more on defense and security, so that the emergency budget allocation was more geared for military purposes.

d. Lack of information on the regional natural cycles and conditions

Information on the regional potentials and characters is something underlying the patterns of life in a particular region. When local information obtained and comprehensively understood will reflect how the balance or harmony of nature occurs. But often times, the available information is only about the potential for a profitable economic activity. This condition is reflected in the formal education policy that prioritizes knowledge about economically potential areas, rather than disaster risk and vulnerability matters.

Information on characters of the area, such as geophysics can only be read and interpreted by people with background in related disciplines. As a result, people often do not know the condition of their localities. Distribution of information on the cycles of nature and local conditions only circulated among the military and scientists. System of national defense and regional development is a key priority of information collections performed by the State. In the end, the information turned into commodity presented to investors.

On the other hand, the public's knowledge on the cycles of nature is more oriented to production safety as a top priority for survival. As a result, information related to other natural cycles is not considered essential. This was proven on the incidence of May 27, 2006

of earthquake and tsunami in Pangandaran. Most people simply did not know that the area had the potential of earthquake and tsunami.

e. Economic-political tensions of power elite at the expense of ordinary people

Mass mobilization during the elections or the transition of power is the elite show of power using the people's suffering as their commodity. With the legitimacy of calling for prosperity, the party's elite involved the people in the power struggle stage. Thousands of promises uttered, billions of money wasted and people's suffering on sale. That was the scene of how the party elite sold people's suffering, either through national or local elections.

Such opportunity was also responded by the people when they were involved in the show of force, while the process of power struggle was running. The people's innocence and ignorance who were dreaming for a dignified life, become the main capital of the power seeker. After achieving the power, the people returned to their position as complementary object. The prosperity dream comes true, yet only among the close circles of the national or local ruling class. While the life of the common people do not change, remains poor and marginalized.

The corrupt structures of power and bureaucracy is the road toward the dream of prosperity for the ruling class. The opportunity for the people to improve their quality of life was never established by the state authorities.

The people must build their own road to safety, in the midst of the structure of civil society governance, which rely on the power approach.

The First Java Collapse

The framework of reading crises in Java can be viewed from the historical perspective. Broadly speaking, the historical development of the Java was divided into two periods, namely Java History Volume One and Volume Two. Java Collapse Team was trying

to analyze Java from one boundary to narrate the storyline in tracking the story of Java from time to time, Java development and movements processes to the present day.

The periodical time boundary can be divided into seven main periods to summarize the history of Java Volume I and Volume II.

The history of Java Volume I divided into seven stages, namely: VOC era (1602 - 1799), Islamic trade era, Javanese kings battle era, forced cultivation era (1849-1830), the Dutch parastatal renaissance era (1907-1850), political ethic era (1919 - 1908), and movement era (1937-1920).

While the history of Java Volume II divided into twelve stages, namely: native bourgeoisie revival era (1938-1941), old brother era (1942-1945), war era (1946-1948), federalism era (1949-1956), anti-west era (1957-1964), bloodbath era (1965-1966), debt-based monetary era (1967-1971), golden age of oil era (1972-1977), golden age of forest era (1978-1984), Cendana golden age era (1985-1994), banking golden age era (1995-1997), and disaster era (1998-2006).

The historicity of Java can be described in seven steps approach to read the logic of Java crisis. First, the construction of Great Post Road (1808-1811); second, the adoption of Daendels creation kingdom (1812-1819); third, land rent (1830-1870); fourth, first stage of resistance against colonialism (1900-1945); fifth, power hunting phase I (1946-1965); sixth, power hunting phase II (1966-1995); seventh, solidarity of pseudo resistance (2000 -2008).

Several decades earlier, Java development process has been underway since 1680, through forced deforestation for coffee planting in Priangan (W Donner, 1987: pp. 62). The process continued in 1749, when the implementation of the long treaty & short tracts on the Javanese kings in submission to the territory to the Dutch authority (Ong Hok Ham, 2002: pp. 159-160).

Dutch reinforced its position through a company called VOC (*Verenidging Oost-Indische Compagnie*). The VOC entered in 1602, yet it was bankrupt and dissolved for not being profitable again in 1799.

On the pattern of economic structure, it was recorded how the cooperation treaty downsized the Mataram region by King Amangkurat I on Java North Coast region of the VOC. On the other hand, the VOC in running its trade had special rights to control the distribution channels and land rights. The picture was recorded in tribute of Kapitan China when having business with the authority, as the highest bidder in the early 18th century in bribing the government (Kano, Soerjo, Huskens, 2001: p.12).

The track record could be read at the Besuki and Probolinggo regions controlled by VOC, through an agreement with Paku Buwana II on November 11, 1743. This contract substantially mentioned the power transfer of Paku Buwana II on lands in the eastern end of Java to the VOC (Putri Agus Wijayati, 2001).

Both regions then leased by the VOC to a Chinese landlord, Han Boey. This illustrated the involvement of private entities in land acquisition, through the tax to be remitted to the king. Land ownership at that time also presupposed that lands in Java owned by the king or ruler. The state (read: Dutch) considered the land was owned by the ruler and the people had to give tribute (taxes).

The private entities were given the special rights to gather crops and liaised with local authorities to develop crops and economic of the region. The private sectors were mostly Chinese people and Demang families (or local authorities). They were required to pay a certain amount of taxes and tributes to the Dutch. Then they eventually oppressed the people and farmers with all the unilateral tributes and trade monopoly.

The picture reinforced how the Dutch power was given the compensation from Mataram ruler, while the growth gave space to the Chinese people to be the engine of growth.

The potentials of the Chinese people who were polite, obedient, hard working, and diligent are tools to speed up the process of capital accumulation in the production and distribution system. Centuries later, we could observe how the Chinese play a role in the distribution and sale of the agricultural products and land ownership in Java.

The Great Post Road (1808-1811)

The emphasis of this book began with the construction of the Great Post Road (1808-1811), with the victims were estimated to nearly 12 thousands people died from forced labor. The road constructed in three years had 1,000 kms long, extending from Anyer to Panarukan (Pramoedya Toer, 2005).

There was no definite record of the death toll in the Post Road construction. They died of exhaustion, malaria and malignant cholera. In Central Java, even there was Batang District, which means corpses, the hell monument of the the Post Road construction.

Construction of Post Road by Daendels described his ambitious power to conquest. On the other hand, it also described the process of economic infrastructure development and power territory. The power principle was maximum optimization of colonies and sent the profits to their home countries.

The combination of power and economic ambitions, ultimately creating the power system with Java as production tools of commodity crops. Intelligence and greed became a massive instrument of conquest.

Post Road, until today, is one of the main transportation axes of Java. At that time, transportation played an important role throughout the island and a portrait of the continuing story of industrial development in Java. Therefore, it can be used as a point of reference for understanding the development of Java and the growth process to date.

The industrial development patterns in Java today are continuing the development of Post Road that occupied the entire northern coast of Java. In addition to geographically more

sloping, north coast of Java is relatively safer from the earthquake than areas of central and southern Java.

Industrial base in Cilegon, Tangerang, and Jakarta became the centers of the development of heavy metal, manufacture and real sector industry. While in Central Java centered in the corridor of Semarang, Pati and Kudus continued to the east. Industrial center in East Java can be observed from the north coast; Tuban, Lamongan, Gresik and Surabaya, extend toward Bangkalan, in line with the construction of Suramadu Bridge.

The development and expansion of the infrastructure corridor in present context completed the extension of Post Road. As an illustration: Merak – Jakarta – Bogor toll road, Cirebon toll road, Semarang toll road to the west, and development plan of Malang – Surabaya – Gresik – Lamongan and Tuban toll road.

This design is one infrastructure entity, new roads based on Post Road expansion and the addition of new roads. The expansion of new roads can be read as a mode of unification of the Java north coast with toll road construction, from Merak – Jakarta – Cirebon – Semarang – Surabaya to the east end of Java (Banyuwangi).

Power ala Daendels

This era was marked by the collapse of the Dutch Government (1799) that weakened the government. The destruction of the power and the production system made the Dutch tried to generate quick cash. One way was selling vast areas of lands to private parties.

State land sales first began in the eastern end - the areas of Besuki, Panarukan and Probolinggo in mid 1810. This was done by Daendels to Han Tjan Pit, who previously rented the land (Putri Agus Wijayati, 2001). The sale of lands and its ownership benefited the landlords, yet increased the burden for farmers (people).

Land tax was one of the instruments of financial reform in the relationship between the native people with the Europeans. Land Tax system was introduced by Raffles in 1813.

Raffles considered the land tax system was not only freeing people from slavery and feudal ties, but also changed the social power between local authorities and the community. Yet, indeed the main objective was the financial interests of the British (colonial) government. It was known as the land tax or *land rent* system.

The state was seen as the land owner, while farmers only have the right to use and to work on the land – with the assumption that they were renting from the state. The problem was many people did not have cash, unable to pay their tax in the form of money. The the doubled tax burden grew heavier as private profits accumulated in taxes, which were charged to the people.

With the tax system, the private entities had the privilege through several lucrative compensation for the Dutch government and private sectors. Demang was assigned to gather crops in the area and then sold in a public auction to the traders to be re-exported. The state took taxes from traders with export duties, although ultimately abolished on July 1, 1813 (Putri Wijayati Agus, 2001).

Taxation of land ownership was collected by senior *aris* (native official at village level). They gathered the farmers to collect taxes according to land ownership and the their harvests. The *aris* officials were supervised by higher level Dutch officials.

In the later development, Raffles changed the previous system. Tax system for lands dominated by Chinese people redeemed by the state. He passed a law where landowners were granted individual land lease. System of individual contracts were decided according to the type of ownership of land and expected to weaken individual property rights to the land.

The new system was implemented through *ryotwari* or individual contracts throughout Java. Farmers directly imposed with individual tax burden, compared to the previous system which was village-based taxation. Therefore, the *aris* power weakened in the village and village level social structures became fragile. Consistent with that system, the tax

levy orders also came from the former district controlled by the Chinese people, except for individual income tax.

For several eras, from the post Daendels to era of Commissioner General De Buss, Daendels, the land taxation system were maintained, although there were minor changes in the pattern and system. *Aris* officials were still used because they were mastering the local towns and villages, just like the Raffles era before applying individual-based tax.

The collection was expected to increase the taxes coffers, as well as weakened the function of the farmers' social structure that changed from village or district base to individual (family).

The new system was introduced by leasing and selling land to the Chinese people directly without intermediaries. Private land tenure began to bloom from the sale of lands.

The impact of leasing and selling land directly to the people was the flow of money to community groups directly. Another impact was leasing of cattle and paddy fields also evolved. On the other hand, the appointment of *aris* officials in tax collection in the village expanded the network of financial fraud, and the patterns of bribery flourished.

The patterns of land sale and control of economic structure underwent many changes. The power structure at middle and lower as well as grass roots levels characterized by bribes, and mutually beneficial tributes. Such economic pattern was what made Java had a chronically ill power system and economic relations, which we know today being very corrupt.

Forced Cultivation

Van Den Bosch introduced the forced cultivation system in Java (1830). According to him, the island of Java was very profitable and the products developed were commodities needed by Europeans. Therefore it would be very profitable if the production done in massive

manners. Van Den Bosch proposal submitted to the Commissioner-General Du Bush, who was in power at that time.

The forced cultivation approach also aimed to suppress expenditure in the colonies and pay off the debts that were created earlier. The type of crop required was sugarcane, which began in 1830. The sugarcane planting was almost in all parts of Java that followed by the introduction of sugar cane milling and the establishment of a sugar factory in Cirebon in 1830, and then followed in some other areas.

In the later developments, the required crops were not only sugarcane, but also other valuable commodities in the European markets (1850) such as coffee, clove, cinnamon, forestry, jute sacks, nila, cattle, nopal, cochineal, pepper, rice, silk, sugar, tea and tobacco. This commodity was highly demanded and being the development of sugar cane at the beginning of forced cultivation.

The regents were granted hereditary power, areas of land, a set of servants and military equipment as well as special protection. In return, they had to introduce and build support for investments in their respective areas, through the mobilization of the people in their regions.

The forced cultivation system was a claim on land rather than on workers. Many people involved in the planting works did not pay rent for the land. The workers need were imposed on the village head through the intermediaries of supra village elite. Greater role given to the regents and interventions at the village level minimized. Forced cultivation system was a series of local accommodation with local customs and regulations.

The economic impact of forced cultivation system was the creation of capital, cheap labor and rural economy. The capital created from the villagers who controled the land that were subject to rent tax. The European entrepreneurs (large estates) utilized abandoned lands that had not been cultivated by renting from the government. Another pattern was private

plantations who signed contract with some Javanese princes for the use of their lands in *Vorstelanden* (kingdom areas, now Yogyakarta and Surakarta).

The cheap labors were created as they were required to work for 66 days. If the work was less than that, they did not get wages. The agricultural products and cheap labors became functional system. The picture eventually turned into the industrial stories in Java for the next century. Cheap labor and land ownership are limited to the functional regulation of the relationship between employers, workers and government (industrial tripartite context).

The forced cultivation system laid important point for the development of Java. In this story, the deforestation and agricultural systems owned by the communities were massively developed for the Dutch interests. The pattern of the story continued in Java today that can be seen from the practices of Perhutani⁶ and PTPN (PT Perkebunan Nusantara). Conflicts between the Perhutani and PTPN with the local communities in a variety of scale usually associated with a claim of ownership of lands and plantation harvests.

In 1870, the system of forced cultivation disbanded, with some changes occurred afterwards. The colonial exploitation practices became more effective. It was also an essential part of the long history of integrating Java into the market economy. At the same time, the Agrarian Law (*Wet Agrarische*) entered into force (Zuhdi, S., 2002: h.xv). The principle of Agrarian Law is the land that has not been cultivated could be rented on a long-term contract, while the village lands already planted can be hired from the village for 3 years.

After the forced cultivation era and in early 19th century, there was a high production growth, expansion of area under cultivation and export crops incredibly improved. The domination of plantation banks and corporate management had gained strength in the economic sector. In contrast, the welfare of the native population were stagnant, even

⁶ State-owned company with teak forest concessions on the islands of Java and Madura

declining. The anomaly of macro growth that did not flow on to the people's welfare and safety.

The story of the land conflicts was actually inherited since the forced cultivation era. The changes in socio-political and cultural system often led to people's resistance as it was being part of their suffering, while the benefit and power were the elite story, both the political rulers (political apparatus) and the economic authorities (Perhutani and PTPN Board of Directors). From these stories we could see how pervasive the inlander mentality is to their consciousness.

It is the mentality where the power became a tool to oppress the masses, whereas among their business partners they keep each other to get greater power, in the name of power and economy. The record of forced cultivation era confirmed the story in contemporary times.

First Stage of Resistance

The early resistance of native movements marked by the emergence of class consciousness among the indigenous elite. The movement that grew out of the ethic policy. The purpose of ethic policy was improving the welfare of the life of the native people with educational approach (Ricklefs, MC, 2005: pp. 320), which in turn generated the native elites. This approach was expected to facilitate the control of power (Ricklefs, MC, 2005: h.329).

The construction of schools for the common people in 1891 (Ricklefs, MC, 2005: pp. 330-331) was the beginning of the education approach and kept evolving in line with the ethic policy. In 1912, there were about 2,500 village schools. At that era, Kartini Foundation was established in the Netherlands with the mission of education for women. They also published Kartini's letters entitled "*Habis Gelap Terbitlah Terang*" ("After Darkness, Light Is Born").

The national awakening was marked with the birth of a social movement initiated by Boedi Oetomo (1908). The growth of social movements (based on ideology, class, religion and ethnicity) became the step in gathering the common people into a solid relation. Movements like Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association) (1911), Nadhatul Ulama by Hadratus Syech Hasyim Asyari and Muhammadiyah by KH Ahmad Dahlan (1912), as well as other movements, which plays a role in the initial movement towards the independence of Indonesia.

During the ethic policy era, the transmigration of population to outside Java also began (Ricklefs, MC, 2005: pp. 320). With the population density of Java was approximately 690 person/km² at that time, the need for labor in the plantations outside Java, and welfare improvement were the reasons the Dutch conducted the transmigration program. This is the initial step in the forced displacement of the community, in the name of prosperity and growth.

The agricultural infrastructure with technical irrigation systems improved to increase agricultural and plantation productions. On the other hand, Bumiputera Trading Association began to take shape in 1919 and conducted their first strike demanding wage increases (Zuhdi, S., 2002: pp. 53). This was an ordinary people's resistance to the power structure.

The land use in Java was mostly devoted to rice fields in the early 19th century, and then converted to sugarcane by 20% (Kano, Soerjo, Huskens, 2001: pp. 64). On the other hand, population density began to increase around 700 to 1300 people/km², and increased very rapidly in 1930. The rapid increase and massive widespread sugarcane took place since the introduction of new and superior varieties of sugarcane. This led to faster land conversion. In 1929, approximately 70 percent of the Dutch capital invested in Java and the rest was for sugar cane plantation (Ricklefs, MC, 2005: pp. 323).

In line with increasing of sugarcane planting, more sugar mills were established, especially around the bases of the sugarcane. The change of the type of cultivation also promoted the culture of prostitution, drugs and gambling, the cultural “jungle” which was close to the stories of ordinary people.

The rubber expansion on a large scale in Sumatra also had implications for the massive deployment of workers from Java (Thomas, L., 2002: pp. 213), which influenced the production and distribution system. The development of rubber commodity then led to the emergence of new centers of growth in Sumatra.

The fact that 70 percents of Indonesia's population lived in Java described the population imbalance with other regions. There were around 30,500 villages in Java that eventually merged by the Dutch to 18,584 villages (Ricklefs, MC 2005: h.329). The incorporation and growth of Java and other areas can be read as an administrative unification of space and movement of people in the economic growth engine. This ultimately generated the emergence of new areas of growth.

The growth of the region as a base of growth approaches continues into the spatial planning approach, this time under the story of development of Indonesia. The prevailing power and production structure are actually only beneficial the capital and power circles, because the people seen as a tool of production, namely labor and equated with commodities as a production base.

Regarding the acquisition of land to individuals, governments only emphasizes their designation. In fact, the designation is also the result of thinking of how to divide plots of land, planned by the employer (read capital). The plotting of sugarcane lands was actually under coercion against farmers to follow the wishes of the government, because it was economically advantageous.

The Second Java Collapse

The new round of construction to the collapse of Java began 20 years after Sukarno proclaimed the independence of Indonesia. A period of 10 years beforehand, the upheaval of extraordinary powers, European-American countries, struggled for power and domination over various regions around the world, including Indonesia. This country was co-opted by VOC for 200 years and then continued for another 100 years, through the direct grip of Dutch monarchy, being exploited to support the needs of the Netherlands, ignoring the people's welfare.

The struggles over territorial powers by the European countries shifted to other major power, one of them was an Asian country that claimed itself as the elder brother, Japan. In countries colonized by Europe, Japan easily gained sympathy from the oppressed people for conquering the older power.

Afterward the power on the "Indonesian" territory developed by Japan over the next three years. The need to consolidate and maintain their regional power made Japan massively forced the colonized people. Inevitably, the power of the colonial Dutch government and its trading partners in various regions displaced in a short time. Japanese military immediately secured the assets of the older ruler, through the improvement of infrastructure and even manpower specialized training, by establishing two schools that train local personnels.⁷

Even the remote areas were not spared from their security. Some Japanese military bunkers could be found at various strategic points, from the northern to southern coasts of Java. A bunker in Bajulmati Banyuwangi can be easily seen from the edge of the main Surabaya-Banyuwangi highway. Such bunkers also found in plantation and conservation forest in Meru Betiri Jember and Banyuwangi. In Bukittinggi, the presence of Japanese military architects indicated by the bunkers along nine kilometers under the center of the city.

⁷ WALHI JATIM, *Buku Putih Migas* (White Paper Oil & Gas), results of research on History of Oil and Gas in 2007

However, history recorded that the main remnant of the 'big brother' was synonymous with forced labor, "*romusha*". At that time, the condition of the people was more bloody compared to the previous colonizers. They did not only asked for labors to meet the needs for regional defense by becoming *romusha*, they also demanded for sexual gratification for their soldiers, *jugun ianfu*, as the inevitable choice to avoid death for many women.

It means the new invader really exploited the socio-economic and cultural infrastructure, which had been established by the previous ruler. They even increased the frequency of optimizing the captive resources in a relatively short period of occupation.

There were not many records of resistance during this period of occupation. It was quite difficult to find any organized resistance. It was most likely due to Japanese jargon as 'Big Brother', which created full of hope to escape from the shackles of the Dutch authorities, and amused all elements of the society. Although at the end of their occupation in 1945, resistance took place in many regions, but beforehand they tend not experiencing any upheaval.

The lack of resistance could also due to Japanese promises to liberate Indonesia. Japan established a Preparation Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI), followed by the Executive Agency for Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI), which were sufficient to make the 'middle class' people busy.

Japanese design to conquer Indonesia which currently still in use is the people's structure up to the smallest group in the village, known as the Neighborhood (RT). This could be interpreted as an ingenious Japanese strategy to analyze the territory and exercise full control on people's lives. The Japanese militarization style with the homage to the God of Sun in the form of the ceremony is still practiced until now. Although no longer accompanied by the rituals to pay homage by bowing down to the 'the sun'. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States in response to the Japanese attack on the U.S. military base at

Pearl Harbour was the climax of World War II. It was also the history of the 'outrage' of war by United States who bombed two cities, which was the center of the civilians development. It was an interesting plot to see a history of American co-optation all over the world, with extraordinary recklessness.

In subsequent periods, through the self-image as the guardian of world peace, the United States committed aggressions to various countries, Vietnam in the '60s, Iran in 90s, and continued to Iraq in 2000s. The surrender of Japan to the United States and its allies was the moment for some educated young people groups consolidated in previous years to declare Indonesian independence. In the next story, the people's army, the former Duchth KNIL army, and Japanese PETA also rebelled and disarmed Japanese army everywhere.

Afterward, the Netherlands through its allied military forces conduct 'aggression' to return to their colonies. The trauma of colonialism for 350 years become the foundation of resistance by all elements of the people's power. History recorded the resistance everywhere during the next two to three years. Heroic stories of territorial defense by 'the natives' at least recorded in four major events: the *Bandung Lautan Api* (Bandung Lake of Fire) (Bandung), Palagan Ambarawa (Semarang), *Serangan Umum* (General Attack) (Jogjakarta), and November 10 (Surabaya).

It was interesting to note the hand over of petroleum control in Langkat, North Sumatra by the allies to Indonesia, via Japan. However, Japan was still controlling the production until an agreements with Japan was reached in 1960, where they Japanese government provided compensation in the form of loans amounting to 8,845 million yen (U.S. \$ 53 million) in exchange for crude oils.⁸

However during the previous ten years there were upheavals in the control of Indonesian oil, with the nationalization of the assets of the former colonial Dutch authority by

⁸ *ibid*

the Indonesian government at the time. During the emergency period, the government through the Minister of Industry and Trade authorized the Chief of Staff of the Army to manage the North Sumatra Oil Mining. In fact, in 1957 an agreement was reached between the government and the military for the management of Indonesian oil and gas with the establishment of PT. Pertamina, which continued by cooperation with foreign companies.

The North Sumatra story might not happen, if the first oil well in Maja, Majalengka, West Java drilled in 1871 by a Dutch businessman, Jan Reerink, produced oil. The time distance was only 12 years before the operation of Telaga Tiga and Pangkalan Susu oil wells, near Pangkalan Brandan in North Sumatra in 1883.⁹

The distribution of control over forest and plantation sectors in the next period created more intense upheaval, a bloody history. Ideological battles fought by the power of the state elite, whether in government or military, shown a notorious history. Soekarno with his socialism had done a distribution of land through land reform embodied in the spirit of Law no. 51960 on the Principles of Agrarian Management.

The prevailing 'distribution' seemed to threaten the capitalistic mode of regional control, which promoted by some elements of state authorities. Then it led to emergence of September 30 event, which until today remains injustice on land ownership to Indonesian people. Afterward, the concession of extraordinary events in 1965 massacre was a collaboration with the United States to control the management of a territory.

Until 2000s, the military still controlled many plantations in various areas. The Law of Foreign Investment (PMA) could be seen as a regulation that allows foreign parties to manage wealth in Indonesia with the guarantee of state administrative authorities. At least it began with the Freeport McMoran control the mines in Papua, which was only a few months

⁹ Ibid, pp. 56-57

after this regulation was stipulated. Although some references stated that there was already an agreement with a faction in the government/military before 1965.

The next regime did not give the slightest space for the land distribution and tended to annul the lands which have been distributed especially in the plantation areas in Java. Then the regulation to control the forestry sector by the government emerged that ensured the continuation of the forestry service and large plantation models through the establishment of the Perhutani and PTPN.

The next regime (Suharto and the military) during the 32-year period had easy access to get loans for development. This could be seen as a compensation for providing power to foreign companies to exploit the wealth of Indonesia with supporting regulation and legal certainty for investment. Presumably the stability of the local economy and security become key factor of investment through the facilitation for long-term exploitation.

In a relatively short time, the new regime was able to dampen the crisis experienced by the people by creating the price stability of basic needs. However, the military had important role in ensuring the 'development design' as part of the big deal with the ruling government elite. Such deal has established 'security' and 'stability' that ensures investment, business development and local and foreign venture capitalists. The domination portrait of government regime created through a variety of terrors against resistance to the development design. From here, a stigma of 'PKI' (Communist Party of Indonesia) emerged towards the emerging resistance.

Slowly but surely, the development under the package of 'PELITA' showed significant growth to the life of people in Java. The provision of infrastructure as a prerequisite to the development became the government excuses to raise more and more debts. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and IMF became the main proponents of the availability of construction financing, which was a prerequisite of foreign investment in

Indonesia. The group of creditor countries also provided technical assistance of development planning through IGGI. It was then dissolved and transformed into CGI, due to providing such 'controversial' advice during the construction of Kedungombo Dam.

The long-term impacts of debts were not felt during the Soeharto regime who was in power for relatively long period. But abuses of the debts resulted in deterioration of the implemented development. The construction of Kedungombo and Gajahmungkur large dams had not brought significant impact on the provision of energy and food, as promised. Kedungombo was built in 1985, by sinking 37 villages in 3 districts and displacing 5,268 families. It was targeted to irrigate 67 thousand hectares of farmland and produce 22,5 megawatts of electricity, yet it was only lasted in a relatively short time. In 2007, out of the 500 million cubic meters of water that should be accommodated, only 40 percent could be met.¹⁰

This story is not different from the incidence of flooding along the Bengawan Solo river basin, which took place in late 2007 to early 2008, for over 4 months. Gajahmungkur in the upstream region was only able to accommodate 25 percent of the amount of water out the estimated number. Inevitably the economic growth which became the basis of calculation caused tremendous destruction effects when not considering the factor of people's safety.

The projects under the name of development stemmed from the debt were subjects to misappropriation, experienced a period of 'enlightenment' with the burden of debt that must be returned. Yet the people must suffer the consequences. The state funds were allocated to pay the debt, then the state cut the subsidies for the people's welfare.

Inevitable, the control of resources by the power elite resulted in a prolonged crisis since 1997. The banking sector experienced a lot of mature debt, forced the state to provide 'bailout' that also came from debt. As a result, the measure to improve the banking sector

¹⁰ WALHI JATENG, Factsheet of Climate Change, 2007

through Indonesian Bank Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) was distorted. At the end, the new debt burden must be borne by all citizens. A silly story, that when deviation was performed, instead of enforcing law they were given various clearances, unmatched with the prolonged suffering of the people.

The story of the economic crisis since 1995 was also solved through a variety of assistance, fraud-ridden until the completion of the story, was a necessity. Especially because the syndicate and manipulative behavior still controlled the government system.

Many more stories depravity happened. The increasing disasters are the answer of decaying development design. One thing always spared is the prolonged suffering of the people. Since the 1990s, the story of resistance began to occur as a result of the pseudo development design that did not produced prosperity.

CHAPTER 4

FROM DAENDELS TO LAPINDO Why The Great Post Road of Daendels

The stories of infrastructure changes, both physical and non-physical in Java, might be started since VOC (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie) established on March 20, 1602, by the Dutch parliament. VOC was given the right to administer the monopoly and colonial activities in the Dutch East Indies, which was based in Batavia. In carrying trade monopoly, the VOC practiced guided and and exploitative manners to enrich the trading company for the benefits of the Netherlands. The VOC that used to be victorious and controlled the natural resources of Dutch East Indies was declared bankruptcy in 1799.

East Indies, the designation of Indonesia at that time, was colonized in exploitative and guided modes. It was the Governor-General Daendels who started the exploitative practices in paving the interests of colonialism. Daendels was the successor of Governor general Albertus Wiese. His main task was protecting Java from the of attack British troops, as it was the only region that they had not conquered yet. Daendels' agenda was building the

supporting infrastructure to protect Java from the threats, such as hospitals, military barracks, military schools, and the construction of the armory castle like in Meester Cornelis (Djatinegara) and Lodewijk in Surabaya. One of the most famous projects was *Jalan Raya Pos* (The Great Post Road).¹¹

The Post Road construction was a giant project involving millions of Javanese workers. The initial motive was a defense against the invasion of Britain, but it could not be denied, there was another motive, which was facilitating the mobilization of goods for economic interests. The years before Daendels took power, the economy depended on shipping that took a long time and involved high-risk for the trading. The giant development project could be regarded as a Napoleon-style project.¹² No wonder Daendels greeted by Napoleon himself at the Tuileries Palace on the red carpet, when asked to lead the troops in Wurtemberg and involved in the invasion of Russia on June 22, 1812.¹³

The construction of the Post Road referred to as a marker of pre-twentieth century acceleration because it was built just in three years, between the 1808 to 1811 which penetrated the main north coast of Java, from Anyer on the western region and Panarukan in eastern part of Java.¹⁴ Imagine the massive mobilization of workers for three years to complete the approximately 1000 kms of the Post Road. Each native authority was required to mobilize their people. Those who were failed to comply, including the workers, were killed. Their heads hung on the tops of the trees on the sides of the street. Thousands of people were victims of Daendels ambition.

¹¹ Read “*Jalan Raya Pos, Jalan Daendels*”, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 2005

¹² He was a France general in the 19th century who did a massive invasion to the rest of European mainland.

¹³ http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jalan_Raya_Pos

¹⁴ Read “*Engineers of Happy Land*”, Rudolf Mrazek; 2006, pp. 8

In Cadas Pangeran area, as the line that connects Bandung – Semarang, the road construction was estimated to take its toll over 5,000 people die from disease and starvation. The victims were also increasing to the rough jobs that they had to bear. Cadas Pangeran was a very difficult areas to penetrate. However the numbers of victims in this area were never reported. It could be assumed how many deaths as the victims of the malignant malaria.¹⁵

Daendels style development practice continued and became the reference of Java industrialization processes in the coming centuries. In fact, the Post Road was the first large-scale infrastructure project in Java, which gives further effect to the development models of this region.

Why Bandung Trash

Bandung, one of the big city, is located in the highlands and serves as the center of West Java government. It has it own uniqueness compared to other big cities in Indonesia. From the historical perspectives, Bandung has a lot of stories to tell. During the Dutch colonial era, Bandung was the areas for plantations and prisoners. Furthermore, the city in central basin of Bandung has a story that will be well remembered, both nationally and internationally, especially the monumental history of struggle.

The most monumental change structure of power was when the capital of Karapiyak, Dayeuh Kolot as the main city, moved by Daendels to Bandung. The change developed based on colonialist interests, putting the city of Bandung as *Parij van Java*. So called because of the condition of the landscape and lifestyle could be equated with the city of Paris in Europe. The colonial Dutch government even intended to make Bandung as *Kolonial-Stad*, City of Park. Bandung also planned to be the capital of the archipelago. The historical study recorded only the first of three development plans were successfully realized. Other ideas were just disappear.

¹⁵ See “*Jalan Raya Pos, Jalan Daendels*”, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 2005, pp. 29

In the next century, the significant development of the city gave tremendous impact on system of people's consumption. The change of consumption system, due to development focusing on conditions favorable to the power and capital owner of the region, putting huge risks for the communities.

The development that attached great importance to economic growth made the regional plan deviated from the original concept. Now, Bandung become completely open and greedy city. Now it turns out as the administrative center of West Java, local and regional trade center, education and science center, as well as culture and history center, plus shopping and tourism city. All these created costly impacts for the urban dwellers.

The most damaging incident to Bandung image as the mode city was the landslide in the final disposal point (TPA) of Leuwigajah on February 21, 2005, with hundreds of human victims. The trashes piles of daily human garbage did not taken into account in the regional planning. It was never counted as inevitable output of urban industrialization processes. The landslide case provided shock therapy for the management of the area.

There are two reasons why the junks damaged the image of Bandung. First, Bandung is a trend-setter of Indonesian urban lifestyle. Second, at the time the urban domestic waste left untreated, the lifestyle industry there is at their peak of glory days, marked by the proliferation of factory outlets and distros. Ironically, an agenda of Asian African Conference would be held a week after the landslide occurred.

Why Betawi?

Jakarta is such an important place for the people of Indonesia. In addition to being the center of power, Jakarta gave a special attraction for rural residents to try their luck. The prototype of the modern life of a nation often displayed in the city's annual flooding, yet it continues to be used as a parameter of the current growth in Indonesia. Jakarta grows afar leaving far behind other cities in Indonesia.

The historical development of Jakarta as the center of power began since colonial days. At that it was called Batavia, the center of Dutch power over Indonesia for three centuries. Although the state capital was temporarily moved to Yogyakarta during the struggle for independence, after condition political improved the center of power returned to Jakarta.

Behind the spectacle of development, Jakarta city has a complex story of the life of people, particularly the native Betawi. The cultural onslaught due to high urbanization made Betawi people lose their identity. The big change of this cultural mix was characterized by the mobilization of Indonesian culture to the nation's capital. Soeharto government with the developmentalism concept concentrated the nation's cultural diversity to this city. The traces could be seen in *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* ("Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park").

The concentration of culture in one point would give effect to the existing culture. The acculturation and cultural assimilation, as well as genetic mixing has covered the Betawi people. The development of Jakarta made the condition and space of Betawi people narrowed down. Their mastery of the means of production did not guarantee their survival. The transformation of the means of production resulted in the change of land ownership. Meanwhile, the inability to manage the land as source of livelihood was another reason to maintain their existence. The weak tenurial system in the Betawi community had marginalized them from the city center, such as Kuningan to the peripheral areas like big Bojong Gede, Depok.

Why Yogya Earthquake

Java Island has the potential and vulnerability to earthquakes. Such information could be easily found in the geological literature. It is located in the meeting point of Eurasian plate with the Indo-Australia one in the south coast of Java (Indian Ocean). It is such a great potential for disaster in plain sight. Since 1867 – 2006, earthquakes have occurred a few

times on the island of Java. The Yogyakarta and Central Java earthquakes which occurred on May 27, 2006 could be categorized as large-scale earthquake and highly destructive disaster. It caused the hisghest casualties in the history of the Indonesian earthquake, 5,930 people died.

The earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java eluded from observation of the experts and regional government. The lack of a comprehensive mapping on the disaster areas caused the large number of dead victims. Although the earthquake occurred shortly after the tsunami disaster in Aceh, in December 2004. Such big number of tolls proved that the state officials did not want to learn from the experience of the tsunami disaster. The responsiveness and effectiveness of disaster relief did not appear in the handling of post-earthquake.

The irresponsiveness of the local government and the inability to handle a disaster were in contrast with the victims own efforts. In responding to the conditions after the earthquake, the people were even more independent in taking care of their safety. The role of taking care their family security and safety of the remaining assets, which were not able to be maintained by the government apparatus, were taken over by the victims. Such kind of guarantees that the state should give when the citizens are in position of victims.

Disaster management relied on people's solidarity and relatives were much more effective than the system that created and implemented by the state and international institutions. Many people of Yogyakarta and surrounding areas, which were not affected by the earthquake, came in to help. They carried goods and tools to help the earthquake victims cleaned up the rubbles, make temporary shelters, open road access, and knock down heavily damaged buildings.

Yogyakarta is one of the important milestones of tourism industry and education. Yet it did not equip themselves with the way of thinking, acting and responding to disasters. It

was seen in the area of Piyungan, one of the areas badly damaged and impassable active faults. In Bantul district spatial plan, the areas previously designed as a residential area turned into an industrial area, which could cause more casualties during the earthquake.

Why Lapindo?

Monday could be the beginning of all activities, but not for the people who dwelt in Sidoarjo. Monday, May 29, 2006 was an unforgettable history for the people of Sidoarjo in particular. Sidoarjo district has 18 districts with an area of 71,424,25 ha. The north side is north by Surabaya and Gresik, on the west by Mojokerto, Pasuruan in the south, and Madura Strait in the east.

It was the Production Sharing Contract which represented BP Kangean, Lapindo Brantas, and Kodeco Energy who conducted the oil and gas exploration. Each produced gas as much as 175 MMSCFD, 48 MMSCFD and 80 MMSCFD.¹⁶ The drilling activities in the area of highly potential and very rich in oil experienced a system failure. The result was fatal to the survival of the Porong people. Thousands of cubic meters of hot mud covered most of the sub-districts in Sidoarjo, especially Porong. Until now, there is no certainty when the mud flow can be stopped.

Unfortunately, the state of uncertainty did not make the victims reacted angrily and perform strong and massive resistance. Such natural reaction suppose to arise, especially as mudflow continues to threaten their lives. In common sense, people will put up a fight when their safety and productivity disturbed, for example, when the farmers' land were evicted and seized.

The reality increasingly bitter when people around the mudflow whom did not affected only demonstrated sense of pity. It makes no difference to the people who live

¹⁶ “*Potret Eksploitasi Gas Bumi Jatim*” (Portrait of East Java Gas Exploitation), JATAM

outside the island of Java. Such strong anger and solidarity as if not comparable as the one shown in sport events. The local heroism and fanaticism in supporting the foot ball team in the national league did not show up in solidarity with the people in Porong, Sidorarjo.

Lapindo mudflow disaster was the real portrait of the depravity of state apparatus. The oil and gas extraction was conducted in the middle of settlement areas, without proper calculation of risk that might result due to these activities. Pursuing investments alone, without considering the safety of people and ecological sustainability as the hallmark of this nation. Hopefully there is still time to learn.

CHAPTER 5

The Great Post Road: Daendelism in Java Industrialization

During its heyday, the Great Post Road or Daendels Road, or Anyer-Panarukan Road, was one of the main transport axis of Java. The post road played an important role in the development of Java for nearly two centuries. Although its role began to be replaced by hundreds of kilometers of toll roads in some areas like: Merak-Jakarta-Bogor, Jakarta-Cikampek-Bandung-Cileunyi, Semarang, Gresik, and Surabaya. Still, the Post Road is some kind of auxiliary lines of sketch, which encourages the development of transportation infrastructure in whole Java for the last four decades.

The Post Road development was an important milestone in the history of industrialization and archipelagic trade of Indonesia, especially Java. When the **Post Road** was built, European nations competed with each other to control the world trade. This competition had only one single purpose, monopoly. All things were done, for example, negating each other through war, either by the countries or trading companies, as well as using all the creativities for the sake of winning the competition.

In order to continuously obtain the accumulation of profits, a strategy to maintain and expand the supply became important. All actions and decisions issued by Daendels for his

three years in this archipelagic country were conscious and systematic actions. Not a survival response like what VOC did in earlier centuries.

The Daendels actions were much better planned than the traditional trading style of VOC. Daendels integrated the interests of commerce, industry, defense, and public administration. The impact was tremendous, compared to what VOC did in 200 years!

In contemporary context the Daendels and other Governor Generals ambitions were similar with the construction of toll roads along the 1000 kms, at the beginning of the Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono regime.

The Dutch trading syndicates in the East Indies conquered and controlled most of Java in response to disturbances launched by the local authorities. The VOC involvement in the politics of Java was naturally an attempt to win the trade monopoly (Clive Day: 1904). The fall of Priangan region, in north coast of Java, and the eastern coast of Java was a transaction process between the local political elites and the Dutch, either through diplomacy, intrigue, and war.

There was something unique on Post Road story - the auxiliary lines of transportation in Java. It was praised and criticized at the same time. In various historical references, the road initiated by Daendels always portrayed as a bloody bad tale, the sacrifices of the deployed 12 thousand forced labors to build the Post Road and always underlined in every treatise on Daendels. However, the state apparatus of this archipelagic country, and even common citizens, felt very much helped, for the construction of the Post Road a major transportation route in Java. The giant scale project was even replicated to develop roads in other parts of the island. This speeded up the movement of people and goods between regions and made Java as the most populous island in the world.

This chapter paper is trying to describe the changes driven by the emergence of Post Road. Among them was the role of this road in the ecological, social, and political changes

for the sake of economic growth in the 19th century. The social costs of these changes emerged in different parts of the Java Island. The most important one was the effort of sovereign territories in trying to survive with these changes.

Further development of the Post Road was indeed continuing the Daendels ambition. The costs of development of the business emporium should be paid by the common people. In the age of Daendels and his successors, capitalism found a space for creative-destructive expression. The massive overhaul of living system plus the gigantic infrastructure change accelerated the exploitation of Java's wealth, with costly changes.

Location of the Great Post Road

In his book "*Jalan Raya Pos*", Pramoedya claimed that Daendels did not make any new road from Anyer to Panarukan. Daendels only ordered to widen and harden the road up to 7 meters. Most of the Anyer Panarukan road had been existed, long before Daendels arrived in Java, January 5, 1808.

Not many records found on who built the road connecting the ports on the north coast of Java, although the line was not a trade channel or main military lines. The expedition Java kingdoms from the time of Majapahit to the time VOC arrived were using the road to rally the troops and trade (Raffles, 1811). In some records it was mentioned as a land access to reach the woods in the forests for the construction of ships, housings, and tp open areas of rice field.

Due to slope geographical conditions and calmer sea, the north coast of Java became the busiest areas. The ports on the northern coast of Java became the gate entrance of Java from the past until now. History recorded the growth and fall of the important ports of Java such as: Banten, Sunda Kelapa, Cirebon, Semarang, Tegal, Semarang, Demak, Jepara, Tuban, Gresik, and Surabaya.

The road started from Anyer, the center of old Banten sultanate and ended at Panarukan, an area to the south of Surabaya. That was the reason for calling it “Anyer-Panarukan Road”. When Daendels built the Post Road, the main route indeed did not follow the shoreline. From Batavia, the Post Road veered to the south, in the direction towards the Pasar Minggu to Bogor (*Buitenzorg*), continue towards Ciawi, Puncak, Cianjur to Bandung.

From Bandung, Daendels ordered the road passed through the mountains in the area of Sumedang to Cirebon. From here, the construction of Jalan Raya Pos consistently followed the shore line, connecting the ports on the north coast of Java.

However, as the main infrastructure of Java, Daendels did not just think of a line in the north of the island of Java. But also the need for roads to remote areas, to the centers of the Mataram kingdom which as rich as the northern coast. It was replacing the former direction of flow of goods transported by large rivers such as Bengawan Solo, Brantas, Serang, Kalimas, and Cimanuk as the pathway for goods and humans (Pratiwo: 2002, Raffles: 1818).

The path to the interior had been around for a long time. It was the main line of the kingdoms in Java, generally centered in the interior areas. One of the quite famous was Mataram road that connected the center of Mataram kingdom to Demak and Jepara through Salatiga.

From Trade Competition to War

Java was a Dutch giant laboratory of business emporium, as well as factory of the highly demanded trading commodities in the 19th century, such as sugar, coffee, tea, indigo and tobacco.

To generate abundant profit from trade and industry, there were a number of keywords that cannot be eliminated, efficiency, availability of materials and labor, as well as the market. History shows all trade and industrial revolutions were efforts to improve

efficiency, maintain the supply of materials and labor in the whole industry chain, while continuing to maintain and expand the market.

The scheme required the support of social institutions. Any business emporium recognized this. Therefore it could not be denied, that until today the needs of trade often include political and military power. Not surprisingly, in the late Middle Ages, the entire European merchant fleets were equipped with military force.

Since the days of VOC, the efficiency and availability of supply were major problems that should be solved in order to win trade competition between European nations and native kingdoms of the archipelago.

However, Java was too tempting. The strategic location as well as soil fertility made VOC not only opened intermediary post and warehouses in Java. VOC even moved their trading concentrations from Maluku Islands to Java.

After rummaging through the Moluccas and successfully monopolized trade in the eastern parts of the archipelago, the VOC began to explore the island of Java. Fertility and productivity of spice crops were much higher in Java than Maluku Islands (Raffles: Stockdale).

Moreover, the political situation of Java in 17th century was quite beneficial for those who want to master Java trade. The dispute of the kings from Banten to Blambangan against Mataram was heated. Battles occurred everywhere, building for influence over the remains of Majapahit glory.

At first, the VOC did not have a policy or intention to intervene in the dispute over the kingdoms elite. But in order to maintain supply and trade monopolies, like it or not, VOC was using their power and involved in the turbulent politics of Java.

The prolonged disputes and wars between kingdoms in Java used by VOC to conquer Jaya Katra (or Jakatra) from the hands of the Sultanate of Cirebon (1527). De Graaf noted

that for two centuries, the kingdoms in Java were really meddled by Europeans trade interests, as well as the the ambitions of the power elite in almost all parts of Java, and even up to Madura and Bali.

Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles noted in two centuries, even until the arrival of European trading companies, Java was ruled by many imperials/royals attacking each other. When the Portuguese visited the island of Java in early 16th century, the Sultanate of Demak was just established and being to expand its power to the west, east, and south in the interior of the island of Java.

When the Dutch arrived in Sunda Kelapa, Sultanate of Mataram was just beginning to grow and fight with kingdoms in the west to the east coast. There was no one strong nations and ready to deal with the expansion of the West (Pramoedya, *Arus Balik*). Java was too busy being a theater stage for elites of former Majapahit kingdom.

As a result, disputes between the allied kingdoms were by the VOC, the British East India Company, and Portuguese. The arrival of European trading partners who intended to monopolize the spice trade of the East Indies did not trigger the sultanates in Java to unite, even in the entire archipelago. The inter-imperial rivalry often took advantage of the presence of Europe's trading companies to hit their opponents, particularly in the 17th and 18th centuries.

The elites disputes often led to the royal and imperial wars. In the annals of the past, the elite fights were recorded with sufficient detail by Raffles, then revised by DeGraaf and Pigeaud (1974).

Power Change: by choice or coercion?

Judging from the history of Java, the frequent change of dynasties, rise and fall of empires, were an attempt to seize, retain, and expand the flow of resources, wealth, glory, and pleasure. At some events, the kings of Java seem adaptable to external attacks. Unfortunately

not every generation maintained the spirit of its predecessor, even unwilling to follow. The presence of VOC and Dutch East Indies for three centuries was an option for the elites in dispute.

Any disputes, conflicts, to wars often lead to changes in the power of the region. The overhaul of the power structure, change control over citizens and workforce, so was in Java.

Since ancient times, wars generated new dynasties, shifted the influence areas, changed the flow of resources and labor availability. The strengthening of Islamic kingdoms in the north coast of Java was the most prominent example. The establishment of the empire changed the power landscape of the Hindu kingdoms, which eventually collapsed through the rapid expansion of the Islamic empire alliances all over the coast of Java.

The resources that previously flowed into the interior stopped, and accumulated in the coastal areas. The Islamization was performed massively and systematically. One of reasons was to shift the allegiance from the old kingdoms; Majapahit and Pajajaran. More and more people in Java converted to Java, and switched their loyalty to the coastal areas. In addition, this transition changed the flow of tributes and labor supply to Demak.

Helping and stabbing each other was something that constantly happened in Java for the two centuries. Frederick and Worden in "Indonesia: A Country Study" called it *perennial instability*. Since the fall of Majapahit and then Mataram, it was safe to say there had never been peace among the elites in Java.

The European renaissance in the medieval age and trade expansion efforts into Southeast Asia were indeed sensed by the new rise of Sultanate of Demak. The endeavours to prevent the entry of Europe, which would be the rivals of Islamic merchants trade in the archipelago, carried by the attack of Pati Unus to Malaka, in 1511. However, this attempt failed and never continued.

After the failure and death of Pati Unus, the Java Muslim kings chose to concentrate on expanding their powers. Inevitably, wars took place in the entire Java until the founding of Mataram, decades later.

When Mataram in the interior began to rise and refused to pay taxes to Pajang in east Java, and began attacking the coastal kingdoms, the transitions kept occurring. The battle spread from the west to the eastern tip of Java, formed new loyalties and changed the flow of resources.

Mataram under Sultan Agung I indeed carried out a massive attack to Jayakarta, at the VOC trading posts, two times in 1628 to 1629. But this attack failed, VOC remained in Jayakarta, waiting for key moments to establish its monopoly in Java.

Since the failure of Sultan Agung's attack to Jayakarta, Mataram directed its expansion eastwards, conquering kingdoms on the coast such as Gresik, Surabaya, Tuban and Jepara. Mataram even shut down the entire ports on the coast for trading activities.

The Mataram campaign to the East was not without a fight. The battle lasted from one generation to another. At certain moments, Mataram sought help of others for the sake of stopping the rebellion. The help came from the VOC, which was once the enemy of Mataram in the time of Sultan Agung I.

For several times in the 17th and 18th century, Mataram asked VOC for help to tackle the remaining insurgency in the coastal kingdom. Thanks to the help of VOC, Amangkurat I of Mataram managed to quell the rebellion of Trunoyoyo. But, there is no free lunch. As the return, VOC got a monopoly on sugar, rice, and opium and fertile areas in Priangan.

Similarly, the case happened in the Sultanate of Banten. The disputes between the kingdom elites of Prince of Banten, Sultan Haji with his father, invited VOC to be involved. The result could be expected, the monopoly of trade in the Sultanate of Banten. Until the late 18th century, Banten was no longer a VOC competitor in the spice trade.

The disputes between the kingdoms in Java ended in the mid 18th century through the signing of Gianti agreement (1755). This agreement confirmed the absolute presence of VOC. Not only in the context of trade monopoly, but also the dramatic changes of power structures in the region. After its area was reduced by the submission of Priangan and North Coast, Mataram kingdom was divided into four. Meanwhile Banten and Cirebon ended up being pseudo territory.

The freedom to trade enjoyed before the presence of the European trading companies now vanished. The kings had to divide the profits to the VOC, but still had power over labors. Yet this did not absolutely prevail.

Many power elites, such as the *adipati* (dukes) and regents, were disappointed for being removed from power as their territory got smaller and did not have the freedom to trade. But some indeed actually enjoyed the imbalanced trade relations. The low purchase prices charged to the people. Often people did not get paid or performed forced work to the regents to produce commodity crops.

Although the empires were up and down and loyalties to the 'the lords' constantly changed, but the power relationship between the king and the nobles remained unchanged. Until the late 19th century, Raffles noted perpetuating slave and master relationships among the Java community. The feudalistic relationship patterns in the villages and centers of power, where the villages provided tribute or crops to the king without being replaced, were still ongoing. Through this feudalistic relation, VOC made huge profits from the trade with the kings and the local elites.

VOC basically did not have the freedom to master the entire workforce in Java. In some areas such as in Priangan, VOC imposed *Prianganstelsel*, which forced the farmers, through the regents and *adipati* in the Priangan to grow coffee in most of their land. The coffee then purchased by the VOC with unilaterally set price, which became an important

source of income for VOC. Later, the Governor-General Van den Bosch replicated the *Priangan Stelsel* model into forced cultivation (*cultuur stelsel*).

In other areas, such as in the north and east coast of Java, VOC was entering agreements with the kings, without directly touching the production affairs in the field. The local kings or regents developed the mechanisms to ensure the produces and spices guaranteed for VOC. Through local feudal structure, which was supported by the master and servant relationship, the local authorities supplied commodities to the VOC. The people in various ways were forced to be supplier of agricultural products that will be handed over to the VOC.

Until the 19th century, no people's resistance to VOC-or the kings was recorded. The people's life remained like the one under the Majapahit golden age, although the current was now changed, to the days of *Neerlandica*.

The collapse of Java was indeed an option. The Javanese political elite were so busy fighting and competing that they forget the threat of outside intervention. Javanese elites choose to enjoy and maintain their own pleasure and power, rather than doing a dramatic deal for the sake of defending themselves from outside attacks.

Basic Industrial Integration of Java

As a giant infrastructure, Post Road was a manifestation of the efforts to integrate the interests of economic, military, and regional governance. The Post Road construction was not only physical development, but a systematic effort to overhaul the Java ecological and political-economic system to become more capitalistic. The infrastructure development in the era of Daendels occurred not only in the physical sector, public works, agriculture, and forestry, but also in the fields of law and government. What Daendels built was the initial sketch of industrialization development of Java in the future decades.

The Post Road was built during the peak of European trade and industrial competition. The industrial revolution driven by the discovery of the steam engine and the new modes of economy and free labor market encouraged a number of revolutions in Europe.

In the late 18th century and early 19th, Europe was in turmoil. Napoleon Bonaparte was campaigning to conquer the neighboring countries, including the Netherlands. The war in Europe, especially between Britain and France, spread quickly to the colonial countries, including the islands of the archipelago.

The British economic progress and ability to master the world sea trade routes, required France to maintain the entire the region that support the war economy. The Kingdom of the Netherlands, who was then under French conquest, was assigned to maintain the production centers from the British attack, including Java.

The fact that the British entrenched in Bengkulu and Malaka was a threat to the survival of Dutch trade in the archipelago. The defeat of the French fleet in the European Theatre produced new strategy to defend the mainland. Moreover, at that time, Java was the richest island in the world that made VOC as richest VOC parastatal on earth.

Marschalk William Herman Daendels, a Dutch military officer who served in the armies of Napoleon, commissioned by the Dutch monarch at that time, Lodewijk Bonaparte, to defend Java from the British attack.

In Java, Daendels had to deal with administrative chaos and corrupt, bankrupt and finally disbanded in 1799 of VOC. The VOC administration system relied on trade monopoly alone, without direct control over production. VOC depended on on relationships and coercion to native warlords who sold the agricultural products. The development of a mode of production developed in England and its colonies were more beneficial, while VOC constantly due to the corruption of the VOC officials with the Javanese elites.

Daendels with all his ambition and determination reaffirmed the Dutch-French political-economic power in Java. In the history of Dutch presence in the East Indies, the Governor-General Daendels was the official who truly represented the king of the Netherlands to run the East Indies government as colonized country (Burger: 1962). Daendels intentionally and seriously restructured the political system inherited by VOC. The existing structures of government, power and authority which were still owned by the Jave kings and dukes could inhibit the Dutch-French mission to build the coastal defenses of Java.

Daendels immediately demolished the barriers caused by the collusion of VOC officials with local authorities. The previous system of government that tended to be more autonomous was changed into a concentrated one, like a civil servant model. All the kings and rulers of native territories were not allowed to levy of their own crops and divided or sold the results to the Dutch. It was the Dutch administrative who managed the crops; sugar, coffee, indigo, pepper, and teak.

The native kings and warlords become salaried employees, being submissive and obedient to their employer. Through this system Daendels also ordered the kings and regents throughout Java to mobilize people into forced labor. Demanding people to give up their rice harvest to supply food for the laborers and overseers of the road construction.

The Dutch relations with the native rulers no longer associated with the trade, but became lord and henchmen. Therefore, as the governor-general, Daendels had the right and authority to order the native rulers to mobilize the native slaves and rice to build the Post Road or *De Grote Postweg* or *La Grande Route*, from Anyer to Panarukan along 1000 kms and get it finished in just one year! The target was actually three years but it could be done in one year.

The power disarmament operation was an important agenda to meet the needs of coolies for road construction and provision of food supplies. Not all areas were willing to

give up the privileges of the kings, who got a share of trade with the VOC. Native rulers responded to Daendels action in various manners. Some areas were recorded to perform open resistance. But some were willing to surrender and disarm without any resistance, being obedient to mobilize their people to build the road, while enjoying the disbursement of guilders salary as the Dutch royal servants.

Several attempts of resistance to Daendels instruction occurred in Banten. Sultanate of Banten refusal to mobilize the people for the construction of road from Anyer to Batavia ended with the surrender of the Sultan of Banten.

Fierce resistance also occurred around Sumedang. Prince Kornel refused and fought against Daendels, who demanded to open the roads in the rocky area near Sumedang. The Prince Kornel resistance was defeated, and thousands of people were forced to open one of the toughest roads along the way.

The frontal resistance of two regions, Cirebon and Banten, led to the abolition of the Sultanate of Banten and Cirebon. Administration of both areas were taken over by the Dutch.

Daendels was in power for only three years, but his existence indeed created a horror for the people passed by the Post Road. During this time, at least 12 thousands of people have died of hunger and exhaustion, caused by the forced labor (corvee) to widen the road. This was the reported by the British administration in the Raffles days. There was never any exact number of people who died while building the Post Road.

The Post Road did not just vitimize the native people. Dozens of white officials also became victims for exhaustion, malaria and cholera. Batang, now in Central Java, was one of the areas that suffered the most casualties. Batang itself means corpse, to commemorate the hell of the road construction.

But did Daendels work only focused on the road infrastructure only?

Daendels did not just perform his military duties. Officially his position as governor general assigned him to take care of the colonies for the benefit of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The subordinate of Daendels (Clive Day: 1904) recorded how Daendels forced the native people and local power elites to mobilize their workforce. Not only for trade but also public works, like road infrastructure, defense, as well as the routine costs of the officials and establishment of government departments.

In addition to finance the preparation of war, he was also assigned to increase the coffers of the Dutch empire, which at that time was under the protectorate of France. The production of cash crops remained an option for Daendels.

Daendels understood that the decrease of cash income for the Netherlands caused by corruption and extortion of the VOC officials and the regents. Daendels broke the ties vulnerable to corruption through disarmament measures. However, Daendels was not only cleaning and changing the system of government and trade susceptible to levies became more efficient. Furthermore he expanded the production of crops such as coffee areas along the north coast of Java.

In fact, in order to ensure the sustainability of wood supply, Daendels deliberately revoked the authority of Rembang and Jepara Regents on teak forest in those regions. Daendels established a kind of forest department who was in charge of taking care and ensuring supply of teaks for the needs of the Netherlands.

It was in in this era where the Dutch absolutely control most regions of Java, except for the remnants of the Mataram kingdom which still had limited privileges as a protectorate. At this time also, Daendels claimed that the lands outside of private lands and the kingdom of Mataram owned by the Netherlands Kingdom. The integration of capital interest was seriously conducted and provided a foundation for further development of industrialization.

Meanwhile, the war and competition was the increasingly sharp between the European kingdoms. The modern ideas on the accumulation of capital accompanied the departure of Daendels to maintain the island of Java, while continuing to accumulate profits. Daendels changed the character of the VOC-style government into a centralized one. It created the foundation of industrialization through the development of physical infrastructure, the expansion of production land, modification of labor deployment pattern, changes in the political structure and judicial system, as well as enforcement of taxes.

Being in power for the short of period time made Daendels could not finish all his missions. Mostly were principles which were then developed and modified by the coming British and Dutch governor-general: Raffles, Van der Cappelen and Van den Bosch (van Zanden, Clive Day: 1904).

But what Daendels did laid down the foundations of further changes in Java, which provided double benefits for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and enjoyed by the local elites of Java, mostly under the expenses of the common people.

The Great Post Road At Last

Dutch government gained absolute benefit from the enormous infrastructure of that era, the Post Road. Along the Post Road grew the cities that turned into economic industrial estates and manufactures. Nas and Pratiwo (2002) recorded that it was eventually encouraged the creation of Java as the longest city in the world. The road became the configuration of economic settlement that used to be based on the river. The role of the river as a means of mobility gradually decreased and vanished.

The decrease of rivers roles in the lives of the Javanese population led to abandon the river basin. Sedimentation occurred in a number of important rivers in West and Central Java. A number of traditional ports at the mouth of the river such as Lasem, abandoned since the

construction of Post Road. The sea lane was no longer a major trade lane. The burden now falls to the ground due to industrialization.

Unfortunately there were no studies about the impact of abandoning the rivers as an important means of human activity.

Another big change occurred was the expansion of coffee plantations, sugar cane, and indigo in the area around the Post Road, and the entire supporting industrialization. The Post Road did not necessarily provide direct impacts of the drastic changes on the ecology, socio-politic, and economy of Java. Yet it should be remembered, Daendels inculcated the principles of integrating physical infrastructure, land administration, industry, legal, and regional administrative management in a single blow.

The successors of Daendels constantly used and modified so that until industrialization continued to provide profits for the Dutch East Indies and a small number of elites in Java, while the costs industrial experiments kept borne by the common people from time to time

Costs of Industrialization Experiments

After Daendels, the industrial expansion performed by Dutch East Indies administration in systematic manner. After Raffles leaving Java, from 1819 to 1830 was a trial period of industrialization. Compliance and order *ala* the new rulers, the Dutch East Indies. In 1830, with the conditions full of debt and lessons from the former rulers, the Governor-General Van den Bosch Dutch conducted the real mission of colonial Dutch. Taking care of Java as a production tool that provided benefits for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in order to pay the previous debts and rebuild the kingdom, ravaged by European War.

Van den Bosch introduced the *cultuur stelsel* system or also known as forced cultivation, inheriting the ambition of Daendels to build Java industrialization. Van den

Bosch just followed what had been left by Daendels, in terms of physical and principles of industrialization development.

The expansion of plantation through forced cultivation found fertile lands after Daendels developed: new transportation lines, claims on most of the land of Java as belonging to the King of Netherlands, disarmament of local powers as officials of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the implementation of continental judiciary.

This section describes a factual analysis of changes in the socio-ecology of Java, a picture of the destructive forces of industrialization initiated by the Post Road. A capitalistic creativity for the sake of high profit margins and an opportunity to develop sugar and coffee emporium in the world

Ecological Changes

The biggest ecological change triggered by the plantations industrialization was deforestation. The year of 1830 was the starting point of the most prominent ecological changes for almost two centuries.

Before the forced cultivation era, large quantities of woods were used to build the Dutch ships. The forced cultivation encouraged farmers to expand cultivation farm for planting cash crops. Coffee, cloves, and tea were the perennial plants that changed the landscape of Java forests (Whitten, 1996). Although initially forced cultivation required only 5% of farmers' lands planted with commodity crops, yet in practice the farmers were forced to work on larger piece of the land.

The intercropping system encouraged by the Dutch East Indies government could only be treated in certain plants such as indigo, sugarcane, and tobacco in ricefield areas. But other main commodities like coffee and tea required farmers to clear up the forest and turn them into coffee and tea plantations. The impact was incredible. In a short time the whole

mountain in Java from an altitude of 600 to 1000 meters turned into coffee belt, eliminating the forest ecosystem forever (Heffner, 1990).

In a period of less than 25 years (1898 – 1922) the amount of lost forests were 22 thousand km² or 220 thousand ha (Whitten: 1996). Mostly were used for construction of the railroad following the Post Road. Meanwhile, from 1830s to 1900, the forest loss reached 5 million ha. In 1973 alone, the natural forests in Java were only 11% (Donner: 1987).

Coffee and tea were the main crops that replaced the forest vegetation. The acceleration of the expansion of coffee plantations occurred in 1830 – 1833. In 1833 alone, the number of coffee trees in Java reached 116 million trees. Two-thirds of the required coffee trees shall be in Cirebon, Central Java, and East Java (Burger: 1962). If one coffee tree required 4 square meters of land, the land of coffee in 1833 had reached 464 thousand ha. It contributed nearly 10% of the natural forest loss for 70 years.

One of the fatal mistakes of the coffee plant expansion occurred in Gunung Sewu, southern coast of Java. In 1850, the Dutch tried to grow coffee in Gunung Sewu. At that time the natural forest there had fertile alluvial soil suitable for coffee. The Dutch then replaced most of the vegetation with coffee trees. In fact, the area was not suitable for growing coffee. Gunung Sewu forest vegetation, which was a mountainous limestone and karst areas could not be replaced by other crops, such as coffee. The coffee tree planting efforts were fail and thousands were left abandoned. The impact of the loss of forest vegetation by the failure of the coffee is the drought in the region that lasts up to 1.5 centuries later.

The expansion of plantation areas also supported with the shifts of land control. During the industrial liberalization after the forced cultivation, a large amount of land handed over to private estates. As the result, in 1860 – 1870s, the colonial government had granted tenure on an area of one million hectares to just 345 people in Java (Donner, 1987).

Another modifier of Java ecology was sugar cane and indigo plantations developed in wetland areas along the northern coast and inland plains, like in Madiun, the regions of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Burger noted the development of sugarcane areas reached more than 141 thousand ha.

Table: Areas of Sugar Cane Crop in Java 1833 – 1910

Source: Burger, 1962

The story of sugarcane was one of the most stirring stories in the history of Java. Until the early 20th century, Java was the largest sugarcane producer in the world and gave tremendous advantage for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Infrastructure Expansion and Migration

In order to accelerate the flow of goods from production areas to the trading ports, such as Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya, the road infrastructure expanded. The road network with the Post Road as the spine connected the ports and some production areas in Priangan and the North Coast of Java. Then extended again into the mountains areas producing coffee and tea.

A number of dams and irrigation were constructed, especially in sugarcane areas. Ports were expanded and cities established rapidly, with the increase in export production.

The expansion of road accelerated the migration into previously isolated areas, such as the Tengger mountains. The road to inland accelerated the movement of people to the mountainous areas, avoiding the sugar cane forced cultivation.

Besides driven by wars, the population movements, which were generally farmers, was avoiding sugar cane forced cultivation that required a lot of time and efforts, compared to grow rice for consumption or coffee. Coffee did not require a lot of work, especially after the growing season. Therefore many farmers went to the mountains to avoid the hard labor in sugarcane plantations in the plains areas.

As a result, the pressure on mountain ecosystems was increasing rapidly. In Tengger region, the population increased over 20 times just in one century. Tengger population in 1830 amounted to 2200's people and increased up to 49 thousand people in 1930. The fastest growth occurred in the period 1830 to 1870.

Before the forced industrialization took place, the work rotation in plantations or factories never existed. Yet the forced cultivation required the heads of the village to mobilize their population in such a way, including freeing the villagers from the village social work when required to work in the factory. Rich people paid other people to do the work required, and this continued, from an adaptation in permanent practices.

Expansion of sugarcane and indigo in the plains really affected people's lives. In order to meet the supply of sugar mills, the forced labor required to spend time only for sugarcane and indigo. The social organizations in rural areas were also forced to change, in order to meet the supply of labors for the factories and plantations.

In 1841, about 2,000 people moved out of the Bagelen area because they could not bear the heavy workload. It took over 9 years to increase population in the region (Burger, 1962).

Promoting Hunger

Throughout the 19th century, based on Boomgard analysis (2002), Java experienced some deteriorations, a combination of climate chaos and economic political factors. The span of time was 1816 to 1824, then 1844 to 1854, and from 1862 to 1870.

In 1816 to 1824 was filled with large-scale famine in Lombok, Bali and Java. There were at least two very dry years and two very wet years, not favorable for agriculture. Climate change was considered to be caused by the eruption of Mount Tambora, causing crop failure in a large number of areas.

Development of Post Road since 1808 to 1811 led to the decrease of capacity the people of Java to survive. Raffles and Van der Cappellen were present in Java to replace Daendels. Both carried out the spirit liberalization as an attempt to implement a system prevailed on the European kingdoms in Java. The feudalistic structure of used by VOC or exploited by Daendels wanted to be abolished. The entire land was taken over by the parent kingdom (England in the time of Raffles, and the Netherlands at the time of Van-der Cappelen).

At the same time, a new system called the land tax and head tax were introduced. Previously, at least until Daendels arrived, the king and the regents had the authority over land and labor. The king or regent collected tribute from the people who then sold to the VOC at a predefined price. When VOC was dissolved the system was still continuing.

Along with the collapse of feudalism in Europe, Daendels and his successors regarded the feudalistic relationship that still existed in Java hinder industrialization. Business and government should be separated. People need to have the freedom of having the means of production, as well as free labor. State (in this case the East Indies) received income from taxes and land lease. Therefore the feudal forces must be eliminated. The relationship with their slaves must be broken so slavery vanished and people became free labor or lease land for production.

Raffles and Van der Cappellen imposed taxes in order to obtain fund for the East Indies. The people were obliged to pay taxes and land lease if they cultivated any land, even for subsistence. As a result, people were striving to produce but only to pay taxes. A number of records on 19th century economics suggested that the income of people who were new to the money economy, entirely given to Raffles or Van der Cappellen colonial government. If not, their land or assets will be confiscated by the colonial regime.

The economic conditions that had not recovered after the European war and the construction of Post Road, plus the bad climate, forced the people to sell the entire small crop is not much, in order to pay for taxes. Sometimes no more money left to buy food. Subsistence life was even more difficult due to tax payments. No wonder at the time of liberalization experiments under Raffles and Van der Cappellen, famine took place in some parts of Java.

On another episode, in the days of forced cultivation, starvation also struck in some parts of Java. This time it was not because the entire production must be sold to pay taxes. Famine took place due to the rate of rice production was hampered by the expansion of sugar cane.

Such heavy work plus exertion of large workforce on sugarcane plantations and indigo made farmers abandoned their ricefield. The whole energy and time devoted to cash crops. Consequently, the rice harvests were shrinking and food shortages occurred.

Famine conditions in forced cultivation era were different with the days of liberalism trial under Raffles and Van der Cappellen. In the age of forced cultivation, the decrease of rice production created rice shortages. The price of rice and other foodstuffs rose due to inadequate production.

The people who earned wages from private plantations were no longer able to buy rice. Similarly the subsistence mode was also faded due to the deployment of labor to grow sugar cane and other crops.

Another problem faced by the Pamanukan-Ciasem industry was sugarcane land. The cane farms opened not placed in the ricefield, but opening an entirely new lands. Therefore it required high perseintence to prepare the land into ricefield. In fact, sugar is spoiled crop that need intensive irrigation and drainage (Cahyono, 1988).

A number of areas who were formerly able to export rice to other regions, even to outside of Java, now their ability were shrinking. In fact, at the time of rice harvest some areas no longer able to meet the local needs. Pamanukan-Ciasem, Cirebon, Banyumas, Bagelen, and Bojonegoro were the regions that suffered famine in the 19th century.

In Bagelen region, land became infertile due to indigo plant. Rice no longer thrives if planted after indigo. Farmers became frustrated and left the villages not only because of the heavy work, but the destruction of soil fertility due to cash crops.

The decline of the agricultural sector of rice was not only because of wetlands developed especially for indigo and sugar cane, but also water. The irrigation developed by Dutch government no longer intended to support rice crops, but sugarcane.

After it was hit by famine, Java still had to suffer other disaster, disease. Boomgard (2002) recorded the outbreaks of smallpox, cholera, and typhoid fever in the majority of the island of Java, especially in areas that experienced food insecurity. Unfortunately, the authors have not found any record of how many victims of the disease outbreak, as well as the link between the disease with the collapse of the people's capacity for subsistence at that era.

How those who still survived got out of this situation? Migration was one way. Although some areas experienced worsening situation due to forced cultivation, some other areas were not experiencing serious deterioration. Surabaya, Probolinggo and Pasuruan which were the largest sugar producer in Java at that time, became one of the targets of migration.

Burger and Atmosudirjo (1962) wrote that one of the impacts of forced cultivation was free labor. The people who did not own land or run away from forced cultivation chose to become wage workers on private estates. They wander in the plantation areas and often involved in law violations. As free wage workers, these groups support the 'entertainers', such as gambling, opium, and *ronggeng*. The gambling and opium houses as well as the *ronggeng* dancers lived from the money of the free workers.

Java At Last

Until the 21st century, the nature of the destruction of nature through mega projects resulted in massive displacement, forced displacement, and destruction of natural cycles continuously. It created human victims, who continued to live in survival conditions.

Migration to urban areas was unsolved phenomenon from age to age. The emergence of urban slums and declining health status in many areas was a phenomenon that had been taken place in the previous century. The widespread of areas vulnerable to disasters is an indication of the development model as envisioned by Daendels and followed by his successors, both in the colonial days and the present republic. They failed to realize the dream of prosperity for the majority of the population of Java.

Java is a real portrait of a creative but destructive character. Always using the same formula to determine who gets the benefit, and ignoring large numbers of victims of human and nature. Furthermore, the feedback from the development model supported by large infrastructure expanded the crisis which was solved with the same formula. The gigantic scale of repair or patching, with the goal that seems noble, still only benefit a handful of people and hurt many others.

The question is: how Java citizens and their leaders can break the vicious circle of Daendels character, dreams, and practices?

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CHAPTER 6

LIFESTYLE GARBAGE OR GARBAGE LIFESTYLE?

Mengapa kita membangun kota metropolitan?

Dan alpa terhadap peradaban di desa?

Kenapa pembangunan menjurus kepada penumpukan, dan tidak kepada pengedaran...?

Why are we building a metropolitan city?

And neglecting the civilization in the village?

Why development lead to accumulation, and not to the distribution ...?

(WS Rendra, poet)

Bandung, as we know, used to be a part of the Kingdom of Padjadjaran (1466). When VOC colonized, this region became a place of exiled people from Europe. Important developments took place around 1810, when the Governor General Hermann W. Daendels decided the zero point (Kilometer 0) on the Post Road (*Groote Postweg*) in Bandung city. It was precisely in Asia Afrika Street. The road connected Batavia (Jakarta) to other parts of Java, a mega project that is used as a role model of development today.¹⁷

Since then, the development of various infrastructure and urban facilities were intensively performed. During the decade of 1920-1930's, there were so many monumental buildings constructed, which characterized the identity of Bandung city until now. Among them, *Department Verkeer en Waterstaat* building or now known as Gedung Sate. This building was known as the center of a national government. The West and East Hall Buildings of ITB Campus, as well as the campus master plan, was embryo of the first technical university in Indonesia. Other buildings are not less interesting, like Isola Villa, Savoy Homann Hotel, Preanger Hotel, Merdeka Building, and others.

The Dutch architects designed and constructed a lot of interesting buildings. The development made Bandung as one of the ten cities with the highest numbers of *Art Deco* architectures in the world, one level above the city of Paris in France.

¹⁷ Bandung was also designated as administrative city under the control of Daendels called *Gemeente*. This position put Bandung as important political and social point in Java.

Apart from buildings, the design of green open spaces shaped the identity of Bandung. Bandung also has many parks, fields and urban open spaces. Apparently, the garden city initiated by Sir Thomas More in 1516 was willing to be realized by the planners of Bandung city at that time. Unsurprisingly, with the arrangement of nature, gardens and the environment Bandung was hailed as Kota Kembang (Flower City).

Bandung was also one of the base of people's resistance during the struggle for independence. One of them was the burning to ash incident in March 1946, known as the *Bandung Lautan Api* (Bandung Ocean of Fire). The most monumental event occurred in 1955, when Bandung hosted the Asia-Africa Conference, a meeting that bringing together Anti-Imperialism and Anti-colonialism countries in the Non-Aligned political stance.

Yet after 50 years, fundamental changes occurred. The anti-imperialism stance was vanished, replaced with massive globalization. One indication was the construction of mega highway project connecting Jakarta and Bandung. This was a time bomb of industrialization activities in Bandung.

Bandung is No Exception

Bandung landscape is right in the middle of an area that looks like a large bowl or basin, surrounded by hills and mountains. This basin used to be a large ancient lake and still save millions of cubic of water in it. The center of Bandung basin is the city of Bandung, the capital of West Java province. As the largest city in West Java, Bandung has the advantage of facilities and infrastructure, the main attraction of all activities. Being so greedy, Bandung can be dubbed "completely open city" that accommodate a variety of activities, i.e., as the central government of West Java, local and regional trade center, education and science center, tourism city, culture and conferences, as well as industrial center. This gives heavy pressure and burden for Bandung Basin, as the development is now infiltrating the mountains.

Such condition of Bandung attracted the investors. In turn, the capital accelerated the pace of macroeconomic growth, which has been justified as the only indicator of progress. The hope indeed does not miss. In 1975 – 1985, for example, the rate of growth in Bandung (the status of municipality at that time) reached an average of 9 percent per year. In 1985-1990, increased to 12.02 percent. Far above the average rate of economic growth in West Java, which was only 7.6 percent.

However, the increase in investment boosted the migration flows. Geographically, however, Bandung has different character from other big cities in Indonesia. Bandung's landscape is the only large city and capital of the province located in the plateau region (hinterland), while other big cities are usually in coastal areas. Bandung is also surrounded by many mountains. This is what makes Bandung has geographical limitations, despite the territorial expansion for five times.

When it was initially established as *Gemeente*¹⁸ on April 1, 1906, the population was only 38,403 inhabitants with an area of 1,922 ha. Now Bandung area is approximately 16,729.65 ha, with 2.5 million population with an average density of 128 persons per hectare. Far above the UN standard which is 60 persons per hectare.

According to Bapedda of West Java, the area of Bandung Basin is 348,891.38 ha, which include: Bandung City, Bandung District, Cimahi City, Sumedang District (Sub-district of Tanjungsari, Cimanggung, Jatinangor, Sukasari, and Pamulihan), with population of 7,554,747 people, with a density of 22 people/hectare. Bandung City was the most dense with an area of 16729.65 ha and population growth rate of 4.37%.

¹⁸ When the *Gemente* was established, Bandung is divided into two districts, namely: Bandung Kulon Sub-district (West) and Bandung Wetan (East). The following new status marked the increasing role of Bandung as the socio-political arena in Java “Old City New City, History of Cities in Indonesia”, 2005, pp. 189.

The land use in the area of Bandung Basin further reducing the primary forest, secondary forest, plantations and rice fields. In 1994, the Bandung Basin primary forest was 57.294.4 ha, and reduced to 1,545.7 ha in 2001. Plantations and ricefields are also shrinking.

The land use change is actually contrary to the Spatial Plan which has been established to address the massive expansion of the population. The settlement areas increased 10 percent each year. In 1991 alone, the settlement area 29,914.9 ha. Ten years later it became an area of 3,3025.1 hectares.

The settlements can be found in Margacinta and Gedebage. The two areas are vast paddy fields functioning as dike that retain water so that Bandung regency will not suffer from annual flooding. The situation is not different with North Bandung, especially Puncut region. Various types of housing have been standing there. Although the area is designated as the water catchment area of Bandung. Not only that, it threatens the area of Boscha center of star observations, with such a bright light at night.

The southern part of Bandung Basin area has become the center of a rapidly growing industrial area. In 1999, the area of the industrial park was 2,356.2 acres. In 2001, it increased to 2,478.8 hectares and every year, the growth chart is rising rapidly.

In 2005 alone, the investment rate rose to Rp 3,658 trillion. This led to an increased use of land for industry, where Bandung District and Cimahi City are the largest industrial area. Not only for textiles, but also various food, toys, chemicals, wood, bamboo, rattan and metal industries. The industrialization in the two areas spread to many sub-districts, such as South Cimahi, Leuwigajah (both part of Cimahi City), Dayeuhkolot, Banjaran, Cikancung, Cipeunduey, and so on.

Land Use	Referrals (Ha)	Land Use		Deviation	
		Area (Ha)	%	Area (Ha)	%
Industrial Land	1077.12	466.1	43.27	606.5	3.32

Use					
Residential land use	11748.08	7770.11	66.14	3941.07	20.97
Trade/services land use	430.92	235.72	54.70	252.8	1.11
Use of land conversion	1114.28	463.21	41.57	701.32	3.68

Sources: Annual State of the Environment Report 2003

The growth of Bandung Basin impacted the Bandung City located in the central part. The rapid development of Bandung leaving behind the surrounding towns.

The problems of urban growth have actually been anticipated since 30 years ago. In 1974, there was the concept of Bandung Urban Development Strategies (BUDS). The concept was an attempt to move the majority of primary and secondary functions to the satellite areas around Bandung, such as Cimahi, Dayeuh Kolot, Banjaran, as well as several other areas. This concept was believed to be able to resolve the problems of the city. Yet at the end it was not implemented, and even generated a new problem in the development of the city.

This concept continued into the period of 1977-1978, just changing its name to Bandung Urban Development and Sanitation Study (BUDSS). In 1979-1986, it became Bandung Urban Development Project (BUDP) I and BUDP II in 1986-1994. All of them aimed at managing and developing the improvement of the basin area.

Unfortunately, the documents were not being applied in the field as planned. Small towns around Bandung, such as Banjaran, Cicalengka, Cimahi, Cileunyi and Lembang were growing rapidly but did not lead to the initial function as a supporting satellite city. They tended to blend with the Bandung City.

The fact that satellite cities did not grow as supporting cities of Bandung can be observed from the development pattern of each areas. Cimahi, for instance, only experienced the administrative changes into municipality, yet Cimahi doesn't seem to be able to develop its own city. The same case with Lembang, that became an alternative tourism destination to the heavily crowded Bandung. Typically, the domestic tourists will not just come for shopping in Bandung, but also traveled to other cities in Bandung Basin region.

The many roles of Bandung are not supported by adequate policies, as in the case of North Bandung Area (KBU) which continues to be debated and unresolved. Automatically, KBU function changed from the catchment area into elite residential areas with luxury housings.

The population rate continues to grow that encourages the consumption of essential and non-essential needs. From 2002 to 2005, the number of markets in Bandung District increased almost two-fold, from 29 to 45 markets. The same thing happened in Bandung City, from 48 to 98 markets in 2005.

Bandung City Economic Zones Tweedledum and Tweedledee

The rapid economic growth in Bandung was marked by the rise of industrial centers and markets. This situation made Bandung as one of the shopping centers in Java. Many people visited to exchange money with a variety of industrial products of Bandung.

The industrial centers of Bandung have their respective characteristics, but not well organized. Among them, Cihampelas is famous with jeans clothing, Binongjati with knitting industry, Cibaduyut with leather shoes and bags, and screen printing services in Soerapatti-Cicaheum (Suci). One of the interesting industrial centers is Cigondewah, center of textile industry.

Cigondewah area is only about 300 ha, consist of three villages, Cigondewah Kaler, Cigondewah Kidul, and Cigondewah Rahayu. In addition, there is another village that

becomes part of Bandung Regency which is Cigondewah Hilir (121,232 ha). This village hat located in the western part of Bandung was known as "kuya", 'seedy but rich'.¹⁹

Cigondewah began to develop into an industrial area since last 20 years. The spectacular development occurred for the last two years, since it was proclaimed as 'Cloth Shopping Zone'. Cigondewah grew into transaction the center of a wide range of textiles and the processed products, as well as recycled materials from factories around Bandung. Hundreds of fabric entrepreneurs grew like mushrooms in the rainy season. The numbers of fabric businessmen here are not less than 400 people. That does not include the entrepreneurs of cardboard, bags, food, and so on.

As a regional textile industry, Cigondewah does look shabby. Textile waste such as leftover fabrics looks scattered. Household garbage piled in the streets and in the home yard. Although being slum and most employers only have basic education (elementary school), it is famous as rich area, as they live well from the textile waste.

In addition to family tradition of being to employers, the geographical condition is another supporting factor. Cigondewah is easy to access from many major highway along the Padalarang-Ciluenyi toll that makes it being a strategic location.

Another advantage, Cigondewah is an integrated area that can be observed from the types of businesses that thrive there. Starting from the production and sale of fabric, purses, hats, mattresses, mats, children and adult clothing, muslim clothing, and supporting materials for the textile industry. There are also recycled materials such as cardboard, sacks, plastic, rags, yarn, and patchwork, as well as processed foods such as *borondong* (popcorn) and crackers. Most products are in good quality at a cheap price.

The growth of industrial centers encourage the development of a number of markets selling a variety of products. Various shopping centers are built, from malls in every corners

¹⁹ Cigondewah industrial area began to grow up in early 2000s to date

of the city, factory outlet (FO), to distribution centers. Some of them displaced the traditional market built many years ago. In addition to the formal trading centers, there are also *pasar kaget* (surprise/impromptu markets), which usually occupy the open spaces in different corners of the city.

In Bandung City, the *pasar kaget* appeared in some corners of the city on certain days, like Sunday. This kind of markets can be found in Tegalega, parks and roads in front of Metro Margahayu Raya Housing (snack stalls and street vendors), west side parking lot of Bandung Super Mall (used car), Macro parking lot (used car), Ciumbeuleuit area (snack, vegetables and crops, more like traditional markets), and the main roads of Arcamanik Housing.

The Gasibu field, in front of Gedung Sate – Governor of West Java Office, perhaps the biggest *pasar kaget* in Bandung. The market known as Gasibu Market open every weekend, and extends from Gasibu field, to Supratman Road, right in front of Gedung Sate. This area became hawkers stalls selling a variety of snacks and foods.

In addition to the Sunday surprise market, some are only open on certain dates, such as the surprise market in front of Taman Lansia in Gedung Sate area, which is only open every on 1st and 2nd day of each month, coincide with the time of the civil servants payday. Another one was at the east end of Naripan Street, which is open every 7 to 10 each month, coincide with the schedule of taking pensions for civil servants.

When closely examined, the presence of these impromptu markets has certain characteristics. They they occupy spaces in Bandung on a temporary basis. This phenomenon is known as *urban spatio temporal places* (USTP). Actually, not only *pasar kaget* which are categorized as USTP²⁰, as it also applies for certain times when the town space used for various activities, yet the main function of the space does not change or switch. The

²⁰ The definition is intended for the temporary use of city space for various activities.

utilization of the space can occur formally or informally. The presence *pasar kaget* using open space on Sundays or other days, not because Bandung has market shortages, yet more because of other motives.²¹

For the people of Bandung, the Sunday could be regarded as market and relaxation day. On the other hand, for some it is an expected day to seek fortune. This is the reason why *pasar kaget* markets emerge. In some locations, they are open from dawn to mid-noon, where they sell various types of merchandises.

For the city dwellers, the Sunday shopping time is more for recreational than shopping purpose. As a result, the production of waste increased every week due to consumption which is actually not that necessary. Such lifestyle contribute to the current condition of Bandung, which is no longer environmentally conducive and sensitive. That is what happens in Leuwigajah, the final garbage disposal of Bandung.

What is it In Leuwigajah?

Leuwigajah is located on the border of Cimahi and Bandung. On February 21, 2005, it was being the center of local, national and regional attention. Not because of the beauty of the area, but due to a large landslide in Leuwigajah Landfill, which occurred at 2:00 am in the morning. The landslide triggered by heavy rains for three consecutive days. About Approximately 2.7 million cubic meters of trashes slid into the valley, where the residential areas located.

After the landslide, for one week Bandung became waste city as the trash left unmanaged. Ironically, at the same time a world class meeting being held, the Asia-Africa Conference. Bandung that is famous for its beauty and compared to Paris, turns into garbage city. No doubt it makes the national officials upset, and even the President had to intervene.

²¹ Results of survey to more than 75% of respondents in three *pasar kaget*.

Leuwigajah waste disposal area (TPA) is the largest one in West Java. Geographically it is located at an altitude of 715-725 meters above sea level. This landfill is located in three regions: Bandung City, Bandung District and Cimahi City, and accommodate waste from surrounding areas.²² The landfill area is 23,505 ha, with Bandung City as the largest user (17,005 ha), and the the rest is used by Cimahi City and Bandung District. It was owned by Bandung City government and built in 1984 to 1985 under the Governor Decree of West Java No. 791/PM.130-Pem/SK.1980. It began to operate began in January 1987, before being closed in June of the same year, then re-opened in October 1987 until the landslide occurred.

The Leuwigajah landslide was not the first time, as previously landslides occurred in 1992, but the casualties not as many as 2005. The signs of the failure of the landfill system had been observed since other landfills in Bandung City were not working, such as Cicabe and Jelesong landfill, which had been taken out of service. As the distance of Sarimukti Landfill was farther than Leuwigajah, then eventually Leuwigajah was chosen as the landfill.

The landslide was not going to be a nightmare and tarnished the face of Bandung, if waste handling was well controlled. Every day over 4 thousand tons of garbage piled in Leuwigajah. The trash of Bandung is averagely 6.5 – 7,5 thousand cubic meters per day, equivalent to 1,864 tons per day. The biggest contributor is residential garbage (3,028 m3), then market waste (459 m3), industrial waste (366 m3), road waste (295 m3), public facilities (184 m3), and business/commercial waste (168 m3). There are inconceivable amount of garbage piled up there in a month.

Garbage Dumps in the City of Bandung

No	Source of Dumps	Volume of	Transported	Untreated	% Unhandled
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²² Landfill waste discharge is based on the results of the survey that showed the average waste per person per day as much as 3.02 liters, equivalent to 0.76 kg/person/day.

	Volume	dumps (m ³)	waste (m ³)	remains (m ³)	
1.	Settlements	3,978	3,028	950	24%
2.	Markets	613	459	154	25%
3.	Roads	449	295	154	34%
4.	Industrial	787	366	421	53%
5.	Business/Commercial	312	168	144	46%
6.	Public Facilities	361	184	177	49%

Source: PD Kebersihan 2003

Geologically, Leuwigajah is a calcareous area, part of the stretch of karst hills in the area of Padalarang. After the Landfills opened, many people come to make a living from the waste. Economic factor encouraged them to settle in the area around the Landfill. All risks, odor and groundwater pollution, and life safety threat were not important considerations for them, until the tremendous impact occurred on February 21, 2005. Dozens of homes buried together with hundreds of people living in it.²³

This is a continuous disaster that took place in Indonesia. According to an American journalist, Andre Vlatchek, many disasters happened in Indonesia were not purely natural factors such as the Mount Merapi and tsunami, but also caused human factors.²⁴ Mahatma Gandhi was true to say “The earth is sufficient to meet all our needs. But it is not enough to

²³ The increased mobility of people in Greater Bandung area triggered by inconsistencies of the local government in controlling the basin area. Before the mega highway project was built, the service industry has grown rapidly.

²⁴ The article was written in one of the American media to address the continuous disaster occurred in Indonesia. He even put Indonesia as the country's first disaster replacing Bangladesh.

meet the needs of a handful of greedy people”. Leuwigajah was one of the disasters caused by negligence, human greed.

Waste Management: Modus of Survival

The profit oriented development has generated a variety of risks that make the region more vulnerable. The design of the Greater Bandung does not count the domino effect. Consequently, the waste production increased. The amount or volume of waste is proportional to the level of consumption of goods or materials used in everyday life. Waste types depending on the type of material consumed. Therefore waste management cannot be separated from the people's lifestyle.

Leuwigajah case could be an example of a system that does not take into account the vulnerability of nature. The negligence in the waste calculation, plus the mismanagement of urban solid waste, resulting in ecological disaster known as trash landslide. The garbage management is still considered in terms of the project to generate revenues, not as a public service.

The management of Leuwigajah landfill is using control landfill system. Trash is compacted and then covered with soil regularly to reduce air pollution. Due to limitations of equipment and funds, the waste management is done by open dumping, dumped and stacked in the open space. This method eventually generated new problem. According to the research, this approach did not take into account the geographical conditions that were prone to landslide.

The results of BIGS (Bandung Institute of Governance Studies) study in 2005 noted that Local Enterprise (PD)²⁵ of Bandung Sanitation Office only got Rp 7 billion of public service budget. The *PD Kebersihan* (Sanitation Local Owned Enterprise) got garbage tax collected from the people. In 2005, the revenues reached Rp 14 billion, but mostly used to

²⁵ The company assigned to take care the garbage of Bandung city

fund operational needs and salaries. BIGS also indicated corruption in the municipal waste management program.

Budget of Sanitation Local Owned Enterprise

2002		2003	
Revenues	Operational Costs	Revenues	Operational Costs
Rp. 7.301.29.025	19.969.384.695	20.018.101.755	21.027.438.538
2004			
Revenues	Operational Costs		
Rp. 21.730.239.270	Rp. 28.590.226.558		

Sources: Department of Sanitation 2004

The open dumping²⁶ and sanitary landfill waste treatment system are common ways of handling big cities waste. It is also practiced in the garbage disposal areas in Jakarta that dispose their garbage to Bantar Gebang Bekasi. This method requires much larger open space, yet there is not plenty of space available for the disposal of municipal waste.

The conflict of interest also exists as a city garbage problem moved to another region, for instance in Bojong, Bogor. The local residents did not want their surroundings used as a landfills of Jakarta. Their rejection was reasonable, as they worried of environmental pollution. Another example was the denial of citizens of Gedebage, Bandung, to the waste treatment using incinerator.²⁷

²⁶ These data were the findings of the ITB task force team formed after Leuwigajah landslide. Three months before the landslide occurred actually the Environmental Engineering Program of ITB had provided an overview of the potential disaster, but the authorities did not do any prevention.

²⁷ The rejection was growing because the city government was indicated to conduct many offenses, such as the tender processes, high cost technology, etc. Conflicts of interest also

Various methods are used to handle municipal waste. Yet what actually happened is just moving the problem to another place. The waste management without changing the collection and treatment methods will not solve the problem, despite of using sophisticated technology. Moreover, most of the waste generated is organic waste.

Based on the research, organic waste requires enormous costs to manage into a product that can be reused. Organic waste generated from the traditional markets and households. The amount of organic waste accounts for 60 to 70 percent of the total waste volume.

The levels of consumption and economic growth proved to encourage the increase volume of waste in the greater Bandung area. The situation is not much different from other major cities in Indonesia. The volume of Jakarta waste in 2006 per day was 6,000 tons, Yogyakarta 1,724 tons, Semarang 1,000 tons, and Surabaya 2,175 tons in 2006, each reached 6,000 tons, 1,724 tons, 1,000 tons and 2,175 tons.

Surviving with Garbage

Garbage often associated with human production that is not used anymore, but the real semantic meaning does not only mean garbage in the landfill. According to the Encyclopedia of Indonesia, trash is unwanted residual materials after the end of a process. Garbage is a man-made concept. In the nature processes there are no wastes, only products that are not moving.

In the Big Indonesian Dictionary (KBBI 2006), the waste is defined as discarded items that are used anymore. Secondhand stuff is a sign of being left behind (already being held, stepped on, passed, and so on).

arised in the handling of municipal waste between the provincial government who still wanted to maintain the TPST Leuwigajah with the Bandung City Government who proposed the concept of waste treatment into energy using incinerator method.

If referring to the above understanding, the garbage is undesirable waste materials. Therefore the definition of waste is not only the disposed one in the landfill, but also relates to the waste of the export, import and cast-off (rejected) items. But the popular meaning is only the first one. This is where the story of trash lifestyle begin.

It is interesting to observe the developments of Bandung City in recent years. In the 1990s, the Cibaduyut shoes center began to be destination of shopping excursions of Indonesian people. Cibaduyut production is awaited, as besides the quality is good; the price is also competitive. After the crisis hit in 1997, the development of Cibaduyut shoes industrial center faltered. Now, it is not even able to massively produce and market shoes.

The economy slowly back to move around 1998. The time when imported used clothing, particularly from Korea and Japan, gradually entered Indonesia. In many cities there were centers of such kind of used clothing.

Initially, the shipping of imported used clothes did not get the government's attention, because it was not categorized as import-export goods and not taxed. When it became a viable business, it was growing very fast. Although it was like buying "a cat in a sack", but the sellers could get them at a low price. A bale or a large sack could be purchased for only some hundred thousand of rupiah only.

When the sack was dismantled and the pieces of clothing sold, the profits could be doubled. Sometimes found several garments worth selling at high prices. The secondhand financiers could get rich fast because one item could be sold for 50 to 150 thousand rupiah. Imagine the profit that one could gain, if one bale contains about 500 pieces of clothing.

The traces of the imported used goods could be observed from Cibadak Mall, Bandung Town Square area, and Cibadak Street. There hundreds of plastic tents provided imported second-hand clothing. Cibadak Street became famous as the second hand clothes later evolved into a lifestyle of Bandung City. Cibadak Mall became the destination to hunt

worth selling secondhand clothes. If lucky, visitors could find a shirt or pant pockets filled with Korean or Chinese money.

The number of enthusiastic people visiting that place disturbed the Square area. The government then moved it to Tegalega area. Although far from the center of the city, there were still many people who hunted for used clothing in this new place.

Now Cibadak is not as busy as it used to. The tents had been dismantled by the city government, as well as in Tegalega. However, some used clothing stores are still open. One of them is in Kiaracondong and Gedebage Market. Although the state suffered heavy losses due to the coming of those duty-free goods, the activities of buying and selling imported second-hand goods continue.

In addition to imported used clothing business, secondhand equipments are also much sought after. Used household or office utensils easily found in every corner of Bandung City. Some were sold in the open place and others in closed one. Tegalega and Cihapit areas are the venues for open sale without tents. Here, shoppers can find items that are no longer available in the market.

There is also an enclosed space, providing the convenience of shopping hunters of cheap used goods. Outlets of Bandung thrift stores are very interesting, equipped cool air-conditioned room, uniformed clerk, fitting price tag, no need to bargain. Café is also available if one wants to take a break. The cashier did not only accept cash payments, but also credit card. *Gerai Barang Bekas* (Babe), *Old & New*, *Barang Titipan Anda* (Batian), *Barang Second* (Base), and *Barang Bekas* (Rangkas) are some of the stores that attracted most buyers.

Various types of goods are available there, such as musical instruments, fishing equipment, sports equipment, mixers, watches, shoes, clothes, jackets and many others. Not

all of them are old goods; some goods are quite new, smooth and flawless. When looking for items that are no longer sold in the market, came to these outlets.

The used goods business is growing, not only for accept used household items, but also the left over from the factories or exported items. Currently, over 65 percent of the goods sold at the outlets are export left overs from the factory warehouse. The rest of the goods were from household secondhand goods. The sales are using the buddy system at low cost. The profits for both sides can be seen from the cheap prices of entrusted goods. Once the goods are sold, the store owners get a tip from the sale.

Garbage Lifestyle and Factory Outlet (FO) Industry

The mega highway project connecting Jakarta-Bandung facilitate access to both regions. This infrastructure is the supporting facility of Bandung city in improving and developing tourism business. It is not clear whether it was the toll road that led to the proliferation of FO and culinary centers, or vice versa. Yet for sure, it will add effects adds to the burden of Bandung Basin.

According to the R & D of Public Works (2006), there were over 20 thousand vehicles every weekend coming into Bandung City. They came from various regions, especially Jakarta. Many who came with family for shopping and culinary visits around the FO areas.

Table of Vehicle Density on Friday at the Pasteur Toll

Sources: enggamasandi.blogspot.com

Bandung area is now just seen as a business opportunity. Various beautiful art deco buildings, which intended as the city landmark, changed into various kinds of FO stores. Such scene is easy to find along Dago and Jalan Riau.

In the age of 196 years, almost two centuries, the Bandung City does not show the image of a well-managed and conceptualized city. It is like an aging city which is becoming

more fragile to support the increasing growth. The contemporary portrait of Bandung shifted away from the concept of natural nuances as it was imagined long time ago.

The construction of Jakarta-Bandung highway encouraged the mobility of Jakarta dwellers to come to Bandung. The numbers are increasing every week. It takes only two hours to get to Bandung. One of their main destinations is the FO outlets. Not visiting the FO stores is like not coming Bandung, they said. Every weekend, the FO outlets in Dago and Jalan are full of car from Jakarta.

At the end of the week, FO is the main attraction of the followers of branded fashion trends. Famous brands like Versace, Aigner, Guess, Calvin Klein are easily found the FO stores. Although sometimes they are not totally perfect and similar to the original products worth hundreds of thousands or even millions rupiah. In FO, the products can be purchased for only tens thousands rupiah only.

Interestingly, the FO visitors are the upper middle class. They use luxury cars parked lined in front of the FO. They are middle-aged women wearing Cartier glasses with the latest type of expensive cellphone in hand, busy ruffling a box reads: 80 percent discount. There are middle age men uncles wearing short pants, with the latest rolex watches, checking Versace belts.

In the category of the international export market, the FO area actually categorized not worth selling or waste products, the export products deemed defective and rejected by the buyer. The industry defines the products failed to sell and consume as trashes.

Initially the FOs help to market the left over of domestic products intended for export. In its development, the FOs did not just sell the left over of domestic exports, but also export left over of other countries. The imports of other countries left over motivated by the inability of domestic industry to capture the local market tastes. Imported products put forward branded goods that the market wants, although the left over goods are not worth exporting.

Unsurprisingly, many FOs filled by left over of garment export or import from other countries to maintain exclusivity.

Moreover, the prices of imported products are relatively cheap considering the amount of taxes being paid when entering Indonesia. The that suppose to be marketed to Europe and United States are sold at cheap prices. For example, jeans and corduroy pants sold at Rp 70,000, shirts for Rp 35,000, and sweatshirts for Rp 20,000.

In the early 2000s, most of the FOs imported as many goods in excess of the demand. The rest were sold by the textile industry into the market, therefore it was no longer exclusive. However, the FO demonstrated changes slowly. The export waste of domestic products already entered most of the FO market. In fact some FOs are already selling the remaining of exports of domestic export. It can be seen from the value of the fabric and garment market in the country that could reach Rp 20 trillion per year, while the world garment market value reached up to U.S. \$ 199 billion per year.

The Creative Bandung

Bandung City is indeed proven its image as the lifestyle trend setter. The ability of the people to create ideas and style make Bandung as Indonesian center of fashion is admirable.

They have developed many ways to adapt to times and survive as a trend setter. From the development of economic centers, either as planned or unplanned, such as Cihampelas, Cibaduyut, Cibadak Mall to FOs. The ability is followed by the capacity to see the market potential. Possibly only the malls that cannot be classified as a form of adaptation of Bandung.

FO is the most interesting phenomena. It could be regarded as a portrait of unique and latest adaptation of Bandung. Each week, visitors from various cities, especially Jakarta, flock to Bandung. They crowded into the corners of the city for FO shopping. This phenomenon is the way Bandung survives when the glory of Cihampelas jeans faded in the

mid-1990s, followed by Cibadak Mall in the 2000s. At that time, some Bandung entrepreneurs start worrying and working hard for a new format to lure consumers to come to Bandung.

The phenomena of spatio temporal urban places (USTP) in Bandung with the *pasar kaget* is a way to survive the economic culture of traditional market, in the midst of a culture of consumption expenditures in FO, or other metropolitan consumer culture.

Cultural experts or urban sociologists might agree to call it as one of creative culture of Bandung people in the economic sector. What is the culture like? By presenting the market day it brings the cultural atmosphere of the market day in the traditional economy. Other forms of creativity is building the culture of factory outlet (FO), the sale of used goods and used car markets and innovation in the domestic industry for various types of snacks like *pisang molen, batagor*, etc.

In addition, there is the incredible people's economy developed in Cigondewah. The system they developed eventually saved the locals from the economic crisis that devastated most of the textile industry. Only the people's economy as practiced in Cigondewah and other areas managed to survive.

The FO development might not as vibrant as today in the next few years. The Bandung people's creativity to respond to the evolving situation will give birth to a new form of survival modes. The government, however, increasingly seen to be part that contributed the least to people's lives.

Underground Economy

Under uncertain economic conditions such as today, people are forced to create new economic spaces to improve their quality of life, without relying on the state, which never gives any welfare. The state on the contrary created a deeper gap among its own people.

The increasing number of poor and unemployed people each year is the fact that cannot be hidden by macroeconomic policy, glorified by the government and their economists' supporters. Based on data of Population Office of Bandung City in 2007 there was a population of 2,771,138 inhabitants. Among these, there were 330 thousand poor people, in addition to the areas around Bandung that the numbers were not much different.

In an effort to survive amid the economic development of the big capital, the people were striving to survive. That was what happened in Bandung by maintaining their image as a lifestyle trend setter.

But, the industry's rapid growth was not comparable to Human Development Index (HDI). The Indonesian HDI recorded at the position of 109 out of 173 countries, while at the ASEAN level Indonesia was at the third lowest rank. The Indonesian HDI was 69.2 percent, just ahead of Vietnam with 69.1 per cent (position 112), and East Timor at 43.6 percent (position 158).

West Java's IPM according to UNDP, *BPS 2003*, was 67.87 percent. Slightly better than the achievement of previous year which was 67.45 percent, an increase of 0.42 point. West Java was at rank 22.

Such HDI achievement was still far below other provinces such as North Sulawesi (71.3 percent), Yogyakarta (70.8 percent), East Kalimantan (70%), and North Sumatra (68.8%). This humand resource based development paradigm is very appropriate to pursue economic growth.

Arief Sritua once spoke about the issue of black economy in Indonesia in the 1990s.²⁸ Black economy is part of the underground economy, which contains a formal economic activities that violate laws and regulations (illegal), and informal economic activities, which was due to various things not recorded or not fully recorded in the national income accounts.

²⁸ Quoted from Aloysius Gunadi Brata, 2004

Underground economy is often referred also as the *shadow economy*, informal economy, *parallel economy*, or *hidden economy*. Because illegal activity involved thus it is known also as the *black economy*. This is consistent with the definition used by Schneider and Enste that the *shadow economy* includes not only the legal activities but also unrecorded income, from the production of goods and services, whether the transaction using payment instruments (money) or simply by barter.

In various studies, it is difficult to categorize an economic venture into the underground economy. However, if closely observed, with the potential losses of local taxes then the economic endeavours in Bandung could be categorized as underground economy. Factory Outlets, Cimall, Used Merchandise, buying and selling junk are included into what kind of tax category?

Underground actually covers all economic activities that can be taxed if the activities are recorded by the tax authorities. Therefore it is believed that the larger underground economy, the greater the potential lost of taxes.

Although there are a lot of research on underground economy, not many people calculate the missing amount of the potential tax from the underground economic activities. Sasmito Wibowo (2001) predicted the value of the underground economy is 25% of the GDP. Even Luki Alfirman (2003), using a slightly different method, predicted the event will be even greater with an average growth rate of 15 percent per year.

Based on the research of Enste and Dr. Schneider (2002), the percentage of underground economic activity in developed countries reached 14-16 percent of GDP, while in developing countries can reach 35-44 percent of GDP. The underground economic activity is never reported as income in the annual notification form (SPT) of income tax. So it is included in the criteria of tax evasion.

The tendency of the underground economy is not only in poor countries, but also in rich countries. However, the crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997 allowed the developing and growing of underground economy.

The economic activity of Bandung characterized as the underground economy. The people struggle to survive amid the economic trouble exceeded the expectations of the people themselves. It can be observed from the efforts to enliven the economic of Bandung, although it is indeed garbage businesses.

Greater Bandung Collapse

The prevailing system of development planning in Indonesia today is referring to the Decree of Home Affairs Ministry (Permendagri) No. 9/1982 on P5D (Guideline of Local Development Planning and Control). This guideline describes the simple relationship between regional development planning with spatial planning of the area. Originally, the local development in in line with regional planning, yet this is not what we observed in the big cities in Indonesia.

Bandung as one of the biggest cities in Indonesia failed to play its function because of the pressure of economic growth. The spatial plan ignored the area vulnerability as stipulated in Regulation No. 02/2004 concerning the Spatial Plan of Bandung. Bandung city development concept aimed to achieve equitable growth, service and harmony of inter-regional development activities, by maintaining environmental balance and availability of local resources.

The concept of urban development as outlined in the Spatial Plan occupied with market needs. The urban planning tends to lead to pro-market policies, so that in the future the citizens will pay the economic costs. The government inconsistency is predictable as they facilitated the flow of capital, not considering the environmental carrying capacity.

One example was the revision of Local Regulation No. 2/2004 on the one year old Spatial Plan. There were indications the revision performed because the vested interest of certain groups. The motives are short-term economic interests and ignoring the public interests of the people of Bandung. This change will bring a huge impact to the ecology of Bandung City. The regulation changes have impacts on the land use maps. One result was the Punclut areas that were once regarded as protected and conservation areas changed into a low-density residential areas.

The urban changes without control of natural balance will result in the emergence of new problems that cannot be managed by local government. During Megawati regime, the development of Bandung has been given serious attention, particularly regarding the level of service to the people of Bandung who were already at the point of distressfull.

In addition to the waste problem, other problems also occur: water crisis, change of micro climate, air pollution, etc. All these are the results of spatial planning policy that does not pay attention to the environmental aspects. Consequently, the environmental damages are inevitable. The land conversion should receive more attention today.

Some research estimated that in 2010 the citizens of Bandung will experience trouble with groundwater, caused by the excessive ground water extraction more than the available capacity, especially in the industrial areas. One cheap way to get water is by using groundwater through the artesian wells. The more artesian wells, the discharge rate of groundwater is greater than the recharge rate. As a result, the groundwater level continues to drop.

In 1997, the level of groundwater in South Cimahi, Leuwigajah, and Cibereum was 98.25 meters. It means to get water one should dug to a depth of over 98.25 meters, compared to 1928 where level in the region was 18.5 feet. It means that the water came out in the form of springs, without having to dig up. In protected areas such as the North Bandung area, the

land degradation due to conversion into housing exacerbated the crisis. Not to mention the poor water service management.

The data of Directorate General of Spatial Data showed that until 1993, the leaks of the PDAM Bandung were the highest one in Indonesia, up to 53 percent. Unfortunately, the complex problems did not make the city government for being alert. Evidently, they still debated over the conversion of North Bandung areas, which is clearly designated as conservation area, with the function of maintaining the balance of the hydrological system of the surrounding areas. Not only in Bandung City, but also other satellite towns that depend on the Bandung Basin.

The waste case is one of the many failures of the government in providing public services. Although the waste management handled by the Bandung City Sanitation Lowan Owned Enterprise, yet it does not provide a solution. In fact, Bandung and Bekasi are the dirtiest cities in Indonesia. Yet again it does not make the government restructure the development planning of the area.

Bandung Mayor, Dada Rosada, even claimed not to be disappointed, and very '*sumamprah*' (surrender) to the existing conditions. The government showed no inclination to improve the existing situation. Human dependence on nature as the indication of ecological stability is no longer a priority. While other creatures surrender to the natural system, human being seems trying to conquer the nature.

The uncontrolled urban development is making seeds for the collapse of Bandung. This situation emerged in the middle of absence of government alignments to the people's safety. Jared M. Diamond in his book "How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed" wrote, most of the nations who were able to avoid collapse is the one that is agile to adapt to change, perform the selection, which changes are beneficial and which one that could eliminate the existence of the group.

The portrait of Bandung people from time to time shows the change of environmental vulnerability, as well as the governance in relationships with people, neighbors and political institutions. In later stage, Jared added, to which extent the people or government contributing 'intake' or 'output' variables in order to provide an indication to the creation of collapse conditions.

It is save to say that garbage as a logical consequence of human activities was not considered in any development policy. Garbage is not a factor in the improvement of economic development. No wonder such a rapid development of the basin created stimulants for the collapse of Bandung. In addition to the above indications, according to Jared, the collapse of a system also triggered by a feud with neighbors and the loss of trading partners (the exchange of goods and services). The development of 'junk' industry expressed by the rapid development of the FO and any other variants become a threat to traders in other industrial areas.

Trapped by Market Mechanism

The conventional economic development jargon often echoed that: "market is a good" and "government intervention is bad". Then if the fate of Indonesia totally surrendered to the market, what will happen? The answer is this nation will collapse, like bubbles in the ocean, tossed by the waves. The argument can be traced back to the concept of land-rent, which is inherent in conventional economic ideology.

Every economic sector has different capacities to pay the land rent in a particular space. Trading is one of the economic sector that can pay the highest for the land rent. Therefore, the sector is able to be present in the center of the city, while other sectors will be shifted away from the center.

Bandung today, could be one of the models, in which the economic power is very dominant towards other sectors. The market-oriented urban growth has pushed the imbalance of city functions. Until today, Bandung is well known as the city of Services and Education.

As a service city, Bandung might have proved it by changing the layout of the city into metropolis one, at all costs. As a city of education, it might be the other side that is not taken into account toward the condition of Bandung. Every academic year, thousands of prospective students flock to Bandung to study. Many scholars and experts were born in this city.

The fundamental question is, how much the education sector contribute to development? There are various educational institutions in Bandung, both private and public ones. Two of them, Universitas Padjadjaran (Unpad) and Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), are the main targets of prospective students throughout the country. ITB indeed could be a very prestigious institution, as it is the base of national technology and barometer of science and technology development, not only in Indonesia but also the world.

ITB, established in 1959, is Indonesia's first technical university. Their vision is becoming higher education institutions and science development centers, technology and artistic excellence, reliable and dignity in the world, as well as being leading institution to for the people of Indonesia to be a united, sovereign and prosperous nation. These will be achieved through the mastery of science and technology development conducted in comprehensive and integrated approach as a Research and Development University. The development of science and technology in ITB is based on the need to support the implementation of nation-building. Therefore ITB will develop itself in research and manufacturing, communications and information technology, land transportation, marine and aerospace, environmental, and bio-technology and biosciences.

From vision and mission of ITB, it can be said that education developed is the support systems of development. In a city planning concept, ITB has knowledge on urban planology, while on protecting the environment system; ITB has knowledge on environmental engineering. Both programs become the reference of other educational institutions in Indonesia.

It is not a secret that ITB is taking part in various regional development projects, especially for Bandung City, which is being considered in the scientific context of regional development. But the question is, how far ITB become the center of regional development design by providing ideas and insights for the ecological balance and development of the city.

The engagement of ITB so far shows the inability and failure to provide solutions to urban problems. This can be observed in its social context. ITB is very rarely considering the social costs of development. They tend not to have concern for the environment. Various projects where ITB involved generated high ecological impacts. One of these cases was Bojong, Bogor.

In their research, ITB scientifically recommended that the location could be used for Integrated Waste Disposal (TPST). But they did not consider the social issues that might arise, as evidenced by the ITB Task Force Team recommendation for Leuwigajah, North Bandung area, Citarum River Basin, and various other development areas that did not consider the social costs. ITB did not seem to contribute anything to the city and its numerous problems, instead creating new problems.

ITB played a role in the development of Cikampek Purwakarta-Bandung mega-highway project, which created open, direct, fast access and added the burden of Bandung city. The increasing numbers of vehicles in Bandung, especially on weekends, are adding congestion and air pollution.

Then where exactly is the position of ITB for this? Is it merely as justification for large projects without considering the vulnerability of nature and environment?

The modern knowledge system has reduced the nature into the piles of commodity nature, which can be engineered and exploited for short-term economic gains. ITB as an institution of science and technology development seems to have failed to realize its vision and mission. The role of ITB in managing the development planning system dominated by the interests of the market and disregarded the people's safety. The pragmatical needs sacrifice the sustainability of natural services for our future children and grandchildren.

In the midst of the chaotic Bandung, ITB does not provide a clear contribution to the problems of the city. The scientific role of ITB as the actor in regional development surrendered to market forces. ITB's failure in solving the problems clearly deviated from the vision and mission of the ITB as the Research and Development University. ITB become the engineering center of regional development without providing any contribution to Bandung City, which is already in a state of collapse.

Eventually, Bandung with the vision of metropolitan city is unable to manage the regional system although they have the city master plan already. This failure is due to the inability of the city to put a halt to the high needs of capital and market. The urban growth does not consider the vulnerability of nature and environment. Consequently, the production wastes have no place in city planning. It is evidenced in Leuwigajah case and will continue to be a major issue in Bandung. Higher burden of the city could generate a lot of environmental issues such as water crisis, air pollution, etc.

The interesting thing is the people's ability to generate appropriate innovation in the middle of the huge capital. In a city growth that embraces capitalistic economy, Bandung is able to offer its own characteristics. The development Cibaduyut industrial centers, Cigondewa, Cihampelas, Cimall and FO are the people responses to the situation.

The economic development in Bandung is actually beyond the mindset of the city government. The people live on their own way and able to survive the economic pressures by creating an underground economy.

Trash as a source of production was growing rapidly in the underground economy and becoming the economic pulse of Bandung people. Trash driven growth through traditional, modern and 'shock' market, as well as waste lifestyle with growth of underground economy might be the cause of Bandung collapse.

At the same time, the city government allow and enjoy the conditions continued to this day.

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CHAPTER 7

EXODUS ROUTE OF BETAWI PEOPLE: Kuningan-Depok-Bojong Gede via warung

Buncit

In Jakarta, God was making Indonesian,²⁹ then Betawi people were confused their identity, due to variety of cultural mixtures in its cosmopolitanism.

(Melting-pot, Lance Castle)

²⁹ Lance Castles, "Profil Etnik Jakarta" (Jakarta Ethnic Profile), Masup Jakarta, June 2007,

Many stories revealed the history and life of Betawi people. One of the themes was their long existence as dwellers of metropolitan Jakarta city. In fact, history recorded that Betawi, formerly Batavia, was swampy areas inhabited by small numbers of people.

In the history books, the existence of Betawi mentioned in the oldest inscription monument from the era of Taruma Negara in the 5th century, found in the area of Kramat Tunggak, Tanjung Priok. From here it was known that the power Taruma Negara had reached the area of the *Queen of the East*. It was also noted that the area was inhabited long before the arrival of the slaves in JP Coen era, the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies who conquered Jayakarta on May 30, 1619. He then changed the name of Batavia into Jayakarta.

As a city designed during the colonial era, the Dutch built this region according to their needs and taste, where Sunda Kelapa port designated as sapce for political, military and trade alliance. Once the city returned to Indonesia and changed its name to Jakarta the function was still the same, as the center of economic growth and governance.

But not many people knew why Betawi people getting knocked out of their living space, and why so little story of their collective resistance to maintain their living space, from the onslaught of the economic growth of Jakarta, which also serves as a barometer of growth in other cities in this country.

What was known was only a story of defeat and resignation of Betawi people, in the absence of other options to survive. This was experienced by Betawi people living in Kuningan Timur and almost any place that was once the settlement of Betawi people.

This part willl analyze another story of Betawi people exclusion process from the standpoint of their responses when their living space eliminated, as written by Jared Diamond in his collapse theory. Why Betawi people could easily let their land go as the settlement of their whole family? Although they often did not know what purpose the land clearance for.

This chapter will also analyze the land tenure system of this city, not only the tenurial issue but also in relation to the ethnicity and access to space. Unfortunately, not many references available to study about this compared to other kinds of urban problems, like poverty. A situation often occurs in the big cities like Jakarta.

Furthermore, we will try to draw a line on the exclusion of Betawi people in the land tenure system and the relationship with urban development, which ultimately shifting the ownership of Betawi people to the hands of land speculators.

Until today, the available studies have not found out the real early owners of this city. Although it was known there had been the first community inhabiting this area, the Betawi people. The 2000 census mentioned that the population of Betawi was only 30 percent of the total population in Jakarta. They became a small group isolated in their own "home".³⁰

So far, the the land ownership and distribution, as a symbol of power system in major cities of Southeast Asia, was not scrutinized from ethnicity point of view. Indeed this study is very important, because there are a lot of social problems and unrest that took place in the city due to unfair distribution of land to indigenous communities, which should be protected by the state.³¹ That is the picture of land ownership in Jakarta, not being attached to Betawi community as an ethnic entity.

This prompted the need for a new way of seeing the crisis experienced by Betawi people, who are isolated in their own home and knocked out of their living space due to the power system on land. Unfortunately, few references told about the structure of the land

³⁰ “*Menjadi Asing di Rumah Sendiri*” (Being Foreign in Own Home), Fokus Kompas, June 15, 2005,

³¹ Hans - Dieter Evers and Rudiger Korff, “*Urbanisme di Asia Tenggara, makna dan kekuasaan dalam ruang-ruang sosial*” (Urbanism in Southeast Asia, the meaning and power in social spaces), Yayasan Obor Indonesia, pp. 325

procurement of Betawi people. Such limitation placed only on two things, religion and physical strength. These matters caused the loss of tenurial bond and story of economic and centre of government developed by the authorities and capital owners.

Decaying Tenurial Relations

There are two things that greatly affect the lives of Betawi people, religion and physical strength. Both have major impacts on Betawi people's perception on land as a symbol of their power system, that in turn led to the disappearance of tenurial bond.

Land that was originally a production means turned into a commodity that could be sold easily. They didn't realize that once the land is sold, they did not only lose their land, but also their the identity as a community occupying the lands for many generations.

As a religious community, the Betawi people are very respectful to religious leaders. This was evidenced in Betawi people struggle during the colonial period, where they put the cleric as a leader against the Dutch. The foundation was a struggle against the infidel colonialists.

Ridwan Saidi said Betawi people are very devout in their religion. The *ulama* (clerics) played a big role in their lives.³² Thus, the voice of the *ulama* really affects the living system of Betawi people, from everyday life matters to their political choice.

When the election comes, they would rather vote for parties based on Islam. No wonder Islamic parties always win in Jakarta, from Masjumi Party at the 1955 election, the United Development Party (PPP) in 1982, and the latest one, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

Religious symbols are then used as a tool to demonstrate the social eksistetensi of Betawi community. One such symbol is the pilgrimage, the fifth pillar of faith in Islam. Later on, the pilgrimage shifted from obeying the religious teachings into an attempts to get a

³² Interview with Ridwan Saidi, Jakarta, January 2007

cultural status. The term "*haji*" raised the social status within the community, as this title can turn someone into a new elite or respected figure by the community. Yet to come to Mecca and perform the pilgrimage requires a lot of sacrifices, including selling the land that supposes to be retained for livelihood sustainability. This was where the term 'haji gusuran (evicted haji) came.

However, the above opinion rejected by H. Irwan Shafi'i, a Betawi figure who had been a *lurah* for decades. Ridwan Saidi in his said there is no such term as 'haji gusuran'. In the old days, he said, the Betawi people performed the pilgrimage using the money earned from their hard work for long time. Besides, the selling price of land at that time was very cheap.³³

However that was what happened in the subsequent period of time. They were willing to sell their land for paying the cost of the pilgrimage. The religion that is supposed to serve as basis of struggle for living space becomes a justification to sell their land.

Another influential point is the physical strength of the highly respected or feared *jawara* (local strongmen), as they are considered as hero. Indeed the meaning of *jawara* by Betawi people, as stated by H. Irwan Shafi, is a village hero who became "*palang dade*" or fortress from outsiders who try to disrupt Betawi village.³⁴

Ironically, the hope of protection from the *jawara* is shifted into being the tool of ruling class to maintain and expand their power. This did not only happen during the colonial rule, yet maintained until today. As the means of colonial control on Jakarta areas, the lands controlled by the Dutch given to local government elites, like *lurah* often called as *bek*, including *centeng* or guards who collected taxes from the people. Here began the control of land by Betawi elites who had the power to control or influence.

³³ Alwi Shahab, Robin Hood Betawi, Republika, 2002, pp. 112

³⁴ Ibid, pp. 1

They became landlords who controlled a lot of lands in Jakarta. If we trace, the land ownership (landlord) among Betawi people are usually passed on from generation to its generation. The present landowner inherited from their parents, who used to have a strong influence in their community, either because of religious reason or physical strength.

This was especially happening when Indonesia started doing physical development everywhere. In Jakarta, the local government issued a policy that the buying and selling of land must include the sale deed before a notary or land deed official. The policy gave the right of land ownership in the form of a certificate to the Betawi people, who had been dwelling for long time. After the land certification process, the Government filed a purchase and start to acquire the land for development needs of Jakarta.

Usually, the government involved the *jawara*, who was once respected and feared, in the process of land acquisition, where they acted as land brokers to speed-up the process of land clearance. Such condition continues until today, even stronger with the emergence of mass-based Betawi ethnic identity, where they tried to show it off to the public. Unfortunately, again using the symbol of physical strength and end up being coopted by the ruler. This obscures the true meaning of the crisis experienced by the Betawi people.

One portrait of crisis occurred in the case of Meruya Selatan, the land dispute between the community and PT Portanigra, where PT Portanigra won at the Supreme Court. The land ownership eventually fell into the hands of the company, although the people had valid proof of land ownership on behalf of Djuhri bin Geni, Yahya bin Geni, and M. Yatim Tugono. The three land brokers who also served as *mandor* (foreman). They sold the 44 ha lands to PT Portanigra in 1972. The evidence of the transaction was only with *girik* or proof of ownership at that time.

This case proved the overlapping of land tenure in Jakarta caused by the competition of physical strength. The foreman who was also *jawara* in the village acts as a "ruler". On

behalf of the community members, they sold the land to PT Portanigra and then sold again to other companies.

The authorities seemed very familiar with the power system of Betawi community. Therefore to control them in order to get their lands should also used the same approach. No wonder the governor of the cosmopolitan city of Jakarta had always came from the military. They usually collaborated with the *ulama*, who can "master" the life of Betawi community.

From here we can understand that Betawi people only have power system, without any production system. That's what caused them to easily let go of their land, for the fulfillment of consumption established by the market and the need for cash.

Heretic Urban Development

Jakarta as a model of urban economic growth in Indonesia contributed greatly to the exclusion of Betawi people. The development character of Jakarta served on economic growth, therefore the goals of Jakarta development will always get rid of the living space of community pre-existed much earlier. Betawi people as the early inhabitants of Jakarta might have the power system, but not production system. They became the main victims and suffered from a process of systematic elimination.

Looking at the stories from the past five centuries, Jakarta indeed used as the node and base of the colonial powers. Pramoedya Ananta Toer mentioned that the colonial Dutch under the leadership JP Coen had built this capital of East India at the expense of sixty thousand native people.³⁵

Jakarta was established as the capital of Indonesia after the second Dutch military aggression and handed power to the Government of Indonesia. According to the Emergency Constitution of the United Republic of Indonesia No. 125/1950, Jakarta was called *kotapraja*

³⁵ ”*Jejak Langkah*” (Footsteps), Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Hasta Mitra, pp. 3

Jakarta Raya, with Soewirjo as first mayor. Since then, the central government of Indonesia was situated in Jakarta, having temporarily moved to Yogyakarta.³⁶

In support of that decision, Law No 2 PNPS/1961 was made specifically to govern it. The special status of Jakarta later reinforced through Law No. 11/1990.

As the state capital, Jakarta has its own peculiarities compared with other regions, both in terms of the duties, responsibilities, or more complex challenges. Some of the challenges are the limited areas and high numbers of population with all its impacts. The complexity associated with its existence as the center of state government. Therefore, Jakarta is developed as one unit of planning and control that is expected to provide proper and integrated services to the community.

The determination of Jakarta as the center of government based on the assessment, that Jakarta has a fairly complete facilities and infrastructure since the colonial Dutch era. It could be the center of economic growth, political, social and cultural development that would be the barometer of Indonesia.

The completeness of this infrastructure was built in a long period of time, precisely since the conquest of Batavia in 1527 by Fatahillah. Then it was continued in the colonial Dutch period that projected Jakarta as the government center. It could be observed from the construction of Dutch government offices, roads, and mass transit facilities. One of them was the train linking Jakarta and Bogor (*Buitenzorg*) to facilitate access to and control of the administration at that time.

As the center of government during the Old Order, Soekarno wanted Jakarta to be well known among the international community. He wanted to align Indonesia with other

³⁶ Biro Humas DKI Jakarta, *Jakarta Meniti Jalan Menuju Parasamya Purnakarya Nugraha* (Jakarta Pursuing the Paths to *Parasamya Purnakarya Nugraha*), 1994, pp. 17

nations, through the symbols of physical development in Jakarta, by showing it as the center of state.

Since then the physical development was rampant, from the construction of an international airport, international port, Gelora Senayan, *Selamat Datang* Monument, National Monument (Monas), Hotel Indonesia, and others. All these are expected to deliver a message, this is the capital city of Jakarta, large and majestic. Presenting its greatness as a center of Indonesian Government.

We can see a lot of symbolic buildings around Monas, such as the Presidential Palace, Istiqlal Mosque, government offices, and many more. The buildings here are considered as supporting the function and position as state government, the symbol of national identity that can symbolize the greatness and sovereignty of the nation.

Sukarno appointed Ali Sadikin as the Governor of Jakarta to begin the massive construction, to support the development of Jakarta as the center of government, economy and culture. The governor then undertook spatial planning based on history of growth in Batavia days, prioritizing the accelerated development and economic growth.

According to former Jakarta Governor, Ali Sadikin, the spatial planning actually had an ideology, a value or spirit underlying the use of space in Jakarta. Considering the interests of the central government in Jakarta the space utilization directed as the center of economic growth, yet missing the development of democracy. As a result, the provision of facilities and infrastructures do not guarantee the political activities of its citizens.

The transportation facilities supporting the city government built through the urban transport system. In the colonial period, the construction of roads functioned as a means of facilitating the Dutch control, as well as strategies to maintain territorial and economic power.

Construction of transportation facilities and space utilization was running rapidly, directed to serve the public who come to the center of government, both international or domestic visitors. For example, international airports, international ports, inter-city and provincial terminals, railway stations and other supporting facilities like terminals and stations. The numbers had increased following the high level of need for transportation facilities.

In addition to be the central government, Jakarta also serves as the center of economic growth, as well as a development barometer of the other areas. Ali Sadikin was a governor who believed that economic development inseparable with political development. The results of economic development that the government achieved would have impacts on political stability and national security. These were required to convey to the people the meaning of development. So that people could understand and participate in development.³⁷

Since Ali Sadikin regime, the government provided the means and facilities to support investments in Jakarta, such as roads and bridges. The acquisition of land with low cost believed to be the main engine of the economy, although often time it created long problems in the future for displacing the community. In spatial planning, the transportation system aimed for the efficiency of economic growth.

The development of Jakarta transportation infrastructure was done in order to facilitate the distribution of industry and capital. Therefore, land became one of the production means of investment that should be prepared in the narrow Jakarta. Government provided the guarantee of land clearance owned by the community for the benefit of infrastructure development. Of course in the name of development and welfare jargon.

³⁷ Ramadhan KH, *Bang Ali Demi Jakarta* (Bang Ali for Jakarta) 1966-1977, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1992, pp. 83

The centralistic economic growth was a key driver of the fast migration from the villages to the capital city. They wished Jakarta would definitely require a lot of manpower, and they came from villages outside Jakarta who no longer have the production means. They were willing to become cheap labor in factories or working in the informal sector. Jakarta then became a magnet for outsiders to try their fortune and lived in this metropolitan city.

Since the Old Order to the New Order government, the industrial growth of Jakarta increased rapidly. Mostly concentrated in Pulogadung and Tanjung Priok in North Jakarta. Here alone, in 2000 there were 996 numbers of industries absorbing around 191,467 people per year.

Furthermore to facilitate economic development and rate of investment in Jakarta, some road constructions prepared. Lands reserved for business purposes, which means industry has major role in urban development.

On the other hand, the consumption of urban community become one of the amplifier of Jakarta's functions as center of economic growth. The annual average of Jakarta's economic growth in 1980-1990 was 8,26 percent, compared with 5.9 percent of the national rate. The service sector contributed the highest (72 percent), while the industrial sector only increased to 26.37 percent in 1990. This figure showed the urban consumption system created by the market. It preserved and met the needs of people for goods and services.

This condition is not generated by itself. The market acts as a wheel of economic growth initiated by the authorities. It can manipulate a lifestyle that encourages people to be consumptive, even consider all elements of life as a marketable commodity. Everything is driven by the desire for a lifestyle created by the industry, and became a necessity of life. As if there is stigma of being outdated or not modern, if not following the urban lifestyle today.

The above phenomena reported by the residents of Kuningan Timur, when they sold their land or house. Surely what they purchased was a vehicle, with the amount exceeds the

need. This is a strong indication of how urban lifestyles turn into urban consumption. They are creating and preserving lifestyle in accordance with the market.

The development of Jakarta as the center of government and economic growth generated many social issues that continued until now. President Suharto's pledge to eradicate poverty never mentioned urban land ownership as an answer, especially to Betawi people. Indeed it was the politicians and officials that mostly involved in the control of urban land, as well as the land speculators who subsequently sold them to the industry.

The magnitude of the rate of economic growth in Jakarta has got rid of the people who have been settling for a long time to. The development left the exclusion of a community of their living space, and being spectators amid the dramatic economic growth.

That is the characteristic of a city pursuing economic growth, revamping consumption system and took over the power system of a community. The scramble over development cake is always won by the market and industry, which controls the consumption and production system.³⁸

Cosmopolitanism & Betawi People

Looking at the early design of five centuries ago, the development indeed never gave space to Betawi people to demonstrate their existence through an attachment to the land.

As a cosmopolitan area, Jakarta is so open with all sorts of cultures. This is what Lance Castle called as "*melting-pot*". He mentioned that in Jakarta God is creating the Indonesian people,³⁹ and then making Betawi people getting more confused with their identity, due to the mixtures of cultures of this cosmopolitanism.

³⁸ Suwito Santoso, "*Fungsi ruang, memperebutkan kue di Senayan*" (Function of Space, Competing for Senayan Cake) Kompas, May 24, 2007

³⁹ Lance Castles, "*Profil Etnik Jakarta*" (Ethnic Profile of Jakarta), Jakarta Masup, June 2007, pp. xxiv

The opening of Jakarta to outsiders, not accompanied by the ability of Betawi people to adapt to the growth the city. They preferred to get away from their living space that they have occupied for long time, in order to survive,. That is their means of adaptation.

The exclusion process of Betawi community began during the construction of sport center or Gelora Senayan in 1962. The building was prepared for the Asian Games IV, where the government used 350 ha lands. In the name of public and state interest, thousands of Betawi people evicted moved to Tebet, without being able to do anything.⁴⁰

Later on, Gelora Senayan was not just a sports facility, but also a five-star Hilton hotel which was later renamed as Sultan Hotel. In the 1980s Ratu Plaza was built, the first luxurious shopping mall in Senayan area designed only for the upper classes. It was known as the "new generation" shopping center selling fashion products from abroad.

H. Irwan Syafrie expressed his regret when observing the current progress of Senayan area. In fact, according to him, Betawi people were willing to give up their lands as they thought Gelora Senayan will be used as public sport facilities. Especially as it was prepared for the Asian Games, the sport event that would establish the reputation of Indonesia. In fact, not for hotels, plaza and any other buildings that standing there today.

But it's too late to regret. The development of Senayan areas continued to this day, and their living space would never return as it it used to be.

Apparently, this is not the final exclusion process. In many other construction projects, the same pattern repeated. Until today, the response of Betawi people to eviction in the name of development has not changed much.

Another example was in Kuningan, South Jakarta. Eviction of Betawi people in Kuningan actually started since 1973 to 1992. The area was known as the golden triangle of

⁴⁰ Alwi Shahab, *Betawi Queen of the East*, Republik, June 2002, pp. 133

Jakarta, which used to be the agricultural and livestock areas of Betawi people. Here there was a dairy farm and orchards, which supplied the needs of Jakarta dwellers.

The dairy milk from Kuningan used to be famous in Jakarta. Every morning and evening, the dairy men delivered fresh milk packaged in bottles to their costumers. Alwi Shahab, a senior journalist and an author who was born in Jakarta and produce a lot of writings about the lives of Betawi people, called this area as the dairy business golden triangle.⁴¹

The Betawi settlement and the dairy cows in Kuningan is now remained a story. The construction of Kuningan Golden Triangle displaced thousands of Betawi people.

Various methods were done by the government at that time to clear the farming lands. Among others through the village officials who act as brokers to persuade the people, also lied to the citizens that it will designated for public facilities/interest, not to mention intimidation. For example, by fencing the land that had been purchased. Therefore other people who did not give up their land yet, did not have road access. Or they chose to move because of flooding due to soil backfill of the neighboring buildings. Betawi people were forced to give up their land to built student center and sports facilities.

In fact, only the construction of Brojosoemantri student sports arena that successfully realized. The rest were used to build government offices and industrial offices opening their practices in Indonesia. One of them was in Building 89, the office of PT Freeport Indonesia - the richest gold mining company in Indonesia.

In the case of Kuningan, many people did get the proper compensation for land acquisition. Unfortunately, not many people knew. They accepted it as a sacrifice for the nation's development and prosperity.

⁴¹ Alwi Shahab, *Maria Van Engels Menantu Habib Kwitang* (Maria Van Engels daughter in law of Habib Kwitang, Republika, 2006, pp. 97

Ironically, the Kuningan Timur community members in 1992 did not know what would be their land designated for. Even they did not know, to whom the lands were sold, other than land brokers. Generally, these brokers are local district officials and respected village elders. They were doing various ways to make Betawi people were willing to sell their lands. One of them was stacking building dugouts near the drains that eventually caused flooding. It made people felt uncomfortable and forced them to sell their lands.⁴²

They sold their lands with decent price, from Rp 500 thousand to Rp 1.25 million per meter. For the displaced residents at that time, the most important was money they could be used, especially to go for *haji*. After returning from Mecca, they would get the new status as Hajj. Something that would boost their social strata in the eyes of Betawi community.

This was experienced by an *ojek* (motorcycle taxi) driver who hung out in front of the Al-Mughni Mosque. According to him, the displaced people usually move to areas near Kuningan like Buncit or now known as Mampang Prapatan. However, many of his friends who were also forced to sell their lands or houses move, moved to another cheaper place, such as the suburb of Pasar Minggu, Lenteng Agung, even in Bojong.

Mughni used to live in the Kuningan Timur. For his family, he was making a living away from their present home. While sobbing, he told what happened to his family who once had lands in Kuningan. "Now we could only stare at the buildings that used to be our place. Only from far away and cannot enter them. Back then, we had never imagined such a fate, losing our land and being *ojek* drivers. Delivering the people who work in those offices and shopping at the malls. At first we thought the rest of the eviction money could be used as venture capital. It turns out many of us are failing at the new place. And there is no other

⁴² Interview with Bang Pirin, *ojek* drivers who had been evicted from his home of in Kuningan Timur, February 2007

alternative, other than being *ojek* drivers, because we are not educated. Although the distance is quite far away from our home".

Currently, the big family of H. Guru Mughni is the only Betawi people living in Kuningan Timur. His name is enshrined into the street name of this area. The family of H. Mughni persisted in this area. They believed that they should occupy the hereditary lands owned by their family. They even built a school and a large mosque of Baitul Mughni, behind Patra Jasa Kuningan Building.

Mughni was a family of great influence in the community of Kuningan Timur. He was one of the respected Betawi leaders in Jakarta, and known as a religious scholar and teacher among Betawi people.

Kuningan, Depok, Bojong Gede via Warung Buncit was like exodus or refugee line of massive evictions experienced by Betawi people, the first inhabitants of Jakarta. It was called an exodus, because it was impossible for them to return to their old living space.

Unfortunately, they are also not likely able to occupy new areas with better conditions inside the city. The compensation money is not enough to buy land in the city. The fact that they have to move to the outskirts of Jakarta is unnegotiable option.

Not to mention, they also lose their previous source of income generation. With limited skills, they have to compete with immigrants who stormed Jakarta. These immigrants have a survival strategy by subsistence production, to meet their minimum needs, an ability that is not owned by Betawi community.

Kuningan now become the construction site of the central business district, by displacing thousands of Betawi people from their "homes". Tragically, this business center also failed and proved unable to stem the financial crisis that hit Indonesia.

Betawi People, Who Cares?

Unfortunately, from the whole exclusion story, no one see this as a crisis facing the first community of this area. Not to mention, helping to find the answer.

The facts are mostly viewed as something understandable, especially because Betawi people as the victims remained silent. They did not realize that this was part of the scenario of removing their tenurial relations, created since centuries ago by the ruling class.

Instead, negative stigma is attached to Betawi people. They are often said to be lazy and with low level of education. Therefore it is reasonable if they were evicted to the outskirts of town. This stigma is slowly becoming thick wall between the urban poor group, among the newcomers and the Betawi community. In fact, the problem lies not on the issue of being native or immigrant, but rather a crisis of a community being displaced by urban development.

Various options to address exclusion of Betawi people performed without reading such crisis. Similar to the state approaches that allow Betawi people being knocked out of their living space. Usually the issue only discussed during the election of the Governor of Jakarta or the anniversary of the city. The Betawi crisis is only becoming a political commodity during the national and local elections, or even in ceremonial events. Certain, all that are not able to cope with the crisis facied by the Betawi people.

It is very strange that the exclusion of Betawi people answered by preserving the culture, food and even establishing the Betawi heritage. Such effort is more suitable to raise sympathy or popularity, but it eventually being mistaken in solving the actual crisis. Therefore, the community entity is not just the sample material, but also the philosophical values of their lives. The results living space interactions sunken in the frenzy cosmopolitan city.

Looking at the exodus of Betawi people, the root of the problem is the perverse character of urban development. This is what must be changed. Never again merely pursuing

the economic growth, which only benefits the capitalist system, but should also provide a guarantee for the safety the citizens living space, especially the Betawi community.

The response of the Betawi people themselves becomes a necessity, or otherwise constantly being the spectators. The missing tenurial ties due tenurial systems by two kinds of strengths, religiosity and physical strength, should be reviewed in the proper interpretation. Religion should be a new bond that could be the basis of thinking and action to retain the rights to their living space, instead of being a tool of power.

Unfortunately, until today the local organizations that should be the basis of Betawi people resistance became the ruler tool to get rid of other urban poor groups, who share the same boat with Betawi people.

This chapter also would like to invite Betawi people to "get angry" and not always accepting the defeat. Moreover, under the name of patience as taught by their religion. Because, the rate of economic growth in urban areas never place the religion values as a public safety concern. Religion suppose to be basis of public anger to maintain their living space.

Islam explicitly stated that Allah will not change the fate of a people, if the people do not want to change their own destiny.

Actually, the story Betawi community resistance associated with agrarian conflict ever done by a person named H. Entong. He led the farmers to fight against a Dutch family, a private landowners in Cililitan Besar on April 15, 1916. This event then became known as the April revolution in Condet.⁴³ Yet since then almost no record of Betawi community resistance against the land rulers that being hostile to them.

⁴³ Alwi Shahab, *Alwi Shahab, Maria Van Engels Menantu Habib Kwitang* (Maria Van Engels Daughter in Law of Habib Kwitang), Republika, 2006, pp. 170

Similarly, the civic groups that have been working on urban issues. They never looked at the roots of the crisis faced by Betawi community as an effort to understand and find the answer to the actual crisis. Thus, the efforts to help Betawi people not just for the own their political "interests", but really helping to liberate Betawi people from the confine of the crisis.

Building the independence and strengthening local organizations that were born out of the right reading of crisis and looking for the right solution to the crisis, should be done immediately. The system of development politic should be one of its main objectives, which will help improve the bargaining position of Betawi people to be taken into account by the rulers.

Another lesson Jakarta is not a good barometer of a model of urban development. Therefore, the characteristic of urban development in Jakarta, as the center of government and economic growth should not be adopted elsewhere.

Unfortunately, the big cities in Indonesia totally followed the Jakarta style. The rise of mall or shopping center is considered a sign of progress and modernity, where exclusion process of the original community is a necessity.

This chapter is not yet deep enough in reading the exclusion of Betawi people. Yet at least, offering the other side of seeing the Betawi community crisis. Hopefully, the people's representatives in Senayan, who claims to work for the people, would be smarter in providing solutions to the real crisis of Betawi people.

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CHAPTER 8

YOGYAKARTA EARTHQUAKE: Do It yourself (DIY)

DIY (read: di-ay-way) is an English idiom for Do It Yourself. It means doing everything on oneself or meeting needs independently.⁴⁴ The earthquake did occur in the Daerah Istimewa

⁴⁴ Wikipedia mentions, DIY as a sub-culture is open critique to consumer culture, which always rely on solutions to all problems with buying something and blunt the ability of

(Special Region) Yogyakarta or DIY in May 27, 2006. But people of DIY who were victims did not the need to understand the English expression to be able to meet all their needs on what they had at that time.

These two terms portrayed at least three interpretations. The first interpretation, describing people's independence as citizens. The second interpretation, regarding the absence of role of local government, at least at the time of the disaster. The third interpretation, concerning exhaustion of the people as citizens to trust the government in implementing their responsibilities of ensuring the safety of the people. The portrait was so visible, shortly after the earthquake untuk the reconstruction process. This is what this chapter will present in the case of Yogyakarta Earthquake.

Saturday morning May 27, 2006, at 5:55 pm, residents of Yogyakarta and surrounding areas were struck by earthquake measuring 5.9 on the Richter Scale. The impact of the earthquake had destroyed the living assets in Yogyakarta and some parts of Central Java, such living, physical, financial, social and environmental losses. During the quake, the people scrambled to several hospitals, some were close and some others were quite distance. The official figures mentioned that 4,715 residents died and thousands more were injured.⁴⁵ The capacity of local hospitals were very limited compared to the number of victims who needed medical treatments. Moreover, some health facilities have more limited services, such as the Community Health Center (Puskesmas) and private clinics. There was no other option except for the people to take care of themselves.

people to be more creative to find a way-out to rely on what they have. See:

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DIY>

⁴⁵ Data of UNDP reported 5,778 deaths for Yogyakarta and Central Java, Oxfam GB mentioned 5,736 deaths for Yogyakarta and WALHI of Central Java and DIY reported 4,867 deaths in Yogyakarta and 1,063 deaths in Central Java.

The responses of the victims to take care of their own safety independently seemed like a normal reaction, including ensuring family security and protecting the remaining assets. Something that would be done by anyone affected. Yet it became abnormal when the victims were positioned as citizens who were in emergency circumstances and required life safety and protection by the State. The earthquake victims were more accurately described as a group of people who lived in nowhere without the State claims.

The hassles of victims in taking care of themselves could be observed in all stages of handling the effects of the earthquake.⁴⁶ The group of people affected by the earthquake were within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia. They took over the responsibility of the state which supposed to protect, supporting the victims attempt to meet their basic needs in disaster situations. It was a reality that the victims indeed had taken over the state responsibility in disaster management, even when they were in critical condition of surviving.

Emergency Response: Totally Unprepared

"I do not know what to do with collapsed houses?" All belongings are inside, many people are injured, where to seek help? Then at night I heard if you want to find a tent, logistics and so on go to the official house of *bupati*. So I also went there but there was nothing as I got there.⁴⁷" That was the story of M. Yuchron, the community elder of Pacar Hamlet, Timbulharjo Village, on July two years ago.

Some other residents expressed different angles with an emphasis on distrust to the government. "I was pessimistic already, Mas, to be able to get a tent. So I evacuated my family to the old shack in the middle of rice field, that usually used as temporary shelter by

⁴⁶ The stage of disaster management: Emergency Response, humanitarian assistance (relief), recovery as well as the rehabilitation and reconstruction. Article 52-59 of Law No. 24/2007 on Disaster Management.

⁴⁷ Personal communication, July 2006.

the brick makers. Not only cold, but the rain water leaked everywhere. I could not sleep because my child kept crying".⁴⁸ This was the experience of Ngadiono, father of two children from Dadapan Hamlet.

Although the two expressions above were just small examples presented, but they provided enough clues on the absence of the state in ensuring the safety of its citizens.

After the quake, the people demonstrated their outstanding ability for survival. Not only using hut in the middle of the ricefield as a refuge site, even the cattle and goat cage was turned into a temporarily place to stay. Such power to survive emerged due to the absence of state protection that suppose to ease the burden of their lives as victims.

Soon after the earthquake, the state apparatus did not respond further, just giving the illusion of promises delivered by the Vice President Jusuf Kalla. He was head of the National Coordinating Board for Disaster Management (Bakornas). Kalla pledged USD 1 million per household per month for a period of three months, with details as follows: Rp 3 thousand per person for food, Rp 100 thousand per month per household for household appliances, Rp 100 thousand per person per month for the purchase of clothing, as well as 12 kilograms of rice per person per month.⁴⁹ Another promise was cash for home improvements Rp 30 million for a collapsed house, Rp 20 million for heavily damaged house, and Rp 10 million for minor damage.

The community responded to the promises with different reactions, from being apathy, doubtful, hopeful, to fully depending for the promised to be met.

⁴⁸ Personal, June 2006.

⁴⁹ *"Bantuan untuk Korban Gempa, Tiap Kepala Keluarga Dapat sekitar Rp. 1 Juta"* (Aid for Earthquake Victims, Each Families Will Receive around Rp 1 Million), Kompas, May 29, 2006

Most people considered that the promises should not to be taken seriously. They continued to struggle of rising from adversity by relying on the remainings of earthquake. Meanwhile, the basic needs like food, water, health and shelter were getting more difficult to be fulfilled. Their survival actions were diverse. Some sold livestock, crops, even land to finance their recovery.

A group of elderly people revealed their impression that felt like going back to the past time, when Indonesia or Java experienced food crisis that they had to eat *aking* (parched) rice and grated coconut.⁵⁰

Yet the tough conditions did not dampen the spirit of the people to rise up. They built temporary shelter, utilizing the rubble that could still be used. The need for food and medicines obtained by utilizing a variety of root crops and plants often used as an alternative traditional medicines still growing in rural areas.

That spirit was still very high during celebration of Independence Day August 17. For instance in Kampung Karanganyar Brontokusuman Mergangsan, Yogyakarta. The earthquake in this village made 150 families or 515 people lost their house, 9 people died, and 15 people seriously injured. The situation did not dampen the spirit of the villagers to organized the celebration of independence day, as they usually did in previous years. The committee held competitions for all level of age. The spirit of togetherness was reflected from the merry celebration amid the rubble and tents. Similar portraits found in almost all areas affected by the May 27 earthquake.

On the other hand, those who were very hopeful to the promise of state officials kept demanding and monitoring the progress. They tried to meet the administrative requirements. However, this effort looked absurd, as some people deliberately demolished their houses to

⁵⁰ Author interviews with some villagers in Timbulharjo Hamlet, Tembi, Bantul.

meet the required conditions, Rp 30 million for a collapsed house. Yet to break down the house, they had to pay some workers.

Other people who were doubtful the promise would be ever met considered such action as ridiculous. Because it would take a greater costs to rebuild the houses that were torn down intentionally.

In fact, the promises were only a mere hope. The living allowance (Jadup) promised only paid for short time. It was only distributed for one month, afterward it was only provided sporadically. Such experiences used by the victims to asses the seriousness of the state apparatus, particularly related to the reconstruction fund. Some people responded by demanding and pressuring the local government. Others were sceptical as they did not believe the government's promises.

Not only for home affairs, the medical treatment for victims of the earthquake was not integrated with other needs. Some patients were returned home by the hospital regardless of the follow up treatment. Arriving home, the patients should seek decent place to live because their houses could no longer be used. As a result, the process of health disturbed. This was experienced by Dwi, a young man from Ngasem Hamlet, Timbulharjo Sewon, Bantul. After returning from, he confused trying to find tent for himself and his mother.

A similar case occurred in Dharma Hospital. When 3.2 magnitude aftershock, there were 21 patients fear rushed out of the hospital. Ironically, they had to spend the night in the open space without tent, although some of them were in quite severe health condition.

Six weeks after the earthquake, many people visited the public and field hospitals. The DIY Health Office recorded 1,142 victims who underwent outpatient, and 679 people inpatient. They were treated at 24 public hospitals and 10 field hospitals.⁵¹ Thousands of

⁵¹ *“Tanggap Darurat Kesehatan Layak Diperpanjang”* (Health Emergency Response Worth to be Extended), Kompas, June 30, 2006

victims still in need of care and healing, both for serious and minor injuries. Most of them suffered fractures that required further treatment.

In addition, the victims faced the threat of potential disease outbreaks such as acute respiratory infections, diarrhea, and skin diseases, especially those living in tents as they couldn't afford yet to rebuild their homes.

DIY Health Office workloads were heavier after the departure of some foreign medical teams, such as USA, China, Spain, and Qatar. Beforehand, they helped medical services for the earthquake victims. In addition the health facilities, such as the damaged community health centers, could not provide optimal service. The limitations of DIY Medical Office was indirectly a contributing factor to the death of victims of the earthquake, along with other factors such as the condition of injured victims, time, speed and quality of treatment, as well as the information or knowledge of the community. The pace of treatment contributed to the safety of critical victims.

If a victim could be treated shortly after the disaster, the opportunities to survive would be higher. The quality of treatment depended on the availability of resources and materials needed in an emergency situation. While the information or knowledge related to healthy lifestyle after a disaster is essential to prevent the development of various diseases in the community when the conditions are still vulnerable.

The need for safe environmental condition after the earthquake was also went unnoticed. As the community was restless, rampant crime was also on scene. Fatigue and mental stress was evident among the people, because at the same time they still had to maintain the security of their area from the threat of crime. In Tembi Hamlet, Bantul, a young man named Mulyadi had to do patrolling in the village. After doing so for five consecutive

days, one night he suddenly screamed hysterically and beaten up his own mother that he had to be rushed to the hospital. He dreamed of catching a thief who would plunder his house.⁵²

During the stage of emergency response, there were two things that suppose be observed to determine the extent to which the development intervention made.⁵³

1. Security protection against disaster victims.
2. Meeting the basic needs of disaster victims including food, temporary shelter, clothing, water, sanitation, health services, psychological and education.

In the case of DIY earthquakes, the minimum requirements on handling of emergency response measures failed be fulfilled by the government. This was the irony of this disaster-prone country. Although the people living spirit was so high to do everything be themselves, it failed to touch the conscience of the state apparatus to fulfill their responsibilities, ensuring the safety protection of the citizens.

Recovery: Emergency Response Volume Two

The recovery process was not much different from the emergency response phase. People worked very hard to improve their conditions all by their own resources. They sold their properties, raised support from families, asked help from various organizations and many other efforts. Their burdens were heavier as they entered the recovery phase. This was evident from the amounts of spending for the post-earthquake disaster management processes.⁵⁴ Again, the victims indeed subsidized the state in their efforts to save themselves.

It was really insulting the common sense when the emergency response phase "officially closed" through the disbursement of the *Jadup* (living cost) fund for Rp 185

⁵² Observations and interviews with Ibu Asmo, Tembi Hamlet, Bantul, August 2006

⁵³ Article 6 and 48 of Law No. 24/2007 on Disaster Management

⁵⁴ The subsidy can be seen from the total needs that the community provided by themselves from emergency response to reconstruction process.

billions and Operational Funds for Rp 5.1 billions.⁵⁵ But again, not as promised. Jadup funds were promised for three months, but only one month paid.

Although *Jadup* funds disbursed, it did not mean the emergency needs of residents met and the state responsibility totally fulfilled. The *Jadup* fund for Rp 90 thousand and 10 kg of rice per person was the price of quality of life offered to the victims of earthquake. Such a worthless figure to meet their daily needs, let alone for recovery. The number of state spendings for handling the emergency response up to the start of recovery phase were much smaller than the amounts that the victims spent themselves.

The recovery processes were done very fast independently by the victims. Within three days after the earthquake, the most affected areas in Yogyakarta and some parts of Central Java, the people looked very hectic. They worked together to restore the function of important facilities such as schools, places of worship, health centers, roads, and damaged irrigation channels.

One of them could be observed in Kentolan Hamlet, Guasari Pajangan, Bantul. In this village, the villagers worked hands in hands to build an emergency school, to get the public elementary school functioning to replace the collapsed school buildings. The provision of land, building materials of bamboo and wood, as well labors were shared as collective responsibility. They did not want to sacrifice the education process and hamper their children's future for the absence of facilities.

Another urgent problem faced was clean water, as happened in Dlingo Bantul. The earthquake caused the water sources dried up. Every day, people have to fetch water for 3 – 4 kilometers. Those who could afford to buy clean water should pay for Rp 75 thousand per tank. A similar situation was experienced by the people of Patuk, Gunung Kidul. To seek new

⁵⁵ ” *Tahap Tanggap Darurat di Yogyakarta dan Jateng dinyatakan selesai*” (Emergency Response Phase in Yogyakarta and Central Java declared over), Kompas, June 30, 2006

sources of water, residents should make wells with depths up to 27 meters. The cost of making each of the wells was Rp 3 million.

Although the emergency response phase "officially closed" through *Jadup* disbursement, in fact people were still at the stage of emergency response to meet their urgent needs. And it would not be possible, if people only relied on *Jadup* funds.

Rehabilitation & Reconstruction? *Sami mawon!*

The amount of reconstruction funds promised by the government dropped from Rp 30 million to Rp 15 million. The news was mixed with the rumours that the numbers reduction associated with the assistance of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector support as well as other parties. Another rumor circulated that the victims who have received help from foreign organizations would not receive the official reconstruction funds. This led to the rejection of people to receive assistance from non-state parties, as they worried about losing the right to reconstruction fund from the government. The government was confused to deal with such situation.

Was the reduction of reconstruction funds done to avoid the victims having too much relief fund? Or the the state did not consider the victims recovery as priority compared to other budget expenditures?

The amount of reconstruction funds for the two provinces disbursed from the National State in 2006 was Rp 1.2 trillion, about 70 percent of the budget (Rp 749 billion) disbursed for the DIY in the first stage. Each household received Rp 15 million. The amount was not proportional to the number of houses to be rebuilt, 206 thousand houses. Presumably the amount of Rp 15 million for building earthquake-resistant house was the quality of life and safety standards established by the state officials.

Reconstruction funds channeled through community groups formed in each village. Each group consisted of 10-15 people. The funds distributed gradually, but the distribution

system was different with one another. Some use the average-distribution system, also known as Bagita system, while some others used priority system. Victims tend to choose the Bagita system, as they worried the reconstruction fund will ended up like Jadup fund, which was only given for one month.

The trust of victims to the state apparatus during the reconstruction period was demonstrated through a variety of attitudes. Some were staging demonstrations, some were sceptical, ignoring the government's promises and continuing to pursue their own recovery. Like what Ibnu Sudiro (54 years) did, a farmer from Timbulharjo, Bantul. He did not care about the reconstruction fund from the government. Several weeks after the earthquake, he and his two neighbors directly produced their own bricks. After one month, about 25 thousand bricks were successfully made. "If the assistance was really provided, that would be nice. But if not, well, I believe I can a make a living on my own. I already produced my own building materials, Mas. I could build my new house gradually," he said.⁵⁶

The reconstruction policy led to attempts of improving the physical buildings. The polemics were presented in the local newspapers almost every day.⁵⁷ The reconstruction policies that led to physical buildings increased the burdens of people's life. The economic recovery efforts, especially the livelihood assets, escaped from the attention of the government.

⁵⁶ Personal communication with Ibnu Sudiro, July 2006

⁵⁷ "*Warga patuk Gerudug Bupati Pertanyakan Realisasi dana Rekons*" (Patuk Residents Visit the Head of District to Question Realization of Reconstruction Funds), *Kedaulatan Rakyat* January 1, 2007; "*Penyaluran bantuan Rekontruksi Prosesnya Harus Dipermudah*" (Distribution Process of Reconstruction Aid Must Be Simplified), *Bernas*, January 21, 2007; "*Data Dana Rekontruksi Dimanipulasi*" (Data of Reconstruction Fund Manipulated), *Kompas*, January 25, 200.

Warsito (32 years), a souvenir artisan from Pundong, Bantul, was trying to rebuild his business three weeks after the disaster, although his means of production were devastated by the earthquake. He did not find any possibility of government assistance to restore his livelihood. Warsito ultimately relied on the remaining items as start-up capital. He no longer cared whether the government support would be available or not.

Similar case was experienced by Ibu Ayom (47 years), snacks vendor in the east entrance of Sasono Hinggil South Square of Yogyakarta. Her house in Cabean hamlet, Panggunharjo Village, Sewon Bantul, was devastated by the earthquake. She even had to be hospitalized for a week due to injured by the falling debris of her own house. But a month after the quake, her loyal customers could buy her snacks like *urap* (ointment), *pecel*, *cenil*, *lupis*, and *ketan juruh*, just like usual days. Ibu Ayom's reason was very simple: "Better than *nglangut* (staying) at home."⁵⁸

Ibu Ayom was recovered not because of the government aid, but from Rp 580 thousand donated by ordinary people who regularly exercised in the South Square every morning, her regular customers.

Many other earthquake victims in Yogyakarta and Central Java were in the same boat with people like Warsito and Ibu Ayom. They employed many kinds of creativities and strategies to survive, an evidence of their capacity to save their own life (See Attachment 1. Table of Earthquake Management).

Collective Solidarity in Blado Hamlet

The morning sun shone not so bright in Blado Hamlet when the villagers were carrying buckets and jerry cans. They climbed the rocky uphill path. Old, young, men and women did the same activity each morning. They went to fetch water.

⁵⁸ www.mediacenteraji-yogya.com

Blado Hamlet inhabited by 95 families, which is part Giritirto Village, Purwosari Sub-district, Gunung Kidul District, Yogyakarta. This village can be reached using a private vehicle or on foot about 9 km from the Police of Purwosari. Indeed, there was no public transport access to the village which lies at an altitude of 1500 m from sea level. This hamlet is dominated less fertile limestone hills (karst) and at risk of water shortages in dry season.

The tectonic earthquake caused cracks along 4 km at Bangsri limestone hills located at the top part of the village. At times the mudslides might befall to residential areas underneath.

"Beforehand we have *rembug* (community meeting) regarding the landslide threat. The majority of villagers agreed to relocate their settlements to upper part of Bangsri Hill, as it was more secure place. Then we started preparing the resettlement site, which was located higher than the previous settlement. Some were using the land they already had before the earthquake. Some were doing land swap with the previous owner, with affordable price,⁵⁹ said Ponijo a community elder when interviewed by WALHI DIY.

The process of preparing new settlements site was not easy. Not as simple as changing the land into a settlement or having a land swap. The challenges they faced in setting up their settlements were changing the limestone hills, uneven surface, with large size rocky limestones. Then making it into ramps and stable location for a settlement. Blado Hamlet people took two months to prepare the new settlement site.

They worked together to break down the limestone, melandaikan the ground, then moved houses. The former dry land now turned into a village, and the cowsheds turned into houses. Although it still need futher improvement, at least the semi-permanent house could protect them the hot temperatur in afternoon, as well as cold air and strong winds at night.

⁵⁹ www.walhi-jogja.or.id

"Indeed not all moved. From 95 families, only 52 families who were already relocated. But now most of the community activity centered on the higher part of the hill. The public concern over the risk of landslides could also be minimized by moving to the new location. The current settlement is far higher than the old location. To be safe from the possibility of landslides following the hill fracture because of the earthquake⁶⁰", he said.

In addition to the issue of settlement site, the next issue was water. In the older settlement, the distance was relatively close to the springs. The water distributed to the houses using pipes and hoses. After the earthquake, some springs buried under landslides and rocks from the hills. Now only two water source below the hill springs available. As a result, villagers had to go up and down the hills as high for 70 meters. To deal with these issues, villagers and some volunteers worked together to build a water tank. Then installing pipe to drain water to the top of the hill, and supplied to houses. Therefore now the Blado people could meet their water needs.

Besides their endeavours to build a new village, the daily activities to earn income kept running. The rhythm of life continued to be heard. In the heat of afternoon sun, some people were still preparing the dry land for farming. Some women were busy drying the crops such as tobacco, the main product of Blado Hamlet. Blado was tiny portrait of the solidarity of a community was able to build a new post-disaster village.

Key of Change

A long convoy of trucks loaded with people appeared in Bantul, Parangtritis and Imogiri streets. The three roads were the entrance to Bantul, which suffered the most severe damage. This went on until three months after the earthquake. Where and for what they came to Bantul raised questions of foreign tourists and aid workers who witnessed them.

⁶⁰ Source: DIY WALHI Database 2006

The trucks convoy was the expression of solidarity by the people who were not affected by the earthquake. They came from adjacent of Yogyakarta and Central Java, especially Purworedjo, Magelang, Semarang, Temanggung, Wonogiri, Solo, Banyumas, and other districts. They came with bamboo, wood, carpentry tools and materials for temporarily living while working in the affected areas.

"This is what we can do for our brothers in Jogja, Mas. I come with a group of 25 people," said Jalu, the leader of a volunteer group from Melung Village, Banyumas.⁶¹

"Cleaning the rubble, making temporary shelters, opening access roads, to knocking down the buildings that were severely damaged by the earthquake. We are ready to help. Yet we do not want to bother our brothers here, so we bring our own logistics needs", he added.

Soon after the disaster, the people's solidarity emerged by independently deploying people themselves to provide help. The kinship based solidarity was huge capital that encouraged the recovery processes in a relatively short time. The results were astounding. They did not have to wait for the state apparatus, as well as their aid budget. Such kind people solidarity should not stop only in handling the disaster situations such as the May 27 earthquake only.

New Earthquake Markets: Only the Elite Benefited

"Selling food, medicines, building materials and contracting services!"

After the earthquake, the people's needs of *sembako* (nine basic needs/groceries) and building materials were on top priority of shopping. Market law applied without even considering the emergency situation. New groceries shops were mushrooming. The same case with mineral water, building materials up to the services of architects and contractors. But the rise of "disaster market" was not causing the prices of basic commodities went down. Almost all prices of building materials increased, such as sand, wood, iron, cement, bamboo,

⁶¹ June 2006.

bricks, tiles and ceramics. So what could be done with the Rp 15 million reconstruction funds per house against the market law?

Confusion occurred in each community groups to find building materials that fitted their needs and financial situation. Not to mention the administrative report on the use of reconstruction funds from the government. Sunarto, Chairman of Bawuran Community Group, Pleret Bantul, reported, "The price of building materials rose to nearly 100%, like sand from Rp 50 thousand to Rp 180 thousand, bricks from Rp 170 thousand to Rp 350 thousand, tile Rp 850 and should be ordered 2 months beforehand."⁶²

Who was actually benefitting from this condition? Unfortunately, the victims did not have the luxury of thinking about it.

Some basic materials were difficult to get including sand, wood, and iron. The main source of sand in Yogyakarta and surrounding areas were from Mount Merapi, where the sand stream flows into rivers, like Gendol, Opak, and Krasak. Also went to rivers passing the urban areas such as Code, Gajah Wong and Winongo.

The sand was mined from those rivers by various parties for reconstruction needs. In addition to the river areas, sand mining was also carried out on productive lands, which was turned into sand land mainly in the slopes of Merapi. This phenomenon became pro-contra at the local community level.

Many new sand mining sites have sprung up, which was sponsored by local officials and businessmen. The new locations stretched from river upstream to downstream. The impact of sand mining widespread on the environment indeed did not directly felt by people around the mining site.

⁶² Source: "*Hasil Laporan Fact Finding LABH Yogyakarta*" (Report of LABH Yogyakarta Fact Findings), 2006

The wood needs for disaster reconstruction process was also very large. Greenomics calculated the minimum and medium scenario of timber needs were estimated between 461-577 thousand cubic meters of sawn timber (see Table 1). This equated to 916 thousand - 1.14 million cubic meters of logs. That number did not include other damages that had not been recorded and timber needs for the emergency phase.

Table 1. Temporary Estimation for Reconstruction Timber Needs of Yogyakarta-East Java

Damage	Unit	Sawn Timber (m ³)		Logs (m ³)	
		Minimum	Medium	Minimum	Medium
House (flat to the land)	84.643	250.881,85	313.602,32	501.763,70	627.204,63
Home (severely damaged)	135.038	200.126,32	250.157,90	400.252,63	500.315,79
School (severely damaged)	861	10.208,02	2.760,02	13.160,16	16.450,20
Office (heavily damaged)	61	271,21	339,01	542,41	678,02
Total	220.603	461.487,39	576.859,24	915.718,91	1.144.648,64

Note:

Source: Study of Greenomics Indonesia on Java Deforestation and Forest Degradation (February 2006)

a. For two years period (2002-2004), conservation areas and protected forests in Java

were degraded or experienced loss of function of the quality of the forest up to more than 330,000 hectares in 76 points on conservation areas and protected forests in the province of Banten, West Java, Central Java, DI Yogyakarta, and East Java. Degraded protected areas covering more than 133,000 hectares and protected forest more than 197,000 acres.

- b. Not only forest degradation, during the two years the practice of forest clearing and encroachment (deforestation) in conservation areas and protected forests in Java reached more than 102,000 acres, consisted of more than 40,000 hectares of conservation and 62,000 hectares of protected areas. The province of East Java, West Java and Central Java were the largest contributors to deforestation in Java. The condition occurred only in a period of two years. That means the rate of deforestation and encroachment of conservation areas and protected forests in Java was quite high.
- c. More severe ecological disaster was expected to threaten the 61 districts in the three provinces in the next few years. The number of districts exceeds 90 percent districts categorized by Greenomics as most at risk for ecological disaster caused by the disruption of ecosystem of conservation areas and protected forests in Java.
- d. Level of forest degradation and deforestation has disrupted 123 points Watershed and Sub-watershed in Java. Greenomics estimated that if the trend of deforestation and forest degradation Java during 2002-2004 continued for the next 2 years, it was predicted around 10.7 million hectares of watershed/sub-watershed in Java would seriously threaten the quality of ecological functions, which in turn will be potential to cause economic losses of Rp. 136.2 billion per year as a result of floods, landslides, and droughts on a larger scale with a prolonged impact.

Source: "Kalkulasi sementara Greenomics Indonesia berdasarkan data kerusakan sementara dari Media Center Gempa Yogya per 5 Juni 2006" (Temporary Calculations

of Greenomics Indonesia based on temporary damage data from Yogyakarta Earthquake Media Center by June 5, 2006)

Based on the above data, the woods in the area of Yogyakarta and Central Java obviously not possible to meet the needs. It was estimated to encourage the widespread deforestation. Not only in the region of Yogyakarta and Central Java, but also in other areas, including outside Java. Another disaster to watch out for was the massive deforestation to meet the reconstruction needs.

On the other hand, a high level of demand made the wood prices soaring. The imported woods from outside the region were the reason to raise the price of woods. The situation encourages the rampant sale of wood in Yogyakarta and surrounding areas. The state could not afford to subsidize the timber needs. Transportation subsidies suppose to be given to transport them from the timber producing regions to affected areas in Yogyakarta and Central Java.

In contrast to sand and wood, iron for building only produced by some plants. PT Krakatau Steel was one of them. The largest steel mill in Indonesia earned a lot of profit with the high demand for building irons. Before the earthquake, the iron with a diameter of 10 mm can be bought for Rp 26 thousand. After the earthquake, the price rose to Rp 31 thousand. Different standard and size of added to the confusion of residents to purchase earthquake-resistant steel standard set by the government.

Iron was pretty much necessary to development of earthquake resistant houses. But the ability to meet all of these requirements was very limited. Most people replaced it with bamboo. This was what M. Zaini, from Hamlet Bejen, Bantul, did. "Well, we tried to reduce the use of irons. We used bamboo to make a bottom ring that connected these walls."⁶³

⁶³ Source: Personal communication with M. Zaini (Bejen Hamlet, Bantul), November 2006.

The victims subsidies to the the state increased when the prices of goods went spontaneously uncontrolled. Was it possible for the bureaucrats and officials to have the authority to control these prices? If the government and their apparatus had the authority, what would exactly happened?

Various post-earthquake community needs did not receive subsidies from the state, that suppose to be the responsibility of the state. Where did actually the funds paid every month go? The regular funds of various taxes paid by the people to the state. Obviously not many of them were use by the satet to protect its people, and eventually the people had to bear the burden alone.

Spatial Planning Worsen the Vulnerability

Bantul and Klaten districts were the worst affected areas by the earthquake, both in fatalities and infrastructure. This was because the earthquake caused the fault between the rocks on the Opaque Fault (Sub-district of Kretek, Pundong, Imogiri, Jetis, Pleret, Berbah, Piyungan to Prambanan). The quake also shook Jiwo Fault zone in Klaten, including sub-district of Wedi, Gantiwarno, Bayat and Cawas.

The opaque fault is a fault line that extends to form Opaque River valley. This region is the border between geological formation breezy in the east and the geological formations zone of younger Mount Merapi sediments in the west. This fault is active for about 12 kilometers, while the fault extends from Sanden, Bantul to Tulung, Klaten by 60 kilometers (see Map Fault in Appendix 2).

The impact earthquakes was huge along and around the Opaque Fault. The question is, were the local government and community aware of the existence of this fault? To answer that, we need to look at the documents of Spatial Planning, the reference for the development of Bantul District.

The last review of Bantul Spatial Planning was done in 1999/2000 by the National Development Planning Research Centre of Gajah Mada University. It was reported that the planning approach used was a comprehensive and integrated development planning. While the use of the space allocation plan utilized the development concept of *Corridor and Radial Concrencrict Development*. It means the development refers to the development of higher level of development center with higher rate of services and frequency of activity. Here are the excerpts of the results of review of Bantul District Spatial Pland on Disaster Prone Areas.⁶⁴

"Disaster-prone areas in Bantul regency caused by landslides and erosion. Natural disasters like erosion and lanslide occured on Baturagung mountains, and erosion occurred in limestone mountains. The disaster-prone areas extended in almost all areas of hills and mountains with the areas of 179 ha, or 0.353% of Bantul's total area. The policy of space utilization in disaster-prone areas is prioritized for stabilization of areas prone to natural disasters, in order to protect humans and their activities from disaster".

If indeed the planning was a comprehensive and integrated approach to development, why not calculated the potential threat of an earthquake? It was clear that Java in general and in particular DIY is earthquake-prone region. The formulation of spatial planning by the National Development Planning Research Centre of Gajah Mada University did not include this information as one of the considerations. Was it in accordance with approach used? Or the job of preparing the Spatial Planning documents was merely a project?

The lack of complete disaster threats consideration in the preparation of spatial planning generated greater disaster impacts. In Bantul Spatial Planning, Piyungan Sub-district, as an area passed by Opaque Fault, was instead destined as industrial development

⁶⁴ "*Dokumen Peninjauan Kembali RTRW Kabupaten Bantul*" (Document of Bantul Spatial Planning Review), 2000.

area. As a result, the number of casualties was high, as well as severe physical damage. This was contrary to the direction of the development of the area as an industrial center, as designed in the Bantul Spatial Planning. The spatial planning maps also did not list the area as earthquake-prone areas (see Table 2).

The industry owners and people who live in the area were never aware of any threat of earthquakes.

Table 2. Disaster Data of Piyungan Subdistrict

Piyungan Sub-district

Source: Database of WALHI Yogyakarta.

Ironically the satet, as the most responsible party in such circumstances, was indeed not the right place to obtain assurance of safety for its own citizens. The great impact on all cases of disaster must add weight to the recovery efforts. This is the expensive price of an economic and investment policy-oriented. The people’s safety is not an important consideration, let alone used as the primary basis of development policy making.

Budgets

To understand the earthquake management, we need to see the 2007 budget draft of Bantul. The allocation of disaster management fund was widely used for personnel expenses and the purchase of goods/services. This usage was far from the hope of reducing the risk of disasters. The small amount of funds and improper allocation reflected the capacity and commitment of the state for the safety of the people. The disaster management fund was under *Kesbanglimas* budget, which the details can be found in Table 3.

Table 3. Budget Draft of Bantul District in 2007

No	Activity	Budget	Amount
1	Monitoring and POT Information Dissemination		
	a) Personnel Expenditure	17.010.000,00	

	b) Goods & Services Purchase	32.990.000,00	51.000.000,00
2	Post-Disaster & Flood Welfare Rehabilitation		
	a) Personnel Expenditure	25.600.000,00	
	b) Goods & Services Purchase	25.400.000,00	
	c) Capital Expenditure	4.000.000,00	55.000.000,00
3	Socialization of Natural & Social Disaster Mitigation of Bantul District		
	a) Personnel Expenditure	19.175.000,00	
	b) Goods & Services Purchase	25.105.000,00	44.280.000,00
4.	Staff Skills & Quality Improvement		
	a) Personnel Expenditure	10.040.000,00	
	b) Goods & Services Purchase	14.960.000,00	25.000.000,00
5	LINMAS Staff Empowerment on Disaster Management		15.000.000,00
	a) Personnel Expenditure	2.250.000,00	
	b) Goods & Services Purchase	12.750.000,00	
6	Quick Reaction Team Building		
	a) Personnel Expenditure	11.325.000,00	
	b) Goods & Services Purchase	35.030.000,00	46.355.000,00
7	Facilities and Infrastructure Improvement of SAR LINMAS		
	a) Personnel Expenditure	171.000.000,00	
	b) Goods & Services Purchase	9.610.000,00	
	c) Capital Expenditure	94.390.000,00	275.000.000,00
8	Skills Improvement of KORSIK Staff		

	a) Personnel Expenditure	26.325.000,00	
	b) Goods & Services Purchase	13.675.000,00	40.000.000,00
9	Firemen Preparation Maintenance		
	a) Personnel Expenditure		
	b) Goods & Services Purchase	24.260.000,00	
		92.740.000,00	117.000.000,00

The disaster management fund in the proposed budget of Bantul was still top down model. It showed how disaster management community did not place the community as one of the important actors. The strengthening of skills and capacity was were designated more for government agencies. Ironically the format of activities were not systematic and sustainable.

The budget darfat did put the community as the main actors in disaster management. The vulnerability of community had not been a priority in the development of disaster risk reduction. The activities to map the type and character of hazards were also not specifically mentioned in the proposed budget. The absence of budgets for items mentioned above could be regarded as a guarantee that such activity would not be performed.

The activities listed were merely a formality. Disaster risk reduction in development was just and idea. In the end, the people must be prepared again to become victims of future disasters.

If we compared with other post in Bantul District 2006 budget, the proposed amount for disaster management was actually small, for example compared with the General Administration Expenses amounting to Rp 1,623,192,700. The same case happened at the central government. In the 2006 budget, the fund was allocated only for disaster relief activities. The disaster risk reduction in development performed by government departments also did not clearly stated their disaster risk reduction perspective.

The earthquake catastrophe in Yogyakarta and Central Java and post-tsunami Aceh were the evidence of Indonesia as a disaster-prone areas. But, like Aceh, the handling of the May 27 earthquake was a reflection that any disaster hazards in Indonesia had always been a disaster designated for the common people. The stories of Yogyakarta and Central Java people who took part in dealing with the impact of the earthquake were the picture of how the government always absence on any catastrophic event.

The community efforts to meet their own needs during the disaster and post-disaster was like a portrait of the citizens who subsidized the state. The government was always absent when the people were at survival situation. The people's safety were the responsibility of themselves, although they live in a country that continued to collect various taxes from its citizens.

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CHAPTER 9

LAPINDO - Jer Basuki (ku) Mawa Bea (mu)⁶⁵

This chapter will present how bad the management of Indonesian oil and gas sector. Only by one single accident at one well four villages sunk. In addition, a total of 13 adjacent villages suffered similar risks and impacts. Without any benefit from the presence of the oil and gas wells, the dense settlement areas in Sidoarjo were gone. People were forced to lost their living space.

⁶⁵ This chapter is the development of a paper by the author (Vinsen Santoso) submitted to the Journal of Business Watch Indonesia (BWI) with the title *“Harga Industrialisasi Sektor Migas- Semburan Lumpur Lapindo sebagai Kelemahan Negara dalam Menghadapi Korporasi Esktratif Hidrokarban”* (The Price of Gas & Oil Industrialization-Lapindo Mudflow as State Weakness in the Facing Hydrocarbon Extractive Corporations), Issue VII/July - August 2007

The half-hearted management made the mudflow issue lasted until three years later (2009). The title *Jer Basuki (ku) Mawa Bea (mu)* means that something must be achieved with sacrifice. Such wise words was suitable to describe the situation of victims who had to wait without any certain time limit to regain their rights, while the company owner remains one of the richest man in this country. Yes, being rich over people's sacrifice.

Monday, May 29, 2006, was the worst day in the history of East Java Province. The world's attention focused on a smallest district in East Java, Sidoarjo. A district with 18 sub-districts and area of 71424.25 ha. The north side is bordered by Surabaya and Gresik, on the west by Mojokerto and Pasuruan in the south, as well as the Madura Strait in the east. As of the time of writing this book, the Lapindo mudflow volume was 150,000 cubic meters per day, gushed out of the bowels of the earth since the first blast on May 23, 2006.⁶⁶

Figure 1 Map of East Java and Position of Sidoarjo

Source: RTRW Jatim 2006-2020

The local people were stuttered because this region relied on manufacturing industry, agriculture, fisheries and trade services as the basis of economic development, not the oil and gas industry. The hot mudflow occurred because of careless practices in the oil and gas mining operations in Porong conducted by PT. Lapindo Brantas. The incident opened the eyes of local residents about the huge potential of energy resources in the region. Yet the government was not able to guarantee the development process provided the safety of the people.

The mudflow incident added to a long line of people suffering caused by ecological disaster in East Java. The cause was mismanagement of development. As a brief overview, a series of ecological disasters in East Java in the past decade included:

⁶⁶ Interview with Renokenongo community members, who became witness in the investigation of Human Right Commission in Surabaya.

- **Flash floods in Sitibondo (2000);**
- **The flooding in Mojokerto, Bojonegoro, Lamongan and Gresik caused by the overflow of Brantas and Bengawan Solo rivers (2001);**
- **Floods and landslides in the Hot Spring of Pacet Padusan, Mojokerto (2002);**
- **Flash floods in Mojokerto, floods and landslides in Sitiarjo, Malang District, and flash floods in Magetan, Tulungagung, Situbondo in early 2003;**
- **Flash floods in South Blitar (2004);**
- **Flash floods triggered by a landslide in the plantation area in Argopuro mountains Jember, East Java, in January 2006, then Trenggalek and Jombang followed with the same condition.**
- **Flash floods triggered by overflow of Bengawan Solo: Madiun, Ngawi, Bojonegoro, Tuban, Lamongan and Gresik in East Java, as part of similar condition in Central Java in late 2007 and still ongoing until March 2008.**

East Java ranks sixth in the number of gas reserves owned from the entire territory of Indonesia. The total proved reserves,⁶⁷ and potential ones estimated at 170.3 TSCF.⁶⁸ The order largest proven reserves are in Natuna (31.4 TSCF and potential 22.4 TSCF), East Kalimantan (28.8 and 22.5 TSCF TSCF), Papua (14.6 TSCF - 9.3 TSCF), South Sumatra (7.5 TSCF - 7.4 TSCF), Aceh (3.7 TSCF - 6.7 TSCF), West Java (3.4 TSCF - 4.4 TSCF), East

⁶⁷ Identified estimation of amount of oil and gas that can be extracted from the fields based on economic conditions and existing operational capacities. Determined based on the results of drilling, production and trend patterns. Source: <http://www.theresourceinvestor.com/RI-archive/gloss-oil.html#P>

⁶⁸ Trillion (million million) standard cubic feet of gas or trillion standard cubic feet of gas.

Java (2.0 TSCF - 3 , 2 TSCF). Followed by South Sulawesi, Central Sumatra, and Northern Sumatra, each with proven and potential reserves of less than one percent.⁶⁹

Table 1. Gas Reserves in Indonesia, Data of Jatam

Natural Gas Reserves Distribution Status, 2000 (TSCF)

Location	Proven	Potential	Total
Aceh	3.7	6.7	10.4
North Sumatra	1.3	0.3	1.6
Natuna	31.4	22.4	53.8
Central Sumatra	0.3	0.3	0.6
South Sumatra	7.5	7.4	14.9
West Java	4.4	3.4	7.8
East Java	2.0	3.2	5.2
East Kalimantan	28.8	22.5	51.3
South Sulawesi	0.7	0.1	0.8
Irian Jaya	14.6	9.3	23.9
Total	94.7	75.6	170.3

Source: Ditjen MIGAS

The above information was never comprehensively presented to the public of East Java. This information was only known and circulated among a handful of parties, such as the capital owner (corporations), government elites and politicians. East Java Spatial Plan document made no mention of the potential content of the gas in the region. In the process of land acquisition by PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc. in 1996,⁷⁰ villagers of Renokenongo misled by

⁶⁹ 2000 BP Oil and Gas Report

⁷⁰ WALHI JATIM, Lapindo Internal Investigation Report, 2006

the information that the industrial activities that the company would do was a chicken farm. The question is, why the gas exploration operations should be such a mystery?

Sidoarjo saved the huge contents of gas in addition to the area of Mojokerto and Pasuruan. In the Brantas block, there were 49 wells, with 43 located in Sidoarjo, 4 in Mojokerto and 2 in Pasuruan included in the management area of PT. Lapindo Brantas, Inc. Lapindo began the exploitation activities since 1997, managing 21 wells that have had Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). While other 11 wells, including the Banjar Panji # 1 in Porong, were still in the exploration stage and preparation of the EIA process.

Figure 2. Concession Areas of Brantas Block (in map)

The mudflow until the end of 2006 had caused great harm to people in Porong and Tanggulangin. The eight villages around the well drilling of Banjar Panji # 1 managed by PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc., almost entirely submerged. The position of Sidoarjo at the center of four crosses of East Java, further added the economic hardship of East Java. Lapindo mudflow turned off the main transportation highway of Sidoarjo-Gempol Pasuruan that connected the West and East, North and South regions.

The victims were helpless against hot mudflow from the Banjar Panji # 1 which was increasingly widespread and uncontrolled. Some people suffered from mental pressure. Sidoarjo District government was in a difficult position, facing structural pressure from above and grassroots pressure. The manufacturing industry which had been a milestone in local livelihoods collapsed. The same case with the fertile region of Renokenongo Village, which had previously been the main provider of rice, disappeared by millions of cubic mud.

The suffering and helplessness compounded by the lack of clarity of state officials decisions with the situation. The state was also doubtful to act on PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc., which was the main cause of this prolonged suffering. What actually the state officials and politicians protected that they choose to sacrifice the lives of 24,500 people in the eight

villages in Sidoarjo?⁷¹ How strong PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc., was to make everyone shut up and went away? Or, was this the character of the oil and gas sector, who was at risk and should be prioritized over the interests of people's safety?

The Gas and Oil Rich of East Java

Java is an area with high potential of oil and gas. There are at least 14 hydrocarbon⁷² basins⁷³ containing oil and gas. Proven gas reserves were 13 TCF and that had been exploited by 2.5 TCF with the estimated value of USD 5 trillion. In 2003, the natural gas wealth has been exploited by the three corporations with sharing profit contract system between BP Kangean (with production of 175 MMSCFD), Lapindo Brantas (with production of 48 MMSCFD) and Kodeco Energy (production of 80 MMSCFD).⁷⁴

In early 2003, East Java filed a request for sharing on the results of its natural gas. As the owner of oil and gas exploration area, East Java felt entitled to 50 percent share of the oil

⁷¹ The number of victims in November 2007 and continues to grow (WALHI JATIM, Factsheet for Bali Climate Change, 2007).

⁷² Hydrocarbon reported to contain "backbone" or "skeleton" which is a compound of carbon and water (hydrogen) and other chemical elements that do not have elements that can lead to combustion reaction without the opposite effect. The majority hydrokarbon found in nature in crude oil, which is the decomposition of organic materials containing carbon and hydrogen in large quantities as a unified chain. See the Wikipedia definition of hydrocarbons in <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydrocarbon>

⁷³ Basin (geology) is very broad structurally layered rock formations arising from tectonic pressures of the previous flat layer. See the definition of geological or structural basin basin in Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_basin

⁷⁴ See JATAM (2005): "*Potret Eksploitasi Gas Bumi Jatim*", Portrait of the East Java Gas Exploitation.

and gas management. The official request from the Governor and Legislative Chairman of East Java was presented to President Megawati Sukarnoputri on January 2, 2003. On January 2, 2003, the Governor Imam Utomo and Chairman of Parliament Bisjrie Djalil sent a letter 545/12/022/2003 to President Megawati Sukarnoputri that proposed sharing of oil and gas management in East Java. To smooth the 50 percent demand, the provincial government formed a consortium of oil and gas management under the banner of PT Petrogas Wira Java, with the members were PT PAL, PT Barata Indonesia, PT Boma Bisma Indra, and Technology Institute of Sepuluh November (ITS).⁷⁵

As a comparison, the Cepu Block in Bojonegoro managed by Exxon Mobil and Pertamina. Blok Cepu covers two provinces, Central Java and East Java. Located in two districts, Blora in Central Java and Bojonegoro in East Java. The shareholding in the management of KPC divided between Exxon Mobil and Pertamina, in which Exxon⁷⁶ as the main operator in the management fo this block. Local Government was given a ten percent ownership stake to be be divided for two provinces and two districts.

List of Oil and Gas Companies in East Java

NO	COMPANY	BLOCK
1	Amerada Hess (Indonesia Pangkah), Ltd.	Pangkah
2	Anadarko Petroleum Corp.	North East Madura II
3	Camar Resources Canada Inc.	Bawean
4	Conoco Phillips (Ketapang), Ltd.	Ketapang
5	Easco East Sepanjang, PT	East Sepanjang
6	Energy Timur Jauh, PT	East Kangean

⁷⁵ JATAM, “Potret Eksploitasi Gas Bumi Jatim”

⁷⁶ WALHI East Java, *Factsheet Krisis Jawa Timur*, 2007

7	EMP Kangean, Ltd.	Onshore & Offshore Kangean
8	Husky Oil (Madura), Ltd.	Onshore & Offshore Madura Strait Area
9	JOB Pertamina – Medco Madura	Onshore Madura Island
10	JOB Pertamina – Petrochina East Java, Ltd.	Tuban
11	Knoc Nemone, Ltd.	North East Madura II
12	Kufpec Indonesia (Onshore) B.V.	Blora
13	Lapindo Brantas, Inc.	Brantas
14	Orna International, Ltd.	Rembang
15	Pertamina	West Madura
16	Pertamina EP	Poleng
		East Java Area – 1
		East Java Area – 2
		East Java Area – 3
17	PC. Muriah, Ltd.	Muriah
18	Petronas Carigali	North East Madura – IV
19	Petronas Carigali Karapan Limited	Karapan
20	Santos (North Bali) Pty, Ltd.	North Bali – I
21	Santos (Madura Offshore) Pty, Ltd.	Madura Offshore
22	Santos (Sampang) Pty, Ltd.	Sampang
23	Sebana, Ltd.	Bulu
24	South Madura Exploration Company, Pte, Ltd.	South Madura
25	Cepu Mobil Oil (Exxon)	Cepu

Figure 3. Map of Oil and Gas in East Java and Corporate Plot (Data of Jatam)

Most of the northern area of East Java has been plotted by oil and gas companies. With proven oil content of 150 million barrels and 133.7 million barrels of potential ones, East Java ranks sixth as a producer of oil and gas in Indonesia with a total of 283.7 million barrels.⁷⁷

Lapindo & Destruction of Living Resources

Lapindo mudflow is a portrait of chaotic management of the Indonesian oil and gas industry. A business which always carries the jargon of high costs, high technology and high risk, yet did not put those three things in balance.

High costs are the operating expenses for investment in oil and gas sector by the corporations. Similarly, high technology represented by the development of the mining technical procedures carried out by the expert and practitioners. But what about the high risk? In any business, it should be the burden of risk investment, so that would be the inherent advantages and disadvantages of being part of the risks of the corporation. The implementation of Environmental Management Act (Law No. 23/1997) requires the provision of EIA and waste management in any business that have an impact on the environment.

The high risk so far become the burden on the environment and communities where these activities are located. As an illustration, there are many industries that dump waste into the river. The rivers in Mojokerto, Sidoarjo, Gresik, and Surabaya are the evidence of bad practices of the industrial sector. The water quality in Surabaya region did not improve from year to year, even after the environmental regulation stipulated. The same case Lapindo Mudflow, which eventually reached a volume of 130,000 cubic meters per day. It became a devastating sledgehammer, not only for the environment but also the economy of the local

⁷⁷ Database Jatam Migas Jatim 2005

residents in the vicinity of the well drilling in Banjar Panji # 1 Porong. Even an impact on the regional economy.

Who should bear the high risk of oil and gas industry? First, it is the people who depend their livelihoods to the area that is now covered in mud (approximately 9,000 households). They are no longer able to use and cultivate the lands covered by mud. Second, the manufacturing industry (approximately 20 factories) which stops operation due to the mudflow.

Third, other sectors that rely on this region as the main transport axis between the eastern region of East Java (covering nine districts/cities: Banyuwangi, Situbondo, Jember, Bondowoso, Lumajang, Probolinggo, Pasuruan) with part of growth centers (Surabaya, Sidoarjo, Gresik, Mojokerto) and the northern part of East Java (Lamongan, Tuban, Bojonegoro). Southern part of East Java (Malang, Batu Blitar) also experienced the same issue to reach the provincial growth centers.

Fourth, the coastal communities in the downstream part of the coastal fishermen and farmers of Surabaya and Madura in Sidoarjo East Coast who depend on sea products and aquaculture if the sludge discharged into the sea through the disposal canals.

The success of Lapindo to drill the Banjar Panji # 1 was quite controversial. The resistance the Renokenongo people, Porong Sub-district, for the use of their areas for oil and gas drilling activity was indicated by the persistence to keep their lands not being sold.

The controversial history of land transfer started in 1996, through the local brokers and village heads who purchased the agricultural lands. At that time, the excuse used was for building livestock farm there. Yet it is awkward because why the land needed were very vast? The dynamics at the village level finally allowed the company's efforts to acquire the land for drilling wells.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ WALHI JATIM, Lapindo Investigation Report, 2006

Lapindo declared to have exploration permit already, which until today only the BP Migas and Lapindo knows. The same case with the principles of consent and location permit, only Lapindo and the Sidoarjo and East Java government who really knows the truth. This is due to the confidentiality clause and public limitations to access the document.

In the investigation, police had obtained the evidence of the 11 documents on procedures and documents of Lapindo drilling. The documents were including letter of drilling plans, drilling reports and system operating procedures, environmental analysis documents, environmental management efforts, environmental monitoring efforts, IMB, nuisance permits, location permits, emergency response permit and the results of the seismic survey. Yet no documents regarding the implementation of drilling exploration licenses granted by the government.⁷⁹

The hot mudflow had devastated the socio-economic and ecological communities in the Porong and adjacents. Until today the displaced persons were approximately 13,000 households (70,000 people). The ricefield and house yard areas of 1,000 ha covered with mud. The loss was not only suffered by the community, 20 industrial firms around the area were closed, with 3,600 people lost their jobs.

Based on data of PU Cipta Karya Sidoarjo the losses for school infrastructure reached Rp 22.5 billion, including elementary, junior high and high schools in Porong areas.⁸⁰ The New Market of Porong became refuge site especially for residents of TAS Kedungendo I and Renokenongo. The new market of Porong until the beginning of 2007 had been filled with

⁷⁹ Kompas, January 23, 2007

⁸⁰ “*Kerusakan Sekolah Akibat Luapan Lumpur Capai Rp 22,5 M*” (School Damage Because of Mudflow Reaches Rp 22.5 M)

<http://www.mediacenter.or.id/pusatdata/27/tahun/2006/bulan/12/tanggal/13/id/1296/>

Accessed on February 8, 2007.

5,951 people (1741 households). The number of displaced will rise as the impact of the increasingly wide mudflow. The place used for evacuation were the market stalls filled with some family or building booths only separated by fabrics.

The people were grouped in the stalls by the village where they came from. Each village the regrouped based on their RT (Neighborhood Association). This grouping facilitated the data collection, as well as the distribution of relief food aid when *Satlak* organized the catering for them. They fled to the market while waiting for the fund from the government to rent housing Rp 2.5 million/year, relocation money 500 thousand and *Jadup* Rp 300 thousand/month for each family given by the Social Service of Sidoarjo. After receiving the funds, they were expected to move from the temporary refuge site.

The problem was the assistance distributed unevenly and not all victims received them. Anxiety occurred between villages because some were prioritized over the other. Some also did not flee to the market, but directly went to their family in other village and some moved to new areas around Sidoarjo or Pasuruan. The scattered locations of the victims also weaken their collective spirit.

The changes in macro transport line also occurred. The primary artery line connecting Surabaya-Malang had been diverted since toll road was totally closed from Porong to Gempol, and vice versa. The heavy vehicles (trucks and buses) were sometimes diverted to go through Mojokerto. Surabaya – Malang that usually took about 2 hours, now up to 3.5 hours. The rupture of highway and high density caused the distribution of people and goods were facing serious obstacles. The Porong Highway now become a tiring path for drivers of trucks and buses.

Distribution of goods to the eastern region of East Java was also disrupted. From Surabaya to Pasuruan, Probolinggo and Banyuwangi (vice versa) have to go through the

Porong Highway. The transportation cost increased due to congestion and changes in transportation flows around Jalan Porong.

The changes in road flow also described how Sidoarjo as the main line of East Java was obstructed by the mudflow. Not to mention the process of redress for citizens whose land flooded by Lapindo mud.

In this situation, the person who had to face the most severe circumstances was Sidoarjo Head of District. As the person responsible for the territory, he faced two fold pressures, from above and below. The pressure from below was accommodating the needs of the mudflow victims, although the Presidential Regulation set out the process of land restitution and cessation conducted by Lapindo. Oftentimes people become injured party, that was where the role of Bupati needed to protect the interest of the people.

The Sidoarjo Head of District, Win Hendarso, resisted the plan of Lapindo Brantas who would only buy certified land owned by the victims. He required Lapindo to buy all lands of mudflow victims as agreed. This was supported by East Java Governor, Imam Utomo, and the National Land Agency authorizing the purchase of mudflow victims lands even without certificates. Win Hendarso considered Lapindo's demands to buy certificate land only as the company's efforts to avoid liability to pay compensation.⁸¹

The Governor of East Java, H. Imam Utomo, encouraged all head of districts/mayors from East Java to participate in thinking about the future of the mudflow disaster victims in Porong, Sidoarjo. If the sludge issue not resolved it could would disturb the economy of East

⁸¹ *"Bupati Sidoarjo Tolak Keinginan Lapindo (Sidoarjo Head of Reject Lapindo's Proposal)*

<http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nusa/jawamadura/2006/12/20/brk,20061220->

[89841.id.html](http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nusa/jawamadura/2006/12/20/brk,20061220-89841.id.html) Retrieved on February 9, 2007.

Java. Therefore it took the cooperation of the local governments and East Java community as a whole.⁸²

The losses caused by the mudflow so far are:

- **Land and livestock affected by the mud until August 2006 include: sugarcane land of 25.61 hectares in Renokenongo, Jatirejo and Kedungcangkring; rice land of 172.39 hectares in Siring, Renokenongo, Jatirejo, Kedungbendo, Sentul, Besuki Jabon and Pejarakan Jabon, as well as 1,605 of unggas, 30 goats, 2 cows and 7 deers.**
- **The factories were forced to suspend production and laid off thousands of workers, 1,873 workers were affected by the mudflow.**
- **Education facilities (elementary, junior) and Porong Military Post were not functioning, as well as damage to infrastructure (electricity and telephone)**
- **Damaged houses as many as 1,810 units. Details as follow: 1,810 in Siring, 42, 480 in Jatirejo, 428 in Renokenongo, 590 in Kedungbendo, and 170 in Besuki.**
- **Damaged public facilities were 18 schools (7 public schools), 2 offices (military command and Jatirejo village office), 15 factories, 15 mosques and prayer houses.**
- **Building and public facilities damaged is a school of 18 units (7 public schools), 2 office units (military command office and village Jatirejo), 15 factory units, mosques and prayer houses 15 units.⁸³**

⁸² “*Bupati/Walikota Ikut Pikirkan Lumpur Porong*” (Head of District/Mayors Participate to of Porong Mudflow) <http://hotmudflow.wordpress.com/2007/02/01/bupatiwalikota-ikut-pikirkan-lumpur-porong/#more-1562>. Retrieved on February 9, 2007

⁸³ “*Giliran Pipa PDAM Patah - Wapres: Tuntaskan Sertifikat Tanah Warga Korban Lumpur*” (Water Taps Pipe Broken – Vice President: Complete the land Certificate of

- **Due to the soil surface decrease around the mudflow site, water pipes of Surabaya Regional Water Company (PDAM) broken.**
- **Explosion of Pertamina gas pipeline caused by land subsidence due to mud pressure.⁸⁴**

The closure of Surabaya-Gempol toll road until an unspecified time resulted in congestion on alternative pathways, like Sidoarjo-Mojosari-Porong and Waru-Porong. The toll road closure also led to disruption of transport links Surabaya-Malang and Surabaya-Banyuwangi and other towns in the eastern part of the island of Java. This also had impacts on production activity in the Ngoro (Mojokerto) and Pasuruan, one of the main industrial areas in East Java.⁸⁵

In April 2007, the government established a new institution Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency (BPLS) to replace the Sidoarjo Mudflow National Task Force that term had ended. The new agency was established by Presidential Regulation No. 14/2007.⁸⁶ The government determined that the impacts of the sludge divided into two. The infrastructure replacement would be borne by the government, while Lapindo would pay for the social funds and termination of the mudflow. The Government got the approval from the House for the

MudflowVictims).. Kompas, Saturday, December 23, 2006. <http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0612/23/daerah/3195071.htm>

⁸⁴ “*Pipa Gas Meledak Diduga Akibat Pergerakan Tanah*” (Gas Pipeline Explodes Allegedly Due to Soil Movement), Metro TV Online/Breaking News. Wednesday, November 22, 2006 <http://www.metrotvnews.com/berita.asp?id=28428>

⁸⁵ “*Banjir Lumpur Panas Sidoarjo 2006*” http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semburan_lumpur_panas_di_Sidoarjo. Retrieved on February 9, 2007.

⁸⁶ Kompas Jatim, pp. J, Tuesday, April 10, 2007.

allocation of state-owned infrastructure improvements on state budget. This picture represented the transfer of Lapindo responsibility only on social losses, while the public infrastructure losses borne by the government.

According to the new regulation, the housing compensation after gas pipeline explosion reached Rp 2.3 billion. That number included 899 houses in the Renokenongo, 6,652 homes and 265 shop in Perumtas I, 768 houses in Kedungbendo, 76 houses in Ketapang, 73 houses in Gempolsari, and 31 houses in Kalitengah.⁸⁷

The data was after the Pertamina gas pipeline explosion. So it was different from the previous data as the chronological process was on going. Previously mentioned data was the data before the explosion. On the other hand Lapindo also indemnify paddy crops failure since July 2006 amounted to Rp 10 billion to 1344 farmers in seven villages.

Infrastructure losses to be borne by the government was Rp 7.8 trillion, including Porong-Gempol Toll, Porong-Gempol Arterial Road, Porong-Gempol Railway and Porong-Gempol Gas Pipeline. Indeed, the costs borne by the community were higher than those borne by the government and Lapindo. The whole infrastructure costs were borne by the state budget that in fact the budget of the people.

Astonishing findings of Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) showed the government, in this case BP Migas, had no oversight at all to the companies in the oil and gas exploitation. BPK showed with the repeated changes of ownership of Brantas Block management means the government did not conduct adequate oversight of contractors performance in exploitation of existing oil and gas blocks.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ BPK Audit, *“Ringkasan Eksekutif tentang Laporan Pemeriksaan atas Penanganan Semburan Lumpur Panas Sidoarjo”* (Executive Summary of the Examination Report of Sidoarjo Mudflow Handling) 2007

The same was done by Lapindo Brantas Brantas block as a contractor in performing the daily drilling report which were not submitted to BP Migas. BPK found at least from May 20 until May 31, 2006, there were only two reports submitted to BP Migas.⁸⁹ In the absence of these reports, it was very difficult to conduct a review of the drilling conducted. Although the authority to request that the document owned by BP Migas, Lapindo Brantas also have an obligation to submit them. But until June 4, BPK RI said the document were still not accepted by BP Migas.

BP Migas did not show any readiness to respond to such disaster. It was evidenced by the sending of a special team only performed on June 5, 2006.⁹⁰ Yet what BP Migas found was also not able to be resolved in accordance with the authority of BP Migas in the technical handling of emergency situation. The sub-contractor appointed by PT Lapindo Brantas, which was PT Medici Citra Nusantara, did not have the experience in oil and gas exploitation and only one time experience in drilling since 2001.⁹¹

BPK also found forecasts of losses caused by the mudflow burdening various parties (government, state owned company, private companies, and the community) from 2006 to 2015. The forecast costs borne by the state amounted to Rp 2.35 to 2.55 trillion; state own enterprise Rp 2 .1 billion, private companies Rp 1.01 trillion; and the community Rp 29.366 to 29.372 trillion.⁹² A fantastic number that could be obviously read how the people are the ones who have to bear all the burden of suffering for the stupidity committed by the state Lapindo in designing the oil and gas exploitation in Sidoarjo.

⁸⁹ *ibid*

⁹⁰ *ibid*

⁹¹ *ibid*

⁹² *Ibid*, hal 270

Brantas Block⁹³

Brantas Block controlled the administrative domain which includes seven cities/districts in East Java: Jombang, Mojokerto, Mojokerto, Sidoarjo, Pasuruan, and Pasuruan. There were 441 villages in 41 districts of seven cities/districts located in the block managed by PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc. It was stretching from the western Jombang and the eastern part of Pasuruan. All these areas are currently being affected by the mudflow in Sidoarjo district which directly in border with Pasuruan.

Porong

Porong Sub-district has 19 villages with a total area of 2,982 hectares. They have a variety of area with the narrowest one is 63 acres (Mindi) and the largest one is 632 acres (Plumbon). The total population in the area is 62,032 people, with 34,901 of them are women.

There were four villages directly affected by mudflow: Mindi, Jatirejo, Renokenongo, and Siring. The total area of the four villages is 420 hectares. Other villages located in Porong Sub-district: Kebonagung, Porong, Plumbon, Gedang, Juwetkenongo, Kedungsolo, Glagaharum, Kebalakan, Kesambi, Pamotan, Wunut, Candipari, Lajuk, Kedungboto, and Pesawahan. The entire area in Porong Sub-district is in a height of 4 meters above sea level (asl).

The rural areas that are currently affected by the mudflow had wider ricefield than dry land, except for Jatirejo and Siring. Mindi had 27 ha of ricefield and 36 ha of dry land; Siring with 20 ha of ricefields and 60 had dry land; Jatirejo, 35 ha ricefields and 66 ha dry land; Renokenongo, 108 ha of rice fields and 66 ha dry land. Mindi village had a population of 4,414 people; Jatirejo 5,659; Renokenongo 4,181, and Siring 2,039. The residents of the four villages were utilizing at least 2,588 wells, dug wells and pumps, as the main source of

⁹³ WALHI JATIM, *“Monografi Porong, 2007*

water. In details, Mindi had 672; Jatirejo 516; Renokenongo 897; and Siring 458. Only 620 people were listed as customers of tap water in 2005.

The main livelihoods were farm laborers, private sector workers, farmers, civil servants, military, merchants, artisans, craftsmen, and transportation services. The farm labors in the five villages were 473 people; private trade 2,022; farmers 617; military/Police 133 people; PNS 318 people; merchants 806; carpentry 292; craftsman 132, and freight services 102.

Jatirejo had 7 industries with 434 employees, Renokenongo 3 industries with 206 employees, Siring 7 industries with 539 employees. However, there were five craft industries in Mindi and Renokenongo with 54 workers who are still working or not being direct victims. In addition to the four directly affected villages, there were still three mudflow-prone more villages, they are Wunut, Glagaharum, and Gedang.

Tanggulangin

There were three villages in Tanggulangin Sub-district, out of the total 19 villages, affected by the hot mudflow. They were Kedungbendo, Ketapang, and Sentul. In addition to the three villages, there are four other villages threatened by the mud spills, Kedensari, Kalisampurno, Gempolsari, and Kalitengah.

Kedungbendo with an area of 159 ha had 5.3 ha of ricefields and 153.89 ha of dry land. For Ketapang, the total area of the village was only 134.4 ha. Smaller than the area of Kedungbendo with rice cultivation area of 46.39 hectares and the remaining dry land area of 88.6 ha. Another affected village was Sentul with an area of 204.37 ha, which consists of 144.05 ha of rice fields and 60.32 ha of dry land area. The total affected villages in Tanggulangin Sub-district was 498 acres.

Kedungbendo was the most densely populated village compared to other villages in the Tanggulangin Sub-district. The total population of the Kedungbendo was 22,833 people

and more than half were women. Most of the villagers utilized dug wells to meet the need of clean water. There were 5,674 dug wells in Kedungbendo, and 19 pump wells. The rest was the tap water users (108 houses).

The number of villagers in Sentul was only 3,259 people, that consisted of 803 households. Most of the Sentul villagers used dug wells to meet their daily water needs. There were 256 dug wells, 4 pump wells and no tap water. While the total population of Ketapang was 4,713 people, divided into 1,025 households. The main livelihoods of Ketapang villagers was private workers (2,506), agricultural laborers, farmers, civil servants, military, merchants, carpentry, crafts business, and transportation services. While in Kedungbendo, private sector workers (1,754), farming labor (49), farmer (12), civil servants (139), military (314), and traders (894).

Gempolsari had 4,339 population, with 1,018 private sector workers, 376 farm laborers, 191 farmers, 13 public servants, 540 trader, and and 491 carpenters. The rest were working in industry/craft business, transportation services, etc.

Jabon

The total area of Jabon sub-district was 6,224 ha, divided into 15 villages. The largest village was Kedungrejo village (1,324 ha) and narrowest one was Pejarakan (48 ha). Among the fifteen villages, three of them had been submerged by mud, Kedungcangkring, Pejarakan, and Besuki. In addition, there were two other mud prone villages, Keboguyang and Permisan. The mud prone villages areas were 1,108 ha.

The area of the three villages submerged by mud was 382 ha. It consisted of 257 ha of paddy fields and 125 ha dry land. The agricultural areas flooded with mud in three villages reached 146 acres, the rest, including houses, school buildings and public facilities.

The number of population Jabon Sub-district was 43.875 people, divided into 11,433 households. The main livelihood of most Jabon residents was farming labors 8,541, farmers 3,863, private workers 3,276, and the rest as traders, civil servants, military, and others.

Oil and Gas Industry, a time bomb for the collapse of a region

Based on East Java Spatial Plan (2006 – 2020), as set out in Regulation No. 6/2006 as a reference and basis of the East Java Master Plan, any kind of activities should be based on the pattern of spatial utilization. In general, the Spatial Plan Local Regulation stipulated the patterns of spatial use in two categories, Protected and Cultivation Areas.

The utilization pattern of the Cultivation including the patterns of settlement, agriculture, fisheries, plantations, trade, industry and mining, including the oil and gas industry in the management of the Mining Area. Referring to the utilization pattern of the spatial region of East Java, the mining areas regulated are only quarrying mining C type, not including oil and gas minerals type B.

East Java is a region rich in mining resources, especially mineral resources. Based on the distribution of minerals mine in East Java, it can be divided into three zones,⁹⁴ namely:

- North Zone is dominated by carbonate minerals, quartz sand, phosphate, gypsum, alumino silicate and clay minerals as well as oil and gas are found in Bojonegoro, Tuban, Lamongan, Gresik, Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan and Sumenep.
- Central Zone dominated by mineral aggregates and alumino silicates and clay minerals that can be found in the district of Ngawi, Magetan, Madiun, Nganjuk, Kediri, Jombang, Mojokerto, Sidoarjo, Malang, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Lumajang, Jember, Bondowoso, and Banyuwangi. Situbondo especially has sodium and sulfur rocks belonging to quartz sand group, phosphate, gypsum, and other minerals. Iodine mineral found in Jombang and Mojokerto.

⁹⁴ *Perda No. 6 /2006 tentang Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah (RTRW) Jatim 2006-2020*

- South Zone is dominated by alumino silicate and clay minerals, carbonate minerals, aggregate mineral, quartz sand, phosphate, gypsum, and other minerals that can be found in the Pacitan, Ponorogo, Probolinggo, Tulungagung, Blitar and South Malang. Metallic minerals are also found in the southern zone including Pacitan, Ponorogo, Trenggalek, Tulungagung, Blitar, Malang, Lumajang, Jember and Banyuwangi.

Based on the type of mineral, the mining in Indonesia divided into three categories, namely:⁹⁵:

1. **A Type Mining, including strategic minerals such as oil, natural gas, bitumen, asphalt, natural wax, anthracite, coal, uranium and other radioactive materials, nickel and cobalt.**
2. **B Type Mining, including vital minerals, such as gold, silver, diamonds, copper, bauxite, lead, zinc and iron.**
3. **C Type Mining, covering vital minerals, such as gold, silver, diamonds, copper, bauxite, lead, zinc and iron. C Type Mining, the minerals are generally considered to have a lower importance rate than the other two mining type, include various types of stone, limestone, and others.**

The north coast of East Java region is rich in oil and gas resources. Conflict of land use occur in the region because of the use of land for agriculture, fisheries, and residential areas, in line with the growth of the region. Referring to the East Java Spatial Plan the mining excavation designated only for C type. Meanwhile, the designation for oil and gas mining was not set in the plan.

Is the oil and gas sector is so powerful than any other sectors? Also indeed it was designated for mining, so why the of function could be that easy? Wasn't it a violation if the area suppose to be for other types of minings, not oil and gas and mining areas?

⁹⁵ Mining Law No. 11/1967

This was reaffirmed in a spatial plan of Sidoarjo (2006-2013), where Porong was designated for industrial, residential and agricultural area. The problem is the spatial plan has just been recently reviewed. But in previous Spatial 2003-2013, the designation shall remain valid for residential, agricultural and industrial areas. The changes or evaluation of the Spatial Plan 2006-2013 on Sidoarjo only decided after the mudflow occurred. Wasn't it something worth to be questioned?

Figure 4: Map of Land Use in Sidoarjo Spatial Plan

Source: *RTRW Jatim 2006 – 2020* (East Java Spatial Plan), East Java Spatial Regulation Annex Chapter IV, pp. 65

Note

In the Utilization Referral of Surabaya Metropolitan Area, Sidoarjo was included in the region. In Sidoarjo Cluster, it was obvious that Sidoarjo and Posrong designated for residential development, marked by the yellow map, and not intended for oil and gas mining. The east and west part of Porong, particularly Jabon and Ngoro, designated as industrial zone.

Obviously the oil and gas industry in East Java not included in the designated plan for Sidoarjo region, both regionally in East Java and smaller scope of Sidoarjo. More specifically, the violations of the designation that suppose to be for irrigated agriculture. Therefore clearly there was a violation of the designation of space for not complying with the initial planning. Yet another strategic area set up like military area, regional hydropower, and other PLTGU. This picture confirmed that oil and gas as strategic commodities number one in the world able to transcend the other designation. Such a silly reality in Indonesia.

The location of mudflow was in Porong, a district in the south of Sidoarjo regency, about 12 km south of Sidoarjo. The district is in border with Gempol Sub-district (Pasuruan)

in the south. The bursts location was only 150 meters from the Banjar Panji-1 (BJP-1), the gas exploration well owned by Lapindo Brantas.

The location was designated for residential areas and future industrial areas of Ngoro, in the west of Arterial Road and Industrial Estate in the Eastern side of Jabon Arterial Road. Not far from the location of bursts, there was Gempol-Surabaya toll road, Surabaya-Malang highway and Pasuruan-Surabaya-Banyuwangi (east coast line), and railway line of east Surabaya-Malang and Surabaya-Banyuwangi.

The wells initially planned to a depth of 8500 feet or 2590 meters deep to reach Kujung (limestone) formation. The wells would be installed with drill casing whose size varies according to the depth to anticipate potential of circulation loss (loss of mud in formation) and kick (influx of formation fluid into the well) before drilling formations penetrated Kujung.

In the initial design Lapindo "already" installed 30-inch casing at a depth of 150 feet, 20-inch casing at 1195 feet, the 16 inches casing (liner) at 2385 feet and 13-3/8 inch casing at 3580 feet.⁹⁶ When Lapindo drilled the earth layer to a depth of 3580 feet to 9297 feet, they had not put on the 9-5/8 inch casing as planned to be installed right in the depths of the boundary between the Lower Kalibeng formation with Kujung Formation (8500 feet). As such depths occurred (total loss of circulation) drilling mud loss and then the operator unplug the drill pipe. Kick happened and pipe stuck at a depth of 4241 feet. The pipe could not be moved up and down at all, then ejected H₂S, water and mud to the surface.⁹⁷

Failure of drilling prognosis also confirmed in Tritech Petroleum Consultants report to Medco Energy International Limited, as one of the owners of Lapindo Brantas. The report

⁹⁶ *"Lapindo Press Rilis ke Publik"* (Lapindo Press Release to the Public), June 15, 2006.

⁹⁷ Audit BPK RI, *Ringkasan Eksekutif tentang Laporan Pemeriksaan atas Penanganan Semburan Lumpur Panas Sidoarjo*, 2007

confirmed that the fault set casing at a depth of 9000 feet, 6500 feet and the back pressure from the depth of 4241 feet contributed to the loss of control of the well drilling.⁹⁸ It also confirmed that the lack of capacity of technical engineering team and Lapindo and Medici could be the driving factor, besides incompetent and incapable Lapoindo drilling team.⁹⁹

From the above data, it could be concluded that the incident of sludge discharge occurred due to negligence of PT. Lapindo in carrying out the drilling procedure. On the other hand, the state as a party giving consent and control to the business activity did not perform its responsibilities. To confirm this, a class action lawsuit was also filed by the Legal Aid Foundation and convened at the Central Jakarta District Court. In addition WALHI also filed legal standing and the case tried in the South Jakarta District Court.

The decisions of Central Jakarta Court and South Jakarta Court were indeed interesting. The decision at Central Jakarta Court in the lawsuit of Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation inferred an error in the drilling process. In the legal ruling the Judge stated:

"Considering that in this case the Council agrees with the Plaintiff that mudflow caused by the prudent drilling by Lapindo (Co-defendant) because the casing/protection was not totally installed that led to kick and eventually causing mudflows."¹⁰⁰

Despite producing the verdict, but the judge did not punish the perpetrators. This was because Lapindo and the other defendants have sought optimal efforts in the fulfillment of the rights of victims and stopping the mudflow. On the contrary, the Walhi lawsuit at the South

⁹⁸ Adam Neal Services, Causation Factors for the Banjar Panji No. 1 Blowout, September 2006

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Central Jakarta Court verdict No. 384/Pdt.G/2006/PN.Jkt.Pst, in the case of Legal Aid Foundation lawsuit in the case of Lapindo

Jakarta Court decided differently with the Central Jakarta Court lawsuit. In conclusion, the Lapindo mudflow caused by natural disasters, not because of drilling by Lapindo Brantas.

Under the consideration in South Jakarta Court, the Judge explained that:

"Considering that of the consideration due to the opinion of Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Ir. Rudi Rubiandini whose views have been silenced by the opinion of the Defendant's expert witness, Dr. Ir. Agus Guntoro, Msi, Prof. Dr. H. Sukendar Asikin, Ir. Mochamad Sofian Hadi and Dr. Ir. Dody Nawangsidi, and his opinions are not supported by documentary evidence of the Plaintiff, while the opinion of the expert witnesses the Defendant was matched with evidence of the Panel of Judges who argued that the mud volcano in the Banjar Panji 1 as a natural phenomenon not due to the fault of Defendant I."¹⁰¹

Walhi appeal and ultimately the decision of the Supreme Court (MA) confirmed the decision of the South Jakarta Court declared the government and Lapindo not guilty, as Lapindo mudflow caused by natural disasters. Actually, if we examine closely the two decisions was somewhat contradictory. The problem then, for the criminal case East Java Police also issued SP3 (Letter of Termination of Case Investigation) in the case of Lapindo. One reason was referring to Walhi civil lawsuit, that the cause of Lapindo mudflow is disaster.

Due to the flood, some parties were considered to be responsible for losses incurred as well as the survival of the victims. The parties were PT. Lapindo Brantas as considered to be the cause of the flood and government as regulator who provided the approval. On the other hand, the government function as watchdog of industrial procedures in the field was not functioning as it should. The responsibility of Lapindo rated as the biggest since they had to

¹⁰¹ Lawsuit Verdict in Walhi Case No. 284/Pdt.G/2006/PN.Jak.Sel

meet the demands above. Unfortunately the government eventually followed the scenario desired by Lapindo.

Learning from Lapindo case, until today the impact, directly or indirectly, was gigantic. Even until 2008, when this study is written, Lapindo ecological disaster can not be addressed and resolved. Economic losses and ecological values are not measurable, because the structure and function of social, economic and ecological as well as the culture has been severely damaged by the incident.

Closing

The East Java Spatial Plan (2005-2020) as a guide and Master Plan of Designated Zone should describe the area integratedly and comprehensively. Besides Java Spatial Plan function as control of territory to ensure the development and growth can be planned. In fact, the regional development did not include the use for mining, including oil and gas zones in the East Java region. Moreover, many oil and gas mining zones are included in the residential zones. Therefore, this is important note in corporate Lapindo mudflow disaster that cause environmental damage and destruction of social values of surrounding communities.

The note became a critical overview on the importance of East Java Spatial Plan as the master plan. The plan is not created and hidden for the corporate interests alone without looking at the social and ecological aspects. The implications and impact of the breach causes the regional economic, transportation systems and patterns of life became victims of violations. The exploration of oil and gas was being the entry point of the emergence of corporate disaster.

Therefore, the development of the oil and gas industry in East Java after the mudflow experienced social upheaval. In Gresik, oil and gas exploration by Petrochina in Lengowangi Village was opposed by the local community. Indirectly the public awareness was raised by the impact of Lapindo mudflow in Sidoarjo. From the aspect of regional vulnerability, the

vulnerable communities in East Java amounted to about 13 million people, located on the north coast of East Java to Madura Islands.

The destructive power of oil and gas industry should not be treated merely as impacts, because in reality that can be easily circumvented through compliance of administrative requirements such as EIA and other technical instruments. The destructive power was the fundamental characters of the mining industry, so the context of risk should not only deal with capital but directly related to the safety of people in the surrounding area of operation. Lapindo mudflow is a living proof that development indeed not intended to ensure the safety and welfare of citizens. The omission of PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc operation in densely inhabited areas, not to mention the fact that most of the production geared more for export than domestic needs.

As a comparison the countries rich in natural resources such as the Netherlands in 1970s, after the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea, they soon realized that it would raised new issues on the performance of other sectors. This phenomenon is known as the 'Dutch Disease' (Ebrahim-Zadeh, 2003). In overall, the extraction of natural resources generated a dynamic on two domestic sectors, natural resources and non-trade sector like construction industry, but with the cost of the worsening performance of the traditional export sectors (Humphrey, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007: pp. 7).

In the Dutch case, the performance deteriorated the manufacturing sector, whereas in developing countries, it is the agricultural sector that is worsening. At the level of East Java, it is important to see how the natural resource sector, particularly oil, devastated other sectors. Not to mention after the mining closed later on, other sectors will be getting more difficult to be restored again.

The destructive power of the upstream oil and gas sector is very visible in the case of Lapindo mudflow. At the same time the victims still have to bear the burden of everyday life

because there is no effort from the state to alleviate their suffering, for instance, by giving distinction of prices of basic commodities and fuel. Lapindo ecological disaster has tremendous destructive force that could paralyze the Sidoarjo and East Java as a whole. The profits are not designed to flow to the people in East Java, but the risk of harm imposed on local residents. In other words, the people subsidize the state and corporate externalities through social, economic and environmental costs. With such description, basically the state is not developing, but digging its own grave in brink of collapse, isn't it?

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